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Articles
Comparative Corporate Governance and the
Theory of the Firm:
The Case Against Global Cross Reference
WILLIAM W. BRATTON

*

AND
JosEPH A. McCAHERY

••

Professors Bratton and McCahery take up the main
questions addressed by the literature on comparative
corporate governance: whether national governance
systems can be expected to converge in the near future,
and whether the focal point of that convergence will be
a new, hybrid governance system comprised of the best
practices drawn from different systems. This A rticle
advances the view that neither global convergence that
eliminates systemic dif
f erences nor the emergence of a
hybrid best practice safely can be projected because
each national governance system is a system to a
significant extent. Each system, rather than consisting
of a loose collection of separable components, is tied
together by a
complex incentive structure.
Interdependencies between each system's components
and the incentives of its actors create significant
barriers to cross reference to and from other systems.
The cross reference hypothesis, zn contrast,
presupposes
divisible
corporate
governance
institutions-a world zn which one system's
*
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components can be adapted for use in the other system
without significant frictions or perverse effects.
This A rticle draws on models of monitoring and
blockholding articulated in the incomplete contracts
theory of the firm. Under incomplete contracts theory,
different governance systems have incentive structures
that entail different trade-offs-trade-offs between
ownership concentration and liquidity, between
monitoring and management initiative, and between
private
rent-seeking
and
activity
benefiting
shareholders as a group.
The trade-offs delimit
opportunities for productive cross reference. More
particularly, blockholder systems, such as those in
Europe,
subsidize
monitoring
by permitting
blockholders to reap private benefits through self
dealing and insider trading. Market systems, such as
those in the United States and Britain, regulate such
private rent-seeking toward the end of maintaining an
institutional framework that supports diff use share
ownership and liquid trading markets. It follows that
a legal framework conducive to blockholding may be
ill equipped to foster dispersed equity ownership and
thick trading markets, and that a legal framework
conducive to liquid trading markets may have
properties that discourage blockholding. This gives
rise to questions for law reform agendas on both sides
of the A tlantic. In the United States, proponents ask
for deregulation of controls on institutional investors,
looking to encourage blockholding and more effective
monitoring. In Europe, proponents ask for stronger
securities regulation, looking to encourage deeper
trading markets.
This A rticle suggests that each
reform program may lead to disappointing results
because neither assures conforming adjustments to the
pertinent actors' incentives.
A lternatively, strict
reforms that materially change prevailing incentive
patterns could perversely destabilize workable (if
imperfect) arrangements without assuring the
appearance of more effective alternatives.
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INTRODUCTION

In these globalizing times, corporate law ' s leading question is
whether there is a national corporate governance system (or
component thereof) that possesses relative competitive advantage.
The question arises in the wake of increased competition in
international product markets. Such competition is intense enough to
make it plausible to proj ect that the different systems pursuant to
which firms are managed and capitalized will become factors at the
margin of competitive survival. If only the fittest practices can
survive in the global market, it also becomes plausible to proj ect that
national governance systems will converge upon them and systemic
differences will disappear. Related questions about competitive
advantage and convergence to best practice come up in domestic
policy discussions in many countries. Concerns about local firms'
performance in international markets turn attention to alternative
governance practices identified in international comparisons: if
competitive advantage lies elsewhere, then domestic practice should
be reformed to follow the international leader.
An extensive body of studies addresses these questions,
identifying and evaluating national variations in management and
financial practices, industrial organization, and corporate and
securities laws. Unfortunately, even as these descriptions have
become thicker and more cogent, answers to the bottom-line
questions respecting competitive advantage have become more
elusive and convergence predictions have become more qualified.
Working hypotheses have changed rapidly, more in response to
external events than to developments in the discourse . American
observers early in the 1990s looked to Japanese governance practices
for guidance for the reform of their domestic market governance
system, then viewed to be in the throes of a productivity crisis. 1 Now
American observers comment on their system' s robust ability to self1.
See W. Carl Kester, Governance, Contracting, and Investment Horizons: A Look at
Japan and Germany, in STUDIES fN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE FfNANCE A N D GOVERNANCE
SYSTEMS: A COMPARISON OF THE U . S . , JAPAN, & EUROPE 2 2 7 , 227-28, 23 9-4 1 (Donald H .
Chew ed., 1 997) [hereinafter lNT'L GOVERNANCE]; Michael E . Porter, Capital Choices:
Changing the Way America Invests in Industry, in lNT'L GOVER.t'IANCE, supra, at 5 , 6-8.
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correct in the wake of external shocks2 and wait for signs of
American-style refom1 in Japan.3 The change in view corresponds to
the comings and goings of national economic distress: the United
States started the 1 990s in a severe recession that tested the resilience
of its corporate institutions; Japan has experienced an intensifying
economic and institutional crisis as the decade has progressed.4
Views about the likelihood of convergence also have changed.
Although some observers still proj ect convergence as an imminent
possibility, 5 many now offer reasons why convergence should not be
expected.6
Comparative governance has this tentative, reactive quality
because no one has any direct, empirical answers to its basic
questions.
It follows that the principal assertions made in
comparative discussions-claims respecting relative competitive
advantage, the appropriate course of national level law reform, and
the likelihood and shape of systemic convergence-cannot be
falsified. They can be evaluated only indirectly, through appraisal of
the theories of the firm and of competitive evolution that support
them. Unsurprisingly, the comparative governance literature holds
out alternative theoretical frameworks that support conflicting
hypotheses.
The theoretical approach commanding the widest acceptance
looks at present national regimes and sees suboptimal performance
2. See generally, Ronald J. Gilson, Reflections in a Distant Mirror: Japanese
Corporate Governance through American Eyes, 1 998 COLUM. Bus. L. REV . 203,205 ( 1 998)

(noting that American firms have learned Japanese lean production methods and that both
Japanese cross-holding arrangements and shop floor arrangements have come under
pressure); Amoud W . A . Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, Objectivity, Control and Adaptability in
Corporate Governance, in COLUMBIA LAW S C HOOL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY 223,
2 3 2-34 ( 1 998) [hereinafter COLUM. CORP. Gov . ] (discussing American adj ustments in the
1 990s).
3.

See, e.g., Gilson,supra note 2 , at 206.

4 . There is also striking evidence of American corporate success in the 1 990s. In 1 992
Japanese companies had a 1 7 . 5 % share of world profits and U . S . companies had 25%. By
the third quarter of 1 998 the Japanese share was 7% and the U . S . share was 3 8%. See Is the
Stock Market Too High?, Bus. WK., Jan. 25, 1 999, at 1 26 .
5. See, e.g., W. Carl Kester, American and Japanese Co1porate Governance:
Convergence to Best Practice?, in NATIONAL DIVERS ITY AND GLOBAL CAPITALIS M 1 07, 1 2324 (Suzanne Berger & Ronald Dore eds., 1 996) [hereinafter Kester, Convergence]; Kester,
supra note 1, at 24 1-42; Porter, supra note 1, at 1 6- 1 7 (expressing fear that signs of German

and Japanese convergence toward American governance will chill reform of American
system).
6.

See

MARK J. RO E , STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE PO LITICAL ROOTS OF

AMERICAN CORPORATE FrNANCE 2 3 8-39, 2 80-8 1 ( 1 994) which took the lead in articulating

this position in the corporate governance literature. There is an independent body of theory
that points in the same direction. See infra notes 1 03-25 and accompanying text.
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caused by the operation of political forces over time. It thereby
dismisses the possibility of evolutionary efficiency in its account of
the status quo. 7 But it nevertheless holds out a brighter future of
productive cross reference between the two prevailing types of
national systems: (a) "Market" systems, found mainly in English
speaking countries and characterized by widely-dispersed
shareholding and thick, liquid trading markets; and (b) "Blockholder"
systems, found with many variations in Europe, East Asia and most
other capitalist economies, and characterized by control in insider
coalitions or wealthy families and thin trading of non-controlling
stakes . 8 The assertion is that each system can and should learn from
the other: the failures of market systems can be ameliorated with
devices from blockholder systems and devices from market systems
can ameliorate the failures of blockholder systems.9 Restated as a
convergence projection, this cross reference hypothesis implies that
global competition will cause the emergence of a hybrid best practice.
It also suggests that we should assume in the meantime that the
market and blockholder systems possess equal competitive fitness . 1 0
7.

See, e.g. , Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 1 09

HARV. L .

REv. 64 1 , 643-62 ( 1 996) (describing path dependent evolutionary patterns in general and

corporate governance i n particular).
8. Systemic differences manifest themselves starkly in statistics on shareholder types,
with institutions being more prominent i n blockholder countries.
Germany and the
Netherlands (blockholder) and Britain and the United States (market) compare as follows:

Distribution of share ownership, 1993:

Germany

NL

UK

us

1 6. 6
3 8 .8
1 4 .2
7.6
1 .9
5.2
3.4
1 2.2

20.0
9.6
0.7
1 .5
7.9
5.5
0.0
54.8

17 . 7
3.1
0.6
9.7
34.2
1 7 .2
1 .3
1 6.3

50.2
1 4. 1
0.0
5 .7
20. 1
4.6
0.0
5 .4

85
57
22

22

13
6
1

Ownership of shares(%)

-households
-non-financial enterprises
-banks
-investment funds
-pension funds
-insurance companies
-government
-foreign share
-share of largest shareholder
>25%
>50%
>75%

CPB NETHERLANDS, NETHERLANDS BUREA U FOR ECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS, CHALLENGING
N E I GHBOURS: RETHINKING GERMAN AND DUTCH INSTITUTIONS 3 5 7 tbl . l 0.3 ( 1 997)

9.

See infra notes 8 5-89 and accompanying text.

1 0.

See infra notes 5 2-56 and accompanying text.
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The leading opposition hypothesis proceeds in the neoclassical
microeconomic mode to assert that market systems reflect the
operation of efficient evolutionary processes. Here product market
competition remains the causal mainspring but has a more powerful
effect, supporting an assertion that the systemic differences identified
as material in the cross reference hypothesis are irrelevant. It follows
that countries with market systems should avoid borrowing from
blockholder systems and stick to internally-generated governance
reform agendas. Convergence is a certainty from this perspective, but
takes the particular form of world-wide hegemony for market
institutions. 11
This Article advances a case for a third hypothesis. Under this
view, which follows from current microeconomic theories of the firm,
we cannot safely proj ect either global convergence that eliminates
systemic differences or the emergence of a hybrid best practice. This
is because each national governance system is a system to a
significant extent. Each system, rather than consisting of a loose
collection of separable components, is tied together by a complex
incentive structure.
Interdependencies between each system' s
components and the incentives o f its actors create significant bmTiers
to cross reference to and from other systems. The cross reference
hypothesis, in contrast, presupposes divisible corporate governance
institutions�a world in which one system' s components can be
adapted for use in the other system without significant frictions or
perverse effects.
As it makes this case, the Article makes two important
contributions to theoretical learning in the comparative governance
field. First, it draws on legal theory, economic theory, and the
pertinent empirical studies to highlight assumptions and analytical
infrastructure heretofore obscured in legal literature on comparative
governance. This results in a taxonomy of comparative governance' s
Encapsulated as "the corporate governance
leading assertions.
matrix," this framework imports transparency to this increasingly
complicated subj ect matter, facilitating a more neutral appraisal of its
conflicting positions.
Second, the Article draws on models of
monitoring and blockholding articulated within the incomplete
contracts theory of the firm, a body of economics not yet significantly
reflected in the comparative legal literature. Under incomplete
contracts theory, different governance systems have incentive
structures that entail different trade-offs-trade-offs between
ownership concentration and liquidity, between monitoring and
1 1.

See

infra notes 92- 1 03 and accompanying text.
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management initiative, and between private rent-seeking and activity
The trade-offs delimit
benefiting shareholders as a group.
opportunities for productive cros s reference. More p articularly,
blockholder systems subsidize monitoring by permitting blockholders
to reap private benefits through self dealing and insider trading .
Market systems, in contrast, regulate such private rent-seeking toward
the end of maintaining an institutional framework that supports
diffuse share ownership and liquid trading markets. It follows that a
legal framework conducive to blockholding may be ill equipped to
foster dispersed equity ownership and thick trading markets, and that
a legal framework conducive to liquid trading markets may have
properties that discourage blockholding. 12
The Article ' s analysis raises important questions for law
reform agendas on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States
proponents ask for deregulation of controls on institutional investors,
looking to encourage blockholding and more effective monitoring. In
Europe proponents ask for stronger securities regulation, looking to
encourage deeper trading markets. This suggestion is that each
reform program may lead to disappointing results because neither
assures conforming adjustments to the pertinent actors ' incentives.
Alternatively, strict reforms that materially change prevailing
incentive patterns could perversely destabilize workable (if imperfect)
arrangements without assuring the appearance of more effective
alternatives.
The analysis seconds the policy recommendations made in
discussions in the United States by neoclassical critics of the cross
reference hypothesis. But it does not simultaneously endorse their
theoretical presuppositions. The incomplete contracts model should
ultimately prove to be more compatible with the capacious framework
of reference developed by those articulating the cross reference
hypothesis. Both make second-best assumptions and recognize the
salience of political events. The difference lies in the underlying
theories of the firm. Proponents of cross reference assume that
improvements in governance institutions would be within easy reach
but for political barriers and historical path dependencies in the
regulatory pattern. Our analysis of the incomplete contracts model
challenges this diagnosis at the level of economic theory. Politics can
indeed explain why a governance system has not evolved so as to be
first best. But it cannot by itself show us how to improve that system.
1 2 . We do not claim to be the first commentators to make thi s point. See, e.g. , Curtis J.
Milhaupt,Property Rights in Firms, 84 V A . L . REV. 1 14 5 ( 1 998). But we believe this article
to be the first sustained exercise in the legal l iterature of describing and confronting the
economic theory supporting the point.

1 999]
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For that one needs an economic theory of the firm. 13 No economic
theory yet articulated shows us how to splice blockholder components
onto market systems so as to effect material improvement.
Part I of the Article recounts the results of the corporate
governance comparison, describing the elements that distinguish
market and blockholder systems.
Part II looks at comparative corporate governance' s
infrastructure.
Here we compare assumptions and
oretical
the
assertions basic to the cross reference hypothesis and the neoclassical
critique. We also draw on the economics of systemic convergence to
show the thin foundation underlying strong convergence predictions .
Comparative governance emerges as a debate over two closely-related
points. Participants make basic choices between (a) the strong and
weak convergence perspectives, and (b) alternative descriptions of
governance institutions as either divisible and fitted for cross
reference or indivisible and not so fitted. We plot these four positions
on a matrix that shows four contrasting perspectives and go on to
consider the taxonomy' s implications for corporate governance
debates.
Part III lays foundations for our case against cross reference.
Here we show how existing comparative studies confirm the salience
of barriers to cross reference-such as the shareholder free rider
problem in market systems and the provision of private benefits in
blockholder systems-without offering any cogent suggestions as to
how they might be overcome.
Part IV describes breakthrough applications of incomplete
contracts theory and highlights their implications for legal policy.
This theory teaches us that the market and blockholder systems '
contrasting features do not imply unexploited complementarities.
They instead should be read to follow from second-best choices in a
world of complex trade-offs. The model tries to work through the
trade-offs so as to show us what features we might see in an optimal
hybrid system. But the incentive problems bound up in the trade-offs
prove destabilizing to hybrid structures. Absent private benefits and
the incentives they import toward block formation, we can never be
sure that blocks will appear when monitoring is needed. Such blocks
as they appear will be unstable and will tend to be larger than
necessary, sacrificing liquidity even as they solve the monitoring
problem. Allowance of private benefits through self dealing and
insider trading solves these problems only to create new problems, for
13. Indeed, it needs to make referenc e to a theory of the firm to show that an evolved
system is deficient in the first place.
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there is no way to assure private benefits provision to an incentiv e
compatible degree. Finally, only a subset of firms will need block
monitoring in the first place.
Part V concludes that a system must go one way or the other,
either controlling access to private benefits for the purpose of
protecting its liquid trading markets or not doing so in order to
support blockholding. The theory of the firm holds out no solid
middle ground. Accordingly, the primary message of comparative
governance for domestic legal policy lies in an unsuspected quarter.
Market systems depend on legal protections for outside investors.
Blockholder systems lack these protections. Caution respecting their
diminution is the indicated course.
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COMPARISON

I.

This Part sets out the results of the governance comparison,
describing the interrelated strengths and weaknesses of the market
and blockholder systems and reporting on empirical findings. Bottom
line results tum out to be thin : We have no empirical basis for
ascribing comparative advantage to either system, and most observers
accordingly assume the systems to be equally competitively fit.

Elements ofMarket Systems

A.

Market corporate governance systems are characterized by
dispersed equity holding, 14 a portfolio orientation among equity
holders, and a broad delegation to management of discretion to
operate the business. Ownership and control are separated. This
leads to two chronic productivity disadvantages.
The first disadvantage is the shareholder-management agency
problem. Collective action problems prevent close monitoring of
management performance by widely-dispersed shareholder owners
holding small stakes. Imperfect performance incentives result for
managers, who may rationally sacrifice shareholder value to pursue
their own agendas. The classic case of this occurred with the
American conglomerate firms of a generation ago: M anagers built
large empires by making investments that yielded uncompetitive
returns and sacrificed shareholder value even as they caused the firm
14.

holdings.

In the case of some large firms, they are also characterized by dispersed debt

1 999]
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to growY Market systems provide three corrective mechanisms to
address this management incentive problem and ameliorate the
structural barrier to direct shareholder oversight. These are the hostile
takeover, derivative lawsuits against management self dealing, 16 and
the inclusion of outside monitors on boards of directors. 1 7
The second productive disadvantage o f the market system is a
time-horizon cost that stems from the shareholders' tendency to rely
This problem has been
on short-term performance numbers.
attributed to information asymmetries. Management has superior
information respecting investment policy and the firm ' s prospects, but
this information tends to be either soft or proprietary and therefore
cannot credibly be communicated to actors in trading markets. 1 8 It
has been said that management as a result is disinclined to make long
term capital investments necessary for international competitiveness.
The problem becomes more severe as the takeover deterrent becomes
more vigorous, causing managers to look for quick fixes to keep the
shareholders satisfied. 19 To restate this point in more general terms,
market systems fail to provide clear-cut protections to managers who

15.

See generally Porter, supra note I .

Different national systems emphasize different protections. The United States at
present holds the derivative action for breach of fiduciary duty, whereas Britain holds out few
incentives to plaintiffs but maintains a more robust takeover market. See Geoffrey P. Miller,
16.

Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Some Points of Contrast between the United
States and England, 1 99 8 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 5 1 , 52-53 ( 1 998).
1 7. See Erik Berg!Of, Reforming Corporate Governance: Redirecting the European
Agenda, in ECONOMIC POLICY: A EUROPEAN FORUM 9 3 , 97-99 ( 1 997). Unsurprisingly, in

both the United States and Britain, studies on governance focus on how to improve the
operation of the board. See Stephen Woolcock, Competition A mong Forms of Corporate

Governance in the European Community: The Case of Britain, in
supra note 5 , at 1 79 , 1 8 3 .

NATIONAL DIVERSITY AND

GLOBAL CAPITALISM,

18. See Roe, supra note 7 , a t 649. Roe adds a third cost, a n industrial organization cost
stemming from American firms ' tendency to resort to vertical integration as the solution for
the commitment problems attending incomplete relational contracts with significant suppliers
and customers. See id. Full vertical integration implies the incentive problems attending and
deadweight costs of bureaucratized management. In the Japanese keiretsu (and to a lesser
extent in Germany), cross-holdings of shares between the vertically related firms ameliorate
the commitment problem without carrying the costs of full vertical integration. See Ronald J.
Gilson & Mark J . Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate
Governance and Industrial Organization, 1 02 YALE L.J. 87 1 , 882-88 ( 1 993).

Roe suggests that in market systems, stronger financial intermediaries "might have linked
related suppliers and customers with partial cross-ownership, but without tight (and
sometimes costly) vertical organization." Roe, supra note 7, at 649 . This pattern does not
occur i n Japan, where significant nonfinancial cross-ownership invariably accompanies
financial ownership. See Kester, supra note 1 , at 23 1 tbl. 1 . Nor would it appear to be
implicated in bank holding and voting patterns in Germany. See RoE, supra note 6, at 1 7 177.
19.

See Porter, supra note I, at 6.
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make firm-specific investments of human capital, 20 a failure due in
part to the systems ' reliance on takeovers, proxy fights, and
boardroom coups to control agency costs.
Market systems have countervailing advantages.
Their -.
shareholders can cheaply reduce their risk through diversification� .
Relative to shareholders in blockholder systems, they receive high:
rates of return. The systems' deep trading markets facilitate greater .".
shareholder liquidity. These capital markets also facilitate corporate. :
finance, providing management with greater flexibility as to the typ e
and sources of new capital than do markets in blockholder systems.21,
More generally, they provide an environment relatively more
conducive to management entrepreneurship, 22 as reflected in
increased investment in new technologies . 2 3 Finally, although market
system shareholders and their outside-director agents cannot acce ss
full information about firm operations, their very distance from
operations yields a countervailing benefit. Distance makes them
relatively immune to capture by the management interest and assures
objective evaluation of the information they do receive. 24 A practice
of objective evaluation means relatively fewer barriers to
disinvestment and related features of downside restructuring. 2 5
·

_

Elements ofBlockholder Systems

B.

Blockholder systems are characterized by maj ority or near
maj ority holdings of stock held in the hands of one, two, or a small
group of large investors. 26 In Europe, the largest block investors tend
20.

See Boot & Macey, supra note 2, at 219-24.

21.

See Bergli:if, supra note 17, at

113.

22. This point is developed in the abstract in the incomplete contracts l iterature. The
idea is that a more generous extension of discretion from capital to management promotes
innovation, and contrariwise that there is such a thing as excessive monitoring. See, e.g. ,
Mike Burkart et a ! . , Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm, 112 Q.J.
EcoN. 693, 693-94 (1997). For a discussion of this l iterature see infra notes 242-52 and
accompanying text.
23. See Is the Stock Market Too High?, supra note 4, at 126 (attributing recent U . S .
competitive success t o corporate-led transition to a n information-based economy).

supra note 2, at 225.

24.

See Boot

25.

Cf Porter, supra note 1, at

& Macey,

5, 11-12; Roe,

supra note 7, at 650; Gilson, supra note

2, at 216-17 (suggesting that the market system in the United States showed that it had the

flexibility to restructure in the 1 980s where the Japanese main bank system might lack
aptitude to respond similarly).
26. In Germany, 64% of large firms have a maj o rity owner, in France 59%. See Paul
Windolf, The Governance Structure of Large French Corporations: A Comparative
Perspective, in COLUM. CORP. Gov., supra note 2, 705, 725. See also supra note 8.
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to be individuals or rich families, with nonfinancial firms and banks
making a secondary appearance in some countries, p articularly
. Germany and Sweden. 2 7 Other European control blocks result from
cros s-ho lding arrangements among groups of nonfinancial firms. 28 In
the Japanese keiretsu system of blockholding, in contrast, individual
and family holders are not prominent. There blockholding means
",. ggregations of smaller blocks than in Europe, held by (a) clusters of
a
bank s having lending relationships with the issuer firm, and (b)
�-. clusters of other nonfinancial companies, in many cases in supplier or
'
'; customer relationships 29 with the issuer. These corporate holders
often belong to a formal keiretsu organization along with the issuer,
·

·

·

For a detailed report on blockholding patterns in

·

Germany, see TIM JENKINSON &

:" ALEXANDER LJUNGQVIST, HOSTILE STAKES AND THE ROLE OF BANKS IN GERMAN CORPORATE
·

GOVERNANCE (Center for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 1695, London
1997).

Following J. Zwiebel,

Block Investment and Partial Corporate Control,

62 REv.

EcoN. STUD. 161 (1995), Jenkinson and Ljungqvist assume three types of firm: (a) firms with
·many small blocks but without a controlling block;
small blocks; and

(c)

(b)

firms with one large block and many

firms with one very large block and no small blocks.

there are five economically significant block sizes in Germany:
can compulsorily acquire minorities shares;

(b)

Furthermore,

a 95% controlling party

(a)

a 75% super-majority block;

(c) a

50% block

that gives management control of the company; (d) a 25% block that gives veto powers on
corporate charter amendments and supervisory board changes; and

(e) a

block less than 25%

that gives protection against other, larger blockholders. The study shows that just under three
quarters of all German listed companies have a majority owner: 23.1% have blocks in excess
of 90% of their equity capital; 18.4% are super-majority controlled; and 30.5% have a simple
majority owner.
Only a quarter are not at least majority controlled by a blockholder.

Taking a closer look at

these 141 firms, they show that 86 of these firms have one or more blocking majority stakes,
where two or three such stakes would amount to majority or super-majority control. The
remaining 55 firms have no stakes in excess of 25%. 37 of these firms have one or more
disclosed non-blocking stakes while only 18 firms are widely held.
& LJUNGQVIST.

See generally JENKINSON

27. See Bergli)f, supra note 17, at 101 tbl.4. Financial advisors in France serve as
proxies for financial advisors to controlling shareholders. They also figure into complex
arrangements of cross-shareholdings among private French firms.

See generally

James A.

Fanto, The Role of C01porate Law in the A daptation of French Enterprise, 1998 COLUM.
Bus. L . REv. 97, 107 (1998); James A. Fanto, The Absence of Cross-Cultural

Communication: SEC Mandatory Disclosure and Foreign Corporate Governance,

17 Nw. J.

INT'L L. & Bus. 119, 184-85 (1996) (discussing French cross-shareholding practices in the
context of U . S . disclosure requirements applied to foreign issuers).
28.

See

Michael Adams,

Cross Holdings in Germany,

155

J.

INSTITUTIONAL &

THEORETICAL EcoN. 80 (1999) (pointing out that corporate cross-holdings are widespread in
Germany, that there is little information about the extent of the cross-holdings due to
inadequate transparency and that disclosure rules which are easy to circumvent, and that such
cross-holding promotes management entrenchment).
29.

This is not necessarily true.

Michael I. Gerlach,

See Kester, supra note 1, at 231 tbl.l, 234 tbl.2;
Twilight of the Keiretsu? A Critical Assessment, 18 J. JAP. STUD. 79

(1992) (stating that preferential trading patterns in Japanese industrial organization follow a
probabilistic rather than deterministic model).
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ameliorating collective action problems. 3 0
Blockholder systems, like market systems, leave manag ement
in charge of the business plan and operations.31 But large -b lo ck
investments imply a closer level of shareholder monitoring .32 In
addition, the coalescence of voting power in a small number of hands
means earlier, cheaper intervention in the case of management
failure.33 The systems' other primary benefit stems from the
blockholders ' ability to access information about operations. This
lessened information asymmetry permits blockholders to invest more
patiently.34 The longer shareholder time-horizon in tum free s
management to invest for the long-term and creates a more secure
environment for firm-specific investments of human capital by the
firm ' s managers.35
There are corresponding costs and limitations. Where the
blockholders are firms, internal agency costs can constrain their

30.

The Japanese system

also is

distinguished by

close ties

between financial

See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Cooperation, Conflict, and Convergence in Japanese Finance: Evidence From the
"Jusen" Problem, 29 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 ( 1 997) (describing how regulatory cartels
intermediaries and government regulators.

among government and private sector actors run according to informal norms and interlinked
decisionmaking institutions).

Keiretsu

cross-holdings are decreasing as a result of Japan's current economic crisis. At the

beginning of the

1 990s

approximately two-thirds of the shares of Japan's listed companies

50% and declining. Simply,
See Brian Bremner, Wanted: A

were held via cross-holding networks; now the figure is around
their members have better uses for their capital at this time.

New Economic Model,

Bus. WK., Nov.

3 0, 1 998,

some will predict movement to the market model,

at 44 . If the system survives the crisis (and

see infra note I 02

and accompanying text),

the question will be whether the groups reform when prosperity returns.

31.

In France and Germany the family owners employ professional technocrats to do

See

the managing, but significant links between the managers and the owners persist.
Windolf, supra note 26, at 722 .

32.

The incomplete contracts models show this formally.

accompanying text.

See infra

notes

2 02-06

and

For empirical studies that support the assertion that ownership

concentration can improve the control of management and therefore can increase the value of

Market Discounts and Shareholder Gains for
Placing Equity Privately, 48 J. FIN. 4 5 9 ( 1 993). See also Karen Wruck, Equity Ownership
Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence from Private Equity Financings, 23 J. FIN. ECON.
3 , 4 ( 1989) (studying transactions that change ownership and finding value increases
provided that the level of concentration is less than 25% of the shares).
the firm, see Michael Hertzel & Richard Smith,

See, e.g. , Masahiko
I, 14- 1 7 ( 1 990)
1 8, at 880.

33.

ECON. LIT.
note

Porter,

supra

Aoki,

Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J.
supra

(discussing Japanese financial systems); Gilson & Roe,

note

I,

at

1 0-1 1 .

34.

Cf

35.

More generally, there tends to b e a closer relationship between management and all

of the stakeholders.

When problems come up, stakeholders raise their voices when

difficulties arise, finding new managers instead of exiting.

1 83 .

See Woolcock, supra

note

17,

at
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.. effectivenes s as monitors.36 Indeed, whatever the identity of the
blo ckholder, its heightened oversight incentive does not appear in
practice to result in sharp oversight of management investment
Although closer proximity lessens the information
policy.37
, asymmetry problem, there is an accompanying increase in
·managem ent influence and loss of critical obj ectivity.38 Freedom to
make long-term investments thus often means pursuit of growth in
market share at the cost of a suboptimal rate of return on equity
investment.39 Trading markets in blockholder countries tend to be
thinner and less transparent than in market system countries,4 0 and
firms in search of financing encounter a more restricted range of
altematives.41 Meanwhile, the blockholders themselves give up the
benefits of diversification and, given thin trading markets, liquidity
and the possibility of easy exit through sale. 42 Finally, there is a
·

·

36.

See Roe, supra note 7, at 649.

37. The result is satisficing (as opposed to optimizing) behavior on the part of the
managers, but satisficing relative to a higher frontier of production for a given level of inputs.
See Kester, Con vergence, supra note 5, at 122-23.

38. See Boot & Macey, supra note 2, at 225, 237-38 (making reference to sources in
public choice and psychology).
39. See Porter, supra note 1, at 12-13. This implies that equity investors in firms in
blockholder systems settle for lower rates of return than do equity investors in firms
organized in market systems. In the case of corporate investors, the explanation is that
offsetting advantages lie in long term business relationships with the issuer. See Kester,
supra note I , at 227.
40. The comparative figures for Europe show this starkly. The capitalization of the
London equity market stays at 90 to I 00% of gross domestic product; in Germany and France
the figure is 20%, for Italy 16%. Britain has 2500 listed companies; Germany 600 (in 1991),
France and Spain 300-400 each, and Italy 200. See Woolcock, supra note 17, at 185.
41. For a summary of these points in the context of bank lending, see Raghuram G.
Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Which Capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian Crisis, 11 J.
APPLIED CoRP. FIN. 40 (1999). Rajan and Zingales compare relationship lending in East
Asian countries to arm's length borrower-lender relationships in market systems.
In
developing economies, say Rajan and Zingales, relationships facilitate reputational
enforcement-a necessity in the absence of reliable legal enforcement. The system discounts
the importance of transparency, which in turn protects the participants from potential
competition. The absence of competition and disclosure implies that few price signals exist.

See id.
42.

See BerglOf, supra note 17, at 96.

The parallel phenomenon in the banking sector is the loan at a below-market rate of interest.
But Rajan and Zingales offer an interesting explanation of this phenomenon as an incident of
a relational lending system in which loan terms result from negotiations rather than from
price signals in a marketplace. Given negotiations, the costs a borrower may face result from
the negotiations and may diverge from the lender's risk-adjusted cost. According to Rajan
and Zingales, in a second-best world an imperfection in cost terms may not be such a bad
thing. It may be that some firms are important and worth subsidizing because they create
social value. The lender, meanwhile, takes a long-term view on return on investment. In a
market system, in contrast, it is unlikely that a lender could make such a loan since it will be
difficult for the lender to extract his investment from the firm in the long term so as to justify
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shortage of loyalty. B lockholders, having sacrificed diversification
and liquidity, extract a return in the form of private benefits yielded
through self dealing or insider trading. Legal regimes in blockholder
states facilitate this quid pro quo with lax protection of minority
shareholder rights and lax securities market regulation. 43 This in turn
chills the development of robust trading markets.

Empirical Studies, Comparative A dvantage, and Equal
Competitive Fitness

C.

Which of the two systems, market or blockholder, has
comparative advantage? Most comparative governance discussants
decline to answer this question, preferring a working hypothesis of
equal competitive fitness. In part, caution dictates this position.
Relative productivity advantage is at bottom an empirical question.
Although there is an impressive and growing body of empirical
studies comparing different aspects of national governance systems,
the studies have not yet attempted to compare productivity.44 Instead
the studies use comparative data to try to establish causal connections
between shareholder protection practices and other structural aspects
of governance and finance. For example, one line of inquiry tests
national systems against a multipart checklist designed to measure the
level of investor protection.45 Items on the checklist include rules and
practices respecting shareholder voting, legal protections against
management self dealing, creditors' rights, accounting rules, and
enforcement practices. Application of the test shows that: (a)
common law countries provide the strongest protection for investors;
below-cost fmancing of the firm in the short term. Lenders in a relationship-based system, in
contrast, are able to offer below-market loans since they are able to absorb short run losses by
resorting to their monopoly power to extract above-market rates over the long run. Despite
these beneficial effects, the fact that relationship-based systems have little regard for price
signals makes them prone to the misallocation resources and severe economic problems. See
generally Rajan & Zingales, supra note 4 1 .

43 .

See Bergl6f, supra note 17, a t 96, 98.

44 . It may be some time before we see such studies. State of the art work proceeds at a
more general level. Compare Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence
and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 5 5 9 ( 1 99 8 ) (studying the connection between growth rates
and financial market development and finding that industrial sectors relatively more in need
of external finance develop more quickly in countries with well-developed financial
markets), with Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth, 8 8
AM. EcoN. REv. 5 3 7 ( 1 998) (showing that each of stock market activity and banking
development positively predict growth, capital accumulation and productivity improvements,
but that the size of stock market capitalization is not robustly linked with growth).
45. See RAPHAEL LA PORTA ET AL., LAW AND f rNAN CE 1 6-3 1 (National Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 5 66 1 , 1 996).
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·(b) France and similar civil law cou�tr� es pr.o':'ide the weak_est level_ of

protection; and (c) Germany and s1m1lar c1vi1 law countnes prov1de
The legal systems, thus
an intermediate level of protection.4 6
diff erentiated, are then sorted again in accordance with data
respe cting capital markets . There results a strong positive correlation
between the level of legal investor protection on the one hand, and the
size and depth of the national securities market and the prevalence of
dispersed shareholding on the other.47 Weak investor protection, in
contrast, corresponds with blockholding.48
Other studies show
46. See id. at 1 8. The study assumes that there are two broad traditions, civil and
common law, and goes on to analyze the rights of investors in 49 countries that have publicly
traded companies. It appears that relatively few countries have legal rules favoring outside
shareholders: only 22% mandate one share one vote; only 1 6% allow cumulative voting; and
only 22% allow voting by mail . See id. Creditors' rights present a more difficult picture. To
summarize, common law countries simply offer better legal protection for creditors.
Correspondingly, the French civil law countries treat creditors and shareholders poorly. See
id. at 24-25.
47. See Raphael La Porta et a!., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN.
1 1 31 (1997). The study confirms that common law countries have better access to equity
finance than do civil law countries. The differences between Britain and France are
particularly significant and strongly suggest that poor investor protection entails lower
liquidity and smaller markets. See id. at 1 137. S trong anti-director rights (as well as one
share one vote) are also linked to higher liquidity markets. See id. at 1140. The level of legal
enforcement and the origin of rules in common law are also correlated to valuation and depth
of both equity and debt markets. Economic statistics, such as the total capitalization of
equity held by outside shareholders, show that common law countries tend to have better
stock markets. See id. at 1146-48. The authors assert that these data confinn the view that
the nature of legal rules and their efficient enforcement are positively related to the size and
depth of a country ' s capital market. See also Asli Demirguc-Kunt &Vosislav Maksimovic,
Law, Finance, and Firm Growth , 53 J. FIN. 2107, 2134 (1998) (showing firms in countries
with both an active stock market and a well-developed legal system are able to obtain
external funds for faster growth).

48. The logic is straightforward: given weak legal protection, only voting control will
protect against expropriation by other equity investors. See Raphael La Porta et a!.,
Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 510 (1999) [hereinafter La Porta et
a!., Cmporate Ownership Around the World] . This study investigates the structure of the 20
largest corporations in 27 different countries, along with smaller firms (in order to maintain
consistency of size across jurisdictions). Its authors have chosen to bias large corporations
because it is these firms which are most likely to possess dispersed ownership patterns. Their
research shows that, based on a data set which included the ten largest publicly traded non
financial companies in the sample of countries tested and assuming a 20% definition of
control, that for large firms: (a) nearly 40% world-wide are widely held; (b) 30% are family
controlled; (c) 18% are state controlled; and (d) the remaining fall into different categories of
ownership. See id. at 491. The Berle and Means image of the firm with separation of
ownership and control dominates in Japan, Britain and the United States, while in the rest of
the world there are few firms that fit this description. In terms of firms with owners, the
principal owner types, as noted, are families and the state. It follows that countries with poor
shareholder protection have more concentrated shareholding (and vice versa). See id. at 49697. The study also finds that bank control is not common, showing up in only Germany and
Belgium. See id. at 502. B lockholding, however, is common, with blockholders employing
control rights devices and other instruments to limit the power of minorities and typically
participating in the management of the firm. See id. at 491. For an extension, see Raphael
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analogous correlations. The level of shareholder protection has been
shown to relate inversely to the size of the premium over the market
price per share paid for a maj ority voting block-higher premiums are
commanded in countries with weak protections.49 A direct connection
between strong shareholder protections and the volume of initial
public offerings has also been shown. 50 In contrast, relationships
between Japanese firms and their main banks have been shown to
result in reduced pain and easier financing during periods of financial
distress.51
What the studies tend to confirm, then, is the accuracy of the
casual description of systemic differences, advantages, and
disadvantages set out above . Subj ect t o a couple of prominent
exceptions, they do not purport to address the matter of comparative
advantage among developed economies. 5 2 One exception i s L a Porta,
La Porta et al., Trust in Large Organizations, 87 AM. EcoN. REv. 333 ( 1 997) [hereinafter La
Porta et al., Trust in Large Organizations] . This study starts with the proposition that trust is
needed to support cooperation in large organizations and accepts an empirical measure of
trust derived from a survey conducted worldwide. Trust is then connected to government
effectiveness (measured by investor evaluations), civic participation (measured by
participation rates) and firm size. See id. at 334. Statistically significant results obtain, with
higher trust countries having higher levels of cooperative success. See id. The lowest levels
of trust obtain in countries with high rates of membership in hierarchical religions. See id. at
336.
49. See Luigi Zingales, The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock
Exchange Experience, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 1 25 ( 1 994). Zingales shows a high (8 6%) premium
for control blocks in companies listed on the Milan exchange, against a world average of 1 0
to 20%, and a United States average of 5 .24%. See id.
50.

See id.

See Takeo Hoshi et al., Corporate Structure Liquidity and Investment: Evidence
from Japanese Industrial Groups, 1 06 Q. J. ECON. 33 ( 1 99 1 ); Takeo Hoshi et al., The Role of
Banks in Reducing the Costs ofFinancial Distress in Japan, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 6 7 ( 1 990).
5 1.

52. Their main normative message lies with developing economies lacking either
institutions of legal protection or blockholding. For a similar evaluation, see Andrei Shleifer
& Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance 52 J. FIN. 769-73 ( 1 997).
Jonathan Macey argues that the studies confirm market system superiority. See Jonathan
Macey, Measuring the Effectiveness of Different Corporate Governance Systems: Toward a
More Scientific Approach, 1 0 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 1 6 ( 1 998). We strongly disagree.
Macey cites results on control premiums and IPO activity, and also stresses the fact that
market systems have hostile takeovers. This all means, he says, that market systems are
superior in controlling agency costs . The problem with this argument is that it fails to
confront the results of the comparative exercise. Takeovers, for example, mean that the
market system has developed means to deal with the agency costs that result from dispersed
ownership. The comparison asserts that blockholding tends to prevent these costs from
occurring in the first place. The same comment can be made about the size of control
premiums. These reflect the presence or absence of legal protection; blockholder systems are
said to compensate for a lower level of shareholder protection by delimiting the agency costs
of the separation of ownership and control. It may be that market systems are superior
overall and that the results Macey cites are suggestive of that superiority. But that case has
yet to be made as an empirical proposition. At present, the only available support is the
lesser backup provided by a theory of the firm that privileges market institutions.

·
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Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer' s finding of no significant relationship
between per capita gross domestic product and the incidence of
widely-held firms based on a study of twenty developed countries. 53
An inference of equal competitive fitness arises.
The second
eption
is
a
famous
body
of
work
by
Kaplan
that
looks at
exc
management replacement rates in the United States, Japan, and
Germany. This finds no significant differences between the three
countries and both of these studies can be taken to imply equal
competitive fitness.54 The respective systems ' evolutionary survival
in the context of national product markets is another fact that (albeit
weakly) implies equal competitive fitness.55
The informal comparison, recounted above,5 6 provides additional
indirect support for the equal fitness hypothesis. Each system' s
weakness appears to b e matched by a systemic strength o n the other
side, and vice versa, as the tables illustrate. Table 1 shows, broadly,
that stepped up shareholder monitoring under the blockholder system
comes at the cost of thick trading markets and associated benefits, and
that thick trading markets exact a monitoring cost. Table 2 looks at
management policy and shareholder information levels and highlights
some points of tension in the comparison. Each system' s investment
minus is also its plus and each system' s investment plus is also its
minus. Thus the market system suffers from short-sightedness
because it sacrifices long-term projects to the demand for present
53.

See L a Porta e t al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, supra note 4 8 , a t 5 1 0.

54. See Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executives, Turn over, and Firm Performance in
Germany, 1 0 J. L . ECON. & ORG. 1 42 ( 1 994); Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executive Rewards and
Firm Performance: A Comparison ofJapan and the U. S , 1 02 J. PoL. EcoN . 5 1 0 ( 1 994). See
also Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette Minton, Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards:
Determinants and Implications for Managers, 36 J. FIN. EcoN. 225 ( 1 994). See also Colin
Mayer et a!., Who Disciplines Bad Management? (Tilburg University Working Paper 1 998)
(on file with author), which provides a complementary study of poorly performing firms in
Britain, comparing the activity of four sets of interested parties-existing holders of large
blocks of shares, investors acquiring new holdings, creditors, and non-executive directors.
The study finds a high level of board turnover, which it attributes to the initiatives of
creditors and the demands of providers of new equity capital. Outside directors perform a
weak disciplinary function and large blocks have little influence, with the exception of
holdings held by industrial companies.
5 5 . European commentators point to this as a reproach to American suggestions of
market system superiority. See Windolf, supra note 26, at 7 1 3- 1 4. For additional evidence,
see Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, supra note 47, at 2 1 20-23, which contradicts the
conventional wisdom that market depth matters for comparative advantage. Their study
shows that it is activity, or turnover, that matters in a comparison o f developed and
developing countries, rather than the market capitalization ratio. See also Raghuram Raj an &
Luigi Zingales, What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from
International Data, 50 J. FIN. 1 42 1 , 1 42 2 ( 1 995) (showing that debt equity rations are
roughly equivalent across G-7 countries) .
56.

See supra notes 1 �3 and accompanying text.
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shareholder value; meanwhile, the ability to deliver present
shareholder value is the market system' s plus. In contrast, the blockTable !-Monitoring Versus Markets
Blockholder
Market
Plus
Minus
Shareholder monitoring
Minus
Plus
Diversification
Minus
Plus
Liquidity
Minus
Plus
Shareholder legal rights
Minus
Plus
Thick trading markets

holder system suffers from an excessive growth focus because it does
not concern itself with shareholder value; meanwhile, these
suboptimal growth investments display the long-term time horizon
Table 2-Investment Policy/Information Asymmetry
Market
Blockholder
Plus
Minus
Short-term focus
Minus
Plus
Shareholder value focus
Minus
Plus
Long-term focus
Plus
Minus
Growth focus
Minus
Plus
Shareholder information level
Plus
Minus
Shareholder objectivity

said to be its plus. A similar plus-is-minus relationship prevails with
shareholder information.
B lockholding ameliorates information
asymmetries, but the proximity that opens this access implies
susceptibility to capture by the management interest and a loss of
objectivity. On the other hand, information asymmetries are more
pronounced in market systems, but shareholders (and director
representatives) at a distance from managers evaluate firm
performance with a clearer eye.
The literature explores the implications of the equal fitness
hypothesis in two frameworks. One framework looks to global-level
effects of competitive interaction among firms in international
product markets. The other looks to competitiveness in national
contexts. Part II recounts and expands on these discussions.
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FRAMEWORKS FOR C OMPARING C ORPORATE GOVERNANCE
S YSTEMS-CONVERGENCE AND NONCONVERGENCE, CROSS
REFERENCE AND INDIVISIBILITY

This Part proceeds as follows. Section A describes the
theoretical frameworks that facilitate proj ections of global
convergence as to the terms of governance systems. Contrasting
scenarios emerge. Some project a process of international cross
reference that leads to a new hybrid system composed of elements
drawn from both market and blockholder systems. Others assert the
primacy of product market discipline and dismiss comparative
governance policy inquiry as irrelevant, even as they assert
evolutionary superiority for the market system and proj ect its eventual
emergence in global competition. Section B describes a contrasting
analytical framework that projects persistent variation in national
institutions even in a global economy. This approach is informed by
social theory and second-best economics and rejects the technological
determinism that informs projections of a unitary, global capitalism.
It acknowledges the possibility of convergence, but at the same time
emphasizes matters that make convergence unlikely, such as the
embeddedness of national systems of production and political barriers
to governance reform. Under this weak convergence perspective,
comparative governance exercises have their primary bearing in
domestic policy contexts. In Section C , comparative governance
emerges as a two course menu. Participants make basic choices
between (a) the strong and weak convergence perspectives, and (b)
alternative descriptions of governance institutions as either divisible
and fitted for cross reference or indivisible and not so fitted. We plot
the four possible selections on a matrix that shows four contrasting
perspectives.
We then discuss the taxonomy' s descriptive and
normative implications.

A.

Comparative Analysis in a Global Framework: Strong
Convergence and Irrelevance

Many argue that the globalization of production, finance, and
trade is causing national economies to converge as to performance,
and national economic institutions to converge as to form. Global
competition will mean bigger markets calling for large and capital
intensive (but specialized) producers and necessitating cross-border
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collaboration among existing producing organizations. 57
These
producers will access capital in financial markets uncoupled from
national regulatory restraints.5 8 Innovative production technologies,
like capital, will rapidly diffuse to firms worldwide. 59 The same
should follow for corporate governance institutions.
Many examples of movement toward corporate governance
convergence support this prediction. Many of these follow from
cross-border investment and finance, including mergers and
acqms1t10ns. For example, hundreds of firms from blockholder
systems raise equity capital in securities markets in Britain and the
United States and in consequence must conform to stricter accounting
standards and incur ancillary regulatory costs. 60 Some of these firms
have also experienced pressure for American-style governance reform
upon the acquisition of significant ownership stakes by American
investment institutions. 61 Contrariwise, American producers acquired
by foreign firms have become subj ect to governance structures unique
to blockholder systems. 62
Additional evidence of convergence occurs within national
systems as they change to take on other systems ' characteristics. For
example, European securities markets have increased in depth in
recent years, partly due to the privatization of state-owned enterprises.
In Italy, for example, privatization has meant a dramatic increase in
the number of large-capitalization, widely-held corporations; between
1 995 and 1 997 the ratio of Italian stock market capitalization to gross

57. See Robert Boyer, The Convergence Hypothesis Revisited: Globalization but Still
the Century of Nations ?, in NATIONAL DIVERSITY AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM, supra note 5, at
47.
58. See Milhaupt, supra note 1 2, at 1 1 86-87 .
59.

See id.

60. At the end of 1 996 there were a total of 7 84 foreign issuers listed on NASDAQ, the
NYSE and the Amex. See Amir Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International
Securities Regulation in A World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA. J . INT ' L L. 563,
566 ( 1 998). The announcement of a dual listing tends to cause an increase in share value.
See id. at 634-3 5 .
6 1 . See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence i n Co1porate
Ownership and Governance, in COLU M . CORP. Gov., supra note 2, 575, 5 80.
62. The most famous example is the German two-tier board that governs the combined
Daimler Benz-Chrysler. See Chrysler Corp . , Proxy Statement: For a Special Meeting of the
Stockholders to be held on September 1 8 , 1 998, at 1 6- 1 7 (Aug. 6, 1 998) (on file with the
SEC) . See also Theodor Baums, Corporate Contracting Around Defective Regulations: The
Daimler-Chrysler Case, 1 5 5 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 1 1 9 ( 1 999) (explaining
the structure of the merger by reference to German law, in particular its constraints on both
forward and reverse triangular mergers, and the practice in German corporate law of creating
capital structures in order to protect firms from opportunistic dissenting shareholders) .

1 9 99]

COMPARATIVE CORPORA TE GOVERNANCE

23 5

domestic product rose from 1 9. 3 % to 3 1 . 3 %.63 One of these new
larg e- capitalization Italian firms has even been the victim of a
successful hostile takeover. Germany has seen a dramatic increase in
the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) of privately -held firms .
Its Neuermarkt, set up to attract start-up company listings i n the
manner of the NASDAQ, 64 will see 1 00 IPOs in 1 999. At the same
time, large capitalization German conglomerates are undergoing
American-style unbundling, selling off holdings in subsidiaries and
affil iates into the Frankfurt Neuermarkt.65
Meanwhile, governance reform by international cross
reference also has become an everyday topic in corporate policy
deb ates. The first prominent round of discussions on comparative
governance occurred in the United States in the early 1 990s,
prompted by a perception that shortcomings in domestic practice had
contributed to the failure of American firms in several key sectors to
compete successfully against foreign rivals. 66 Systemic shortcomings
were alleged-the market system had operated in the United States in
the 1 980s to favor short term increases in shareholder value and deter
long-term investment in production processes. As a result, Japanese
and German producers, which had invested more in search of growth,
had a product market advantage. It was thought that America ' s short
term bias had arisen as a perverse result of widespread hostile
takeover activity in the 1 980s. Ironically, by the early 1 990s, new
legal controls constrained takeovers, constraints that also deprived the
governance system of a principal disciplinary device. It was thought
that America therefore needed to look abroad for additional means of
agency cost control in order to reestablish a competitive position. It
made sense to make reference to the systems whose firms were seen
to be beating American firms in product markets-s y stems which had
not evolved to rely on takeovers. Thus, European and Japanese
practices of bank monitoring, cross holding, and blockholding
presented themselves as simultaneous correctives for both shmi-term
investment bias and the takeover' s decline.67

63. See John C. Coffee, Jr. , The Future as History: The Prospects for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U.L. REv. 64 1 , 665
( 1 999). This is still a small percentage. The figure for Britain in 1 995 was 1 32 % and for the
United States it was nearly 87%. See id. at 663.
64.

See id. at 664-65.

65. See Jack Ewing et al . , Enough Spin-Ojjs to Make You Dizzy, Bus. WK.
May 1 0, 1 999, at 68.
66.

INT ' L

ED .,

See Porter, supra note 1 , at 5-8.

67. Policy debates respecting participation of institutional investors in governance in
the United States provided an independent impetus. For discussion, see infra notes 1 44-62
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Today ' s Europeans return the favor, looking to the corporate
governance institutions of the United States to improve the quality of
boardroom operations and enhance the depth and liquidity of their
trading markets.68
Toward this end, the Italian government
and accompanying text.
68. Three prominent committee reports demonstrate the trend: England's Cadbury
Committee, the Netherlands ' Peters Committee, and France ' s Vienot Committee. The best
practices they recommend will be familiar to American observers.
(a) England. The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report of
the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Dec . 1 992) [hereinafter
Cadbury Committee Report] develops a Code of Best Practice based on a survey of the
financial practices of 200 firms in Britain. The Code addresses the design, structure, and
function of the corporate board. The Committee recommends, inter alia, ( 1 ) that if the same
person holds the positions of the CEO and executive director, then the board should be
balanced by the inclusion of a senior non-executive director substantially independent from
the CEO/executive director; (2) that outside directors have an important p lace on the board,
and should form and manage special committees on the executive director's compensation;
(3) that the board form an audit committee including at least three non-executive directors.
The mechanism of a voluntary code, which presupposes that companies that do not comply
disclose that fact, seems to have worked reasonably well in Britain. See Committee on
Corporate Governance, Final Report (Jan. 1 998) [hereinafter Hampel Committee Report]
(established to review the operations of the Cadbury Committee' s recommendations).
(b) The Netherlands. The Committee on Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance in
the Netherlands-Forty Recommendations (June 1 997) [hereinafter Peters Committee
Report] , sets out a l ist of forty recommendations for companies listed on the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange. The report provides, inter alia, ( 1 ) that the Dutch supervisory board be
given formal independence from the managing board in order to guarantee effectively that
the duties to shareholders are upheld; (2) that executive compensation for supervisory board
members should be linked to long-tenn investment in the firm and should not be tied to short
term results; (3) that supervisory board members not gain personally from their role on the
board; (4) that, toward greater transparency, the annual report should contain information
about backgrounds of board members, the number of shares held, and business relationships
with the firm; (5) that an audit committee or the supervisory board should monitor the quality
of external financial reports, ensure compliance with internal procedures, facilitate external
communications with auditors, and establish high standards with regard to audits.
This code, like the British one, contemplates that if a firm decides not to adopt a
recommendation, then it must explain its action. Moreover, the supervisory board is to assess
whether the auditors should verify the reporting of implementation of the recommendations.
Interestingly, a follow-up study prepared by an accounting firm shows that, although
companies have welcomed the Peters Report with open arms, they have done very little in the
way of adopting its recommendations. Meanwhile, the Dutch Minister of F inance has warned
that mandatory rules may be in the offing.
(c) France. Le Conseil D ' Administracion des Societes Cotees, Raport du Groupe de Travail
de l 'Association Francaise des Entreprises Pricees et du Conseil National du Patronat
Francais (July 1 995) [hereinafter Vienot Committee Report], like the British and Dutch
reports, emanates from the financial community. More particularly, it was appointed by the
Conseil National du Patronat Francais and the Association Francaise des Enterprises Privees.
Here the express aim is to assist small investors by providing greater transparency and to
assist foreign investors newly involved in the French stock market. The committee
recommends, inter alia, ( I) that the board produce a regular report on the activities of the
firm; (2) that there be at least two outside directors per listed company; (3) that boards form
committees to monitor the actions of management, select top executives, and set
compensation.
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promulgated a package of securities and corporate law reforms in
1 998 . 69 Japan has removed both process restrictions that inhibit
shareholder derivative actions 70 and legal restrictions on share
issuance that prevent issuers from including stock options in
m anagement compensation arrangements . 71
American-style
shareholder activism is also spreading.
For example, French
shareholders have been forming associations, initiating inquiries, and
que stioning entrenched practices. 72
The list of confirming examples, although impressive, does
not tell us much about the degree, character, and speed of the
convergence being proj ected. Cross-border stock listing and merger
and acquisition activity, for example, can continue to increase in
volume without entailing systemic convergence. The French or
For commentary, see Karel Lannoo, A European Perspective on Corporate Governance, 37
J. COMMON MKT. STUD . 269 ( 1 999) (recognizing a contradiction between, on the one hand,
the globalization of markets, and on the other hand, the insular nature of national corporate
governance systems in the EU, but acknowledging that the recent, gradual convergence in
corporate governance regimes, as reflected in the recommendations of the three semi-official
national committees, Cadbury, Vienot and Peters, constitutes adaptation to globalization).
69. These include increased disclosure requirements and a requirement of a mandatory
takeover bid by any person or group acquiring 30% or more of the shares of a publicly held
company. See Coffee, supra note 63, at 665-66.
70. See generally Mark D . West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative A ctions in
Japan and the United States, 88 Nw. U . L . REv . 1 436 ( 1 994).
71.

See Milhaupt, supra note 12, at 1 1 8 8-89.

Recent German reforms can also be cited. The Act on Control and Transparency of
Enterprises (implemented on May 1 , 1 998) seeks to increase performance of supervisory
boards, create greater transparency, and strengthen shareholder positions.
The new
legislation also facilitates performance pay (either through share buybacks or other schemes)
for management. At the same time, the Act attempts to limit the influence of banks on
voting. The Act provides that: (a) a bank must inform customers whose shares it administers
that their shares can be exercised by a shareholder association or by the bank; (b) a bank must
inform its clients when it holds 5% or more of the voting rights of a company or was
involved with that firm recently as a member of an underwriting syndicate; (c) a bank must
advise customers if any one of its managers or employees is a member of the management or
supervisory board of a firm in which the client holds stock. In order to implement these
changes, banks are required to take steps to ensure that their own interests do not influence
the voting rights of their customers (that is, to appoint a compliance officer). More
significantly, the Act, through new sec . 1 3 5 Is 3 Aktg, provides that a bank may not exercise
the voting rights of its customers in a corporation in which it holds 5% or more of the shares,
unless it has obtained specific prior approval or does not exercise its own voting rights;
amendments refer to the Stock Corporation Act. All of these changes could be denominated
as movement in the direction of market system regulation. For discussion of this legislation,
see THEODOR BAVMS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GERMANY: S YSTEM AND C URRENT
DEVELOPMENTS 1 7- 1 8 (University of Osnabruck Working Paper No. 70, 1 998).
72. See Oliver Pastre, C01porate Governance: The End of "L 'exception Francaise " ? ,
1 998 C O L U M . Bus . L. REv. 79, 8 6-88 ( 1 998). There is also evidence that the Italian
Parliament reacted to demands from foreign investors when it increased its disclosure
standards in 1 998. See Coffee, supra note 63, at 665-66.
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German company that avails itself of the New York or London equity
market remains rooted in its blockholder system of origin even as it
makes some governance concessions. Indeed, such a firm ' s very
resort to a cross-border transaction to raise equity capital
demonstrates the continuing salience of systemic differences. A
convergence event does occur when the firm consents to a change in
its governing rules. But this is convergence on a company-specific
basis rather than at the level of a national system. Managers of
multinational firms have for decades been making reference to
international sources and engineering changes in internal governance
processes that similarly imply convergence. In all of these cases, the
firm ' s home governance system continues unchanged. Note that
convergence events such as these occur in the new global venue-in
the world of transnational linkages generated by actors in the handful
of international business centers that provide financial and corporate
services on a global basis.73 The vast maj ority of such linkages, to the
extent they entail legal obligations, rely on conventional national
systems to guarantee contract and property rights 74 and to create and
define juridical corporations. Such global transactions and actors
interact with and influence national systems but have not as yet
fundamentally transformed them.
Other items on the list of confirming examples more directly
signal possibilities for the convergence of national systems.
Thickening trading markets and related law reform initiatives make
the German and Italian blockholder systems more market-like; the
United States' institutional investor movement seeks a more
blockholder-like environment.
Counter-anecdotes can be cited,
however.
The United States ' institutional investor movement
succeeded more in changing academic theory than in changing
embedded market system practices. Europe-wide law reform in the
form of EU directives related to insider-trading and disclosure of
significant ownership stakes has been hobbled by slow
implementation and indifferent compliance. 75
To catalog anecdotes, then, is to collect evidence of both
global convergence and persistent national differentials.
The
collected anecdotes provide little basis for projecting convergence ' s
degree, character, and speed. To move beyond cataloging and
73. For a fuller description, see
194-2 1 4 ( 1 998)
74.

See

SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DI SCONTENTS

id. at 1 99.

75. For a description of the difficulties with the transparency directive, see Coffee,
note 63 , at 669-7 1 . For a description of the difficulties with the insider trading
directive, see infra note 1 7 6.

supra

COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

1 999]

239

evaluate the anecdotes' meaning requires reference to a theoretical
framework. To make that reference is to encounter three schools of
thought, each supporting a different projection. The schools are: (a ) a
strong global perspective that posits a determinative causal link
between corporate governance institutions and the competitive
survival of firms in international product markets and stresses both
the importance of governance reform and the possibility of successful
systemic cross reference; (b) an irrelevance perspective that posits the
same causal link but dismisses the importance of governance reform
and the value of systemic cross reference; and (c) a weak convergence
perspective that emphasizes impediments to the realization of at-the
margin competitive dynamics at the global level and questions the
inevitability of institutional convergence. The strong convergence
and irrelevance perspectives are discussed below.
The weak
· convergence scenario and the closely related national framework of
comparative corporate governance inquiry are discussed in Section B .
Strong Convergence and Productive Cross Reference

1.

Strong globalization scenarios depict national economic
systems as firms competing in a frictionless world market that brings
national institutions to the margin that determines competitive success
or failure. Such a market does not in fact occur in the real world, of
course.
But, citing growing international product competition,
financial deregulation, and trade liberalization, many now hold this
global, at-the-margin model to provide a plausible basis for making
predictions about the future development of national economies. 76 A
series of projections follow. 77 Under the law of a single price, each
commodity should carry the same price throughout the world market
and production costs should equalize world-wide. Given free trade
and complete diffusion of technical knowledge, national productivity
levels and growth rates should also converge, even assuming
continued barriers to the movement of labor and capital.78
This model also proj ects that competition and emulation
among producers will lead to homogenous institutional settings.
Since coordination mechanisms, including corporate governance
76.

See, e.g. ,

KENICHI 0 H MAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD: POWER AND STRATEGY IN THE

INTERLINKED ECONOMY x-xiv, 1 6 1 -62 ( 1 990) (contending that national borders will be

smashed by a new world market lying beyond the capacity of national intervention ) .
7 7 . For a description, see Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law
or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 6 1 Moo. L. REV . 1 1 ( 1 998).
7 8.

See Boyer, supra note

5 7 , at 30-3 1 .
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arrangements, figure into produc tion costs, the viability � f the best
.
arrangements and innovatwns will be tested and proved m product
and factor markets. Rational actors responding to price competition
will seek to design or emulate optimal arrangements .79 Actors and
firms that fail to adopt these superior organizational technologies will
in the short run lose money and in the long run disappear. 80 Diffusion
of knowledge respecting the best practices will follow as a practical
matter from contacts among multinational managers, consultants,
lawyers, government actors, and academics. 81 Accordingly, the only
cognizable barrier to actual convergence to best practice comes from
government controls 82 like trade barriers and corporate governance
mandates. More generally, to the extent that convergence proves to
be slow or uncertain, it must be that government actors or rent
seeking interest groups are using resources generated outside of
markets to sustain distinctive national institutions.83
These predictions, if robust, imply a dividing point in the
history of corporations. We come to a moment-whether in the
immediate past, the present, or in the near future-at which
intensifying competition in international product markets for the first
time turns endowments derived from national governance systems
into factors relevant to firms' competitive survival.
Once this
industrial divide is crossed, the identification of a material difference
between two systems ' governance practices gives rise to the
possibility of, first, long-run relative competitive advantage for firms
organized in one of the systems (and disadvantage for those in the
other) and, second, a need to reform the system not presently
endowed with the better practice. 84 This comparison facilitates a just
in-time intervention that gives the firm or system with a comparative
disadvantage a chance to self-correct at an early stage in the history of
the global market.
Note also that crossing the divide causes formerly irrelevant

I.

,

1
-!

l

l!

1l

\

\

l1

l
I·
,

I
\
i

l

l

i

1
:1

J

79.

See generally id. at 34, 54.
Under post-war macroeconomic theory, given
competitive markets and the availability in each country of the same technology, each
country has the same growth rate. See id. at 34-- 3 5.
80.

See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 6 1 , at 565, 568-69 .

81.

See Boyer, supra note 5 7 , at 46.

82. See J. Mark Ramseyer, A re Co1porate Governance Systems Converging: The
A-Contextual Logic to the Japanese Keiretsu , in COLUM. CoRP. Gov. supra note 2, at 5 3 7 ,
544.
83.

See Suzanne Berger, Introduction, in
CAPITALISM, supra note 5, at 1 .

NAT!ONAL

DIVERSITY

AND

GLOBAL

84. These are not the only possibilities. The systems, although materially different, also
could be equally competitively fit. See supra notes 5 3-54 and accompanying text.
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differences in governance practice to start to bear on competitive
fitness. To see this, continue to take a neoclassical, first-best view of
the effects of product market competition, and assume further that
governance institutions bear on product cost and that national product
competition is keen, but that there is little or no international trade. It
follows for any given nation that domestic firms following inferior
governance practices have already disappeared or will do so
forthwith. To the extent that all surviving firms within a given
national system follow a common set of practices, the practices do not
lie at the margin of competitive survival even if they are inferior to
practices followed abroad. International product markets remain too
thin to bring them to the margin.
If we now change the facts and interpose expanding
international product markets, there follows a proj ection of a second
round of competitive testing in the global venue for the governance
institutions of firms organized within each national system. National
practices theretofore irrelevant to competitive fitness become
relevant.
No inference of competitive advantage in the new
international environment arises from the fact of national-level
survival. Identification of a point of difference between national
systems can as easily imply future competitive disadvantage as
advantage for a given set of national firms.
In a Coasean world, each competing firm would restructure
itself and the necessary adjustments would occur on an informal,
decentralized basis. In the real world, in contrast, law and political
processes will matter for the adjustment of corporate governance
institutions in the new global venue. Law influences shareholder
protection, agency cost control, and the investment behavior of
financial intermediaries and blockholders, and thereby the form and
relative effectiveness of governance arrangements of firms organized
in a particular national framework. It follows that law reform can
figure importantly in a given national system' s adjustment process.
Assuming no political barriers, it also follows that convergence to
best practice can be proj ected not only for firms' internal
arrangements, but for national corporate law regimes . 85
These strong convergence proj ections presuppose a high
degree of technological determinism. In the world they posit, all
firms face the same optimizing problems and seize on the same
solutions.86 This adaptive dynamic depends on an assumption of
85.

See

Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 6 1 , at 5 7 5 .

86 . Carrying this point out to its logical conclusion, the i mplicit assertion is that there is
a single optimal way of organizing production among a possible multiplicity of local optima.
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pervasive and high-powered incentives to innovate. This assumption,
however, challenges the equal competitive fitness hypothesis,
discussed above. 87 If the systems are equally fit, it could follow that
their differences, even their most prominent differences, are irrelevant
to productivity. 88 Consider the fact that the market and blockholder
systems share an inability to reduce the agency costs of management
to zero even as they treat these costs differently. By hypothesis, then,
each system could be reducing the aggregate of agency and capital
costs to roughly the same level at roughly the same cost. If all other
systemic costs and benefits worked out roughly equally, then the
differences among the systems would not impact on bottom line
results, at least until a change in the prevailing economic context
caused the situation of cost equality to change. In this scenario,
incentives to invest in innovative governance technologies cannot be
assumed: if nothing disturbs the equilibrium, corporate governance
does not matter at the margin. It follows that the strong convergence
proponent who subscribes to the equal competitive fitness view must
articulate a plausible scenario that highlights a generative incentive to
invest in governance reform.
The missing incentive lies encased in the prediction that
competitive evolution will result in a new hybrid system that adopts
the best practices on an international menu. 8 9 Proponents predict that,
given imperfections in both present systems, there will likely ensue a
process of borrowing and modification of components of existing
systems. Certain features of certain national systems will come to be
seen as possessing problem-solving advantages and come in for
widespread adoption. The incentive to adopt follows from the
ordinary stress to reduce costs felt by actors under competitive
pressure.
This is plausible enough, but one further operative assumption
needs to be highlighted. For governance cross reference to offer
advantageous solutions in which business actors willingly invest, the
existing systems must have divisible components.
That is, a
particular feature (or innovation) must be detachable from one system
and adaptable to another. 90 If the systems are in fact divisible, then
See Boyer, supra note 5 7 , at 4 7 .
87.

See supra notes 5 3-54 and accompanying text.

8 8 . One can reach the same insight by j uxtaposing the two systems a n d then viewing
both from the point of view of an observer in a Third World country. That observer sees
commonalties for the most part. See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 52, at 7 3 7-3 8 .
89.

See Aoki , supra note 3 3 , a t 23-24 . See RoE, supra note 6 , a t 1 87-94.

90. See Berger, supra note 83, at 1 2- 1 4. For a speculation as to the components of a
hybrid corporate governance regime, see Kester, Convergence, supra note 5 , at I 08-09 .
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the cro ss reference hypothesis emerges as robust. Policy discussion
should anticipate the hybrid' s likely composition so as to identify
barriers to its realization. Moreover, assuming intense global product
comp etitio n and no other significant frictions, the systems should
indee d converge in their broad outlines over time.9 1
Irrelevance and Market Superiority

2�

The connection just drawn between a strong convergence
and the cross reference hypothesis has been controverted by
nario
sce
an irrelevance contention following from neoclassical microeconomic
assumptions.
Chicago School critics suggest that governance reform by
· cross reference at best would be wasted effort and at worst could
injure market systems.92 They posit a global marketplace j ust as (and
perhaps more) competitive than that posited in the strong convergence
model. Here again product competition determines firm survival and
any governance arrangement that hobbles a competitor with excess
costs causes failure. But here it follows that firms not only must
choose optimal governance arrangements in order to survive, but that
governance problems take care of themselves in the long run. In that
long run, therefore, corporate governance policy inquiries are
irrelevant. 93 In the meantime, the differences between governance
Kester' s hybrid, inter alia, preserves some of the shareholder protections and high powered
incentives of present market systems, but contemplates informal ties among co-operating
companies as in Japan.
9 1 . It should b e noted that the cross reference hypothesis can be restated i n a weaker
form so as to allow for the persistence of national level colorations. See Berger, supra note
83, at 1 8-1 9.
92.

Cf Merton H . Miller, Is American Co1porate Governance Fatally Flawed?, in
supra note 1 , at 44-4 5 .

lNT ' L GOVERNANCE,

93 . This irrelevance point can b e combined in a unitary description with the irrelevance
point made above, in the text accompanying supra note 88, despite their different emphases.
For a first step, juxtapose the two stories: the first focuses on a structural feature of a first
best world; the second follows from the fortuitous possibility that systemic differences may
have equivalent cost implication s .
The juxtaposition highli ghts the point that neither
irrelevance story eliminates the possibility that systemic differences can have important cost
consequences for competing firms and national economies. A cost difference has the greatest
impact for a firm at the margin, where any cost disadvantage impairs its survival. Ironically,
the margin i s the base point for the first story ' s irrelevance claim, while under the second
story it i s the point of greatest relevance for governance difference. This i s because what the
first story makes irrelevant is less governance itself than governance policy talk. Talk
matters least at the margin. There the uncompetitive finn runs out of room to maneuver,
market practice identifies the most productive governance device, and no reference to theory
I s necessary.

Let us take a step way from the margin and introduce

a

small measure of room in which firms

244

COL UMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

[3 8 : 2 1 3

systems highlighted in comparative ,discussions are immaterial. !his
is because blockholder systems components and behavwral
characteristics can be explained by reference to the same
microeconomic model that explains the components and
characteristics of market systems. 94 Convergence at a substantive ly
significant level already has occurred. Differences obviously exist,
but these always can be accounted for as adj ustments to legal
barriers. 9 5
This two-sided irrelevance assertion is accompanied by the
claim that the United States' market system is substantively sound
and not in need of reform. 9 6 Proponents of cross reference, it is
argued, overreacted when they claimed at the beginning of the 1 990s
that recent legal constraints on hostile takeovers created a need to
look to blockholder systems for alternative arrangements to control
agency costs.97 Subsequent events have shown that the market system
has adj usted very well: takeover activity again breaks volume records;
new strategies for hostile tender offers have been developed; and
institutional activism has become a governance constant. 98 In the
alternative, it is admitted that the subset of hostile takeover activity
with different practices having positive cost implications can survive over an intermediate
term. Here the relevance of the comparative exercise depends on the observer' s point of
view. An observer with an investment or citizenship stake in one of the competing systems
might be quite interested to know whether it possesses the relatively inferior or relatively
superior practice. But if one changes perspectives and looks at the competing systems from a
general efficiency point of view, then the comparison loses its urgency once again. From this
point of view, any needed corrections are assured in the long run, along with the concrete
identification of the superior practice. Only if all systems produce deadweight losses due to
some shared perverse feature does this point of view counsel intervention at the planning
level.
94. Ramseyer illustrates this point with an historical explanation of the Japanese system
couched solely in terms of rational, self-interested responses to the national economic and
legal environment. See Ramseyer, supra note 82, at 5 3 7 , 546-47, 5 5 5 . Ramseyer admits that
the explanation is incomplete because it does not explain cross-shareholdings held by
nonfinancial keiretsu members who do not stand in a vertical supplier-customer relationship
with the issuer. Since the blocks of stock held by these firms are small on a percentage
basis-less than 5% of most keiretsu members-he dismisses the phenomenon as trivial or
symbolic. Id. at 5 5 7 .

Aoki provides a useful contrast t o this analysis. Here the same microeconomic perspective is
applied so as to highlight systemic differences. See Aoki, supra note 3 3 , at 1 8-24.
95. See Frank H. Easterbrook, International Corporate Differences: Markets or Law?,
9 J. APPLIED CORP. FrN. 23, 29 ( 1 997); Ramseyer, supra note 82, at 5 3 8 .
9 6 . See Ramseyer, supra note 8 2 , a t 540-4 1 (arguing that barriers t o hostile bids do not
reduce the diffusion of efficient governance strategies.). Cf Jonathan R. Macey, Italian
Governance: One American 's Perspective, 1 99 8 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1 2 1 , 1 24-25 ( 1 998)
(describing evaluative standards under which the United States emerges as first best).
97.

See infra notes 1 46-56 and accompanying text.

98.

See Boot

&

Macey, supra note 2 , at 232-3 3 ; Easterbrook, supra note 9 5 , at 24-25 .
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decreased in the 1 990s, but it is argued that the decrease does not
much difference. A potential acquirer with a better governance
ends up taking over the target one way or the other. If
regulation forecloses the option of a hostile takeover, then the
acquirer will win over r� cal � itrant members of the defending board
_
with side payments d1sgmsed as consultmg
agreements or as
takeovers
Hostile
obs.
j
accordingly are
paying
high
ive
stant
nonsub
not the only means to the end of bringing new governance strategies
.to the firms that need them. Friendly mergers and acquisitions can
sub stitute for them, with the sole difference going to the pattern of
distribution of merger gain. 99
Some commentators in this vein go a step further to argue that
market systems occupy a higher evolutionary plateau and are
100
Nothing in
intrinsically superior to blockholder alternatives.
99.

See Ramseyer, supra note 82, at 540--4 1 .

100. See, e.g. , Miller, supra note 92, at 3 8--4 1 ; Easterbrook, supra note 9 5 , at 26
(comparing Europe and East Asia to the United States i n the late nineteenth century); Macey,
supra note 96, at 1 23-29 (arguing that systemic performance can be gauged by reference to
barriers against self dealing and robustness of securities markets). Macey argues that there is
empirical support for this assertion. See Macey, supra note 96 at 1 24-2 5 . We refute this
claim in the text accompanying supra note 5 2 .

Rajan and Zingales pursue the superiority argument on a more serious level, in connection
with their discussion of the current East Asian crisis. As discussed, Raj an and Zingales
describe misallocations of capital in the context of relational banking systems, hypothesizing
that a relationship-based system works better in less developed economies where price
signals are less effective. They note recent work on the performance of United States
conglomerates abroad which appears to confirm the view that, despite resource misallocation
within the firms, these large groups perform better in less developed markets such as India
and South Africa. Raj an and Zingales attempt to develop a theoretical framework which
provides a guide to the circumstances supporting the emergence of a relationship approach
and the circumstances supporting an arm' s length approach. Under this framework, a
relationship-based system will emerge when there exists little investment capital and
contractabi lity i s low. In contrast, an arm' s-length system dominates when there exists
abundant capital and high-quality proj ects. Both systems are equivalent when there i s little
available capital but high contractability. Raj an and Z ingales posit that in this last situation,
the arm' s-length system will eventually replace the relationship based approach. See supra
text accompanying note 4 1 .
Rajan and Zingales employ their model to explain the recent crisis i n East Asia. Until
recently, East Asian economies have been dominated by the relationship-based model. Prior
to the liberalization of capital, most East Asian markets lacked sufficient capital even though
good investment proj ects were abundant. The opening of these markets saw a dramatic shift
of capital flows toward East Asia. Yet, these systems had few well developed controls in
place to monitor these loans properly. In effect, the East Asian economies reflected a
combination of high sources of capital and low contractabi lity, with the result that neither
system could operate effectively. In response, Western investors took a short-term view i n
order t o facilitate easy exit. The compromise was effective until the crisis emerged. The
crisis led to a massive retreat of short-term capital from these markets, since there existed
inadequate protection.
Rajan and Zingales argue that, while moral hazard and panic may have played a role, the
crisis should be explained by reference to the unhappy encounter of arm ' s length and
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economic theory makes this assertion untenable. It may be that the
market system does have superior properties of competitive fitness
and will achieve hegemony after a period of competitive struggle.
The convergence events cataloged above also can b e drawn on to
support this view. 1 0 1 Firms that opt to list in London and New York
in effect vote with their feet, seeking to lower their cost of capital by
bringing themselves in a market system context. In so doing they
resemble American firms that reincorporate in Delaware. Meanwhile,
to the extent that firms in market systems have a lower cost of equity
capital, they have a financing advantage in the emerging global
takeover market. There results a proj ection of long iun assimilation
of firms from blockholder systems into multinational firms with
market system parents. 1 02 As more and more firms from blockholder
systems adopt market institutions by these transactional means, their
systems of origin become less and less relevant. Presumably, such
marginalization imports an impetus for adaption of market institutions
through law reform. Arguably, we see the beginning of this in Europe
today.
On this view, present policy discussion in market system
venues should be directed to the preservation and enhancement of this
advantage. It also must be noted, however, that nothing in economic
theory guarantees the correctness of this evolutionary superiority
claim. If the equal competitive fitness hypothesis turns out to be
accurate, then the foregoing scenario does not work. All such
assertions lie at the level of hypothesis, pending the appearance of a
decisive empirical literature or the occurrence of the long run.
A point of tension between the evolutionary superiority claim
and the irrelevance claim should also be noted. If policy choices
respecting systemic structure are absolutely irrelevant, then, by
hypothesis, the Anglo-Saxon market system cannot meaningfully be
deemed to be evolutionarily superior. The systemic superiority claim
implies not only relevance for policymaking but an emphatic policy
agenda. Under this, the market system needs protection from forces
of interest group rent-seeking, protection that should be secured in
advance of the promotion of structural change inspired by reference to
the more primitive systems of Japan and Germany.
relationship-based systems. The flight of arm ' s length capital was rational given the options
available to investors. At the same time, Rajan and Zingales concede that East Asian
countries may have made a strategic error in accepting such large flows of near term capital
without developing adequate institutions to support the new financial environment. See Raj an
& Zingales, supra note 4 1 , at 44-45 .
101.

See supra no tes 60--7 2 and accompanying text.

1 02.

See La Porta et a!., Corporate Ownership Around the World, supra note 48, at 5 1 2 .
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B.

Weak Convergence and Comparative Governance in a
National Framework

1.

Barriers to Convergence and the Weak Convergence
Perspective

A third body of theory controverts both strong convergence
hypotheses described above, rejecting their technological determinism
even while acknowledging the existence and importance of the
emerging global markets. 103 This alternative approach also rej ects the
idea that a single production technology always must emerge as the
winner. 104 It instead posits that there may be more than one way to
solve a given technical problem. Expanding on this point, it also
suggests that there can be more than one type of capitalism: not only
may different national systems of production be functionally
equivalent and equally fit, but national differences may persist
indefinitely. 105
This perspective draws on social as well as economic theory to
depict national systems as tightly bundled packages of specific
resources, institutions, and legacies. The perspective does not deny
the possibility of convergence to best practice. But it asserts that
when such convergence does occur, such convergence does not
follow from the operation of a self-implementing mechanism like the
at-the-margin adjustment process described in strong convergence

1 03 .

See Kester, Convergence, supra note 5 , a t 1 08-09.

1 04.

For an example of this thinking, see

BUSfNESS SECTOR ADVISORY GROUP ON

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ORGANIZATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND

D EY . ,

GOVERNANCE: lMPROVfNG COMPETITIVENESS AND ACCESS TO CAPITAL
MARKETS-A REPORT TO THE OECD ( 1 998) (rej ecting a one-size-fits-all

CORPORATE
fN

GLOBAL

approach to
corporate governance, opting for pluralism and adaptability of corporate governance, and
recommending that nations adapt corporate governance rules suited to changing competitive
markets, formulate minimum standards of corporate governance designed to promote fairness
and transparency, issue voluntary best practices for boards to improve accountability,
encourage common principles for disclosure, and emphasize the impact that corporate law
rules have for private and public sector).
1 05 . A related point of view that favors centralization also should be mentioned. If
national-level sticking points will prevent convergence to best practice, then international
level coordination may be called for. See Paul Davies, Issues in Corporate Governance 1 4
(Presented at the Single Market and Company Law Conference, European Commission 1 997)
(on file with author) (addressing corporate governance in the European Community). Davies
argues that, given the central role of the EC in generating the conditions for effective
mobility of capital across borders, the EC should promote cross-community action by
coordinating the corporate governance requirements of national stock markets. Under this
approach, the articulation of common standards would be developed in a single EC
instrument. See id.
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theory. 1 06 Convergence instea d occurs with �n limits s et by natio�al
.
contexts. According ly, its effects are uncertam and vaned, dependmg
on precise confi gurati ons of markets, technical competencies, 1 07
property rights institutions, and related incentives. 1 0 8 Nor can we
safely assume that a best practice will emerge and be adopted
universally. A materially different national system can survive in a
competitive global market by finding a niche suited to its particular
endowments. 1 09 Alternatively, a national system may be disabled
from adopting a productive technical innovation because the
necessary implementing reform lacks political feasibility when
mooted in the context of a tightly-fitted set of national institutions.
Given barriers such as these, significant, context-breaking steps
toward convergence are most likely to be taken during the political
crisis that follows an external economic shock. 1 1 0
This picture of intermittent movement toward convergence
can be restated in the terms of second-best microeconomics.
Movement is intermittent because competition operates imperfectly,
hobbled by asymmetric information, contracting frictions, sunk costs,
increasing returns to scale, and public goods problems. 1 1 1 Instead of a
unique, global equilibrium, then, we should expect unstable,
punctuated equilibria. Convergence can indeed occur-but so can
autonomous evolution, partial catch-up followed by collapse, or
catch-up followed by forging ahead. Strong convergence predictions,
1 0 6 . There is accordingly no tension between this description and the contemporary
movement toward partial integration o f national systems in Europe and North America. The
conventional view of harmonization initiatives such as that of the European Union is that
mutually designed institutional structures facilitate the development of competitive
techniques in a more open marketplace. The European movement toward harmonization
assumes partial divergence, in that some countries will be slower in adapting common
standards due to their relative starting points.
1 07 . Technology is not a pure public good. Accordingly, its use depends on learning. It
follows that different producers will be differentiated in respect of their ability to learn a new
technology-accessibility may presuppose past experience, shutting out some producers. See
Boyer, supra note 5 7 , at 5 0 .
1 08.

See id. at 4 7 .

1 09.

See id. at 3 1 . This point derives from the observation of national product markets,
where the same product can be sold for different prices and domestic firms develop niches,
with different niches possibly calling for specific organizational forms. See id. at 5 0 .
1 1 0. See Berger, supra note 5 7 , a t 1 8- 1 9 , 2 1 . This theory appeared in the 1 970s i n
opposition to theories o f technological determinism and strong convergence articulated i n the
1 95 0 s and 1 960s by both Marxists and liberals. See id. at 2-3 .
I l l . Trade theory posits that free exchange causes factor incomes to converge without
also asserting convergence as to the form of the institutional arrangements of trading nations.
At the same time, international product competition can lead to several different equilibrium
results, some of which do not include institutional convergence. See Boyer, supra note 5 7 , at

5 1 -53.

1 999]

COMPARA TIVE CORPORA TE GO VERNANCE

249

meanwhile, credibly can be made only if special conditions obtain,
including costless availability of requisite technology, total
divi sibility of production institutions, and independent availability on
the part of each such divisible, systemic component. 1 1 2
This weak convergence perspective is supported by a body of
c omp arative studies of production practices. These antedate the
comparative governance literature by a generation, looking at the
shop floor rather than the boardroom. They show that during the
post-war era different capitalist economies developed fundamentally
different firm organizations to produce the same products. 1 1 3 The
different organizational patterns are accounted for as the product of
domestic interactions between political and social interests and
economic strategies. 1 1 4 These studies anticipated and paralleled the
governance literature, articulating a set of distinctions between
market-based production institutions in English-speaking countries
and societal and state-coordinated systems of Germany and Japan . 1 1 5
Additional support for the weak convergence view comes
from the endogenous growth school of macroeconomic theory. This
approach rej ects earlier models of technologically-driven convergence
of growth rates. It instead posits an endogenous model under which
each country' s equilibrium growth path depends on contextual factors
such as past investments in research and development and education.
According to this view, rates of productivity growth will vary from
country to country 1 16 and movement toward convergence can only be
expected given a base of similar educational endowments and
Given similar economies, convergence
technical policies. 1 1 7
1 12.

See id. at 3 1 , 5 5-5 8 .

1 1 3 . F or studies antedating the comparative corporate governance l iterature, see MARC
MAURICE ET AL . , THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF INDUSTRIAL POWER ( 1 986); RONALD DORE,

BRITISH

FACTORY-JAPANESE

FACTORY:

THE

ORIGINS

OF

NATIONAL

DIVERSITY

IN

( 1 97 3 ) . For more recent contributions to this literature, see MICHEL
ALBERT, CAPiTALISM VS. CAPITALISM ( 1 993); JAMES P. WOMACK ET AL., THE MACHINE THAT
CHANGED THE WORLD : THE STORY O F LEAN PRODUCTiON ( 1 990).
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

1 14. See Boyer, supra note 57, at 45-46 (discussing differentials in the manifestation of
Fordist production techniques as they diffused during the p ost-war period) .
1 1 5.

See Berger, supra note 8 3 , at 4 .

1 16.

See Boyer, supra note 5 7 , at 3 5 .

1 1 7.

I t follows that underdeveloped countries can become trapped.

See generally

GROWTH, PRODUCTIVITY, UNEMPLOYMENT: ESSAYS TO CELEB RATE BOB SOLO W ' S BIRTHDAY

(Peter A. Diamond ed., 1 990).
Empirical tests of convergence hypotheses focus on per capita measures of gross national
product. These applications of per capita gross national product measures have been applied
so as to yield productivity levels from the late nineteenth century to the present. The best
work models the convergence of income across regions, taking into account the interplay of
net migration pattern and economic growth. See generally Robert J . B arro & Xavier Sala-i-
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resp ecting produc tivity grow�h rates, in . fact, has bee� dem?� strate d
.
empirically. B ut the rate IS slow: g1ven s�rong similantles, the
underlying sp eed of convergence has been estimated at two percent
per year, meaning that it takes 25 years for similar economies to
reduce an initial productivity gap by 50%. 1 1 8
Martin, Convergence A cross States and Regions, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS IN ECON. ACTIVITY
1 07 ( 1 99 1 ); B ART VERSPAGEN, UNEVEN GROWTH BETWEEN INTERDEPENDENT ECONOMIES
( 1 993). The results support the proposition that convergence depends on similarity. See P.
Bairoch, Europe 's Gross National Product: 1 800-19 75, 5 J . E U R . EcoN. H I S T . 2 7 3 ( 1 976)
(showing divergence in Europe between 1 83 0-80 when more than the top eight countries are
tested, yet evidence of strong productivity convergence if only the top eight countries are
tested); W. BAUMOL, S. BLACKMAN & E. WOLFF, PRODUCTIVITY AND AMERICAN
LEADERSHIP : THE LONG VIEW ( 1 989) (showing convergence among a select club of countries;
divergence for less developed countries); J. B radford Delong & Lawrence Summers,
Equipment Investment and Economic Growth, 1 0 6 Q.J. EcoN. 445 ( 1 99 1 ) (looking at 6 1
countries and arguing that convergence occurs with significant investment, divergence where
investment is too low) ; Bart Verspagen, A New Empirical Approach to Catching Up or
Falling Behind, in 2 STRUCTURAL CHANGE & ECON. DYNAMICS 3 5 9 ( 1 99 1 ) (looking at 1 1 4
countries and observing that if the technological gap is small enough, then there is
convergence, but that there is divergence with a large initial gap).
The basic chronology that emerges fro m this research supports the proposition that strong
convergence cannot be assumed as an historical constant. Boyer summarizes the research to
show that there was significant divergence among countries until the end of the nineteenth
century. At the beginning of the twentieth century there was some convergence, but this was
disrupted in the 1 930s. Significant reduction of productivity differences is a more recent
phenomenon. From the 1 95 0s to the present there has been convergence in productivity. On
the other hand, in the post- 1 97 3 era many newly developing countries have fallen behind
similarly-situated countries due to external shocks and other problems. See B oyer, supra note
7 8 , at 42-43 .
1 1 8. See Boyer, supra note 5 7 , at 4 1 . Barra and Sala-i-Martin show that the speed of
convergence within the United States in terms of per capita income fro m 1 8 8 0- 1 988 was
around 2% per year (within and across four maj or regions). They also make similar estimates
for the 1 963-86 period and find the same estimated rate of convergence in Europe for the
period 1 950-8 5 . The effect of net migration on convergence is found to have been quite
small in the United States. A more complex impact is found for capital mobility, although
B arro and Sala-i-Martin assume that greater mobility would not lead to higher rates of
convergence. See generally Barry & Sala-i-Martin, supra note 1 1 7 .
B lanchard challenges this simple convergence story. See Olivier Jean B lanchard, Comments
and Discussion, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1 5 9 ( 1 99 1 ). He acknowledges
that B arra and Sala-i-Martin establish a robust convergence of incomes across regions. Yet
he doubts their conclusion that convergence is the salient aspect of regional growth in the
United States. He introduces a simple model of the United States in which he assumes there
are 50 small economies, and looks for the effect of shocks, technology, and factor mobility.
He challenges several assumptions of B arro and Sala-i-Martin : (a) he asserts that there is
substantial evidence showing considerable regional specialization due to increasing returns of
production; (b) he asserts that persistent regional specificities may explain why certain states
and nations experience decreases in their terms of trade; (c) he focuses on the mobility of
factors across j urisdictions; and (d) in contrast to the strong, neo-classical convergence
model, he assumes that labor is immobile.
B lanchard offers two special cases to challenge the strong convergence hypothesis. His first
case assumes that if (a) labor is immob ile so that it is allocated evenly across states, (b)
capital is mobile, and (c) there is an absence of shocks, then the economy will converge to
equal per capita output per state. If, however, we change assumptions and introduce state-
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The weak convergence view influences much recent
on comparative governance. 1 1 9 It now is accepted that
mentary
com
large, successful firms do not operate at the razor-thin margin
as sumed in strong convergence scenarios. When a competitor' s
superior governance arrangements yield a product market advantage,
the disadvantaged firms do not automatically go out of business.
They can instead offset the disadvantage by cutting supply or other
production costs, returning less to their equity investors, or, as a last
resort, securing state subsidies. 120 More broadly, national systems
ho ld out real and persistent barriers that can prevent the emergence of
a hybrid corporate governance system, even a hybrid holding out
productivity advantages (or, in the event of market system superiority,
that can retard the diffusion of market institutions). Each of selective
incentives, 12 1 cost barriers, 1 22 interest group politics, 123 and structural
interconnections among systemic components 1 24 can contribute. It
specific shocks but retain labor immobility, the movement of capital causes the shocks to
impact on output per capita, and over time will lead to divergence. The second case assumes
In this case the economy will exhibit
that capital is immobile and labor is mobile.
convergence even when the shocks to technology and demand have a permanent aspect. But,
given the stochastic nature of the shocks, the states do not converge to the same level.
Eventually a stationary level is achieved, as labor adjusts in response to the shock.
Blanchard argues that although the economy i n this model appears to exhibit signs of
convergence, true convergence should not be implied. Blanchard contends that an innovation
in personal income should lead to a permanent increase in the level of employment, as labor
is attracted to a higher return. Based on this insight, he looks at the long-run elasticity of
employment in the South and North-Central regions of the U . S . and finds effects of
innovation i n the South but none in the North-Central region. The conclusion is that there
appears to be convergence of output across the United States, with labor mobility the crucial
reason for this outcome. This is not a surprising result given the relative level of economic
development among the states.
1 1 9. See, e.g. , Berglof, supra note 1 7, at 1 04- 1 1 (commenting on the limited amount of
actual convergence among European governance systems). In Europe, he says, neither
globalization nor increased institutional shareholding activism has prompted institut;onal
changes that lead to more uniformity. See id.
1 20.

See Bebchuk

& Roe,

supra note 6 1 , at 5 84-8 5 .

1 2 1 . See id. a t 5 7 5-7 8 (noting the possibility that blockholding could persist after
securities market reforms so long as not accompanied by effective reform of fiduciary law
causing value of private benefits to b lockholders to exceed proceeds on public sale of b lock,
and the possibility that dispersed shareholding could persist even though legal barriers to
blockholding were removed due to resistance of managers seeking to retain positional
advantage).
1 22. See id. at 572-74, 579-83 (describing several possible cost frictions, including sunk
costs, along with the possibility that equal e ffectiveness denudes the reform movement of
force).
1 2 3. See id. at 5 72-74, 5 7 7-78 (noting the possibility of interest group resistance); La
Porta et al., C01porate Ownership A round the World, supra note 48, at 5 1 2 (noting that
maj ority shareholders in b lockholder countries tend to oppose law reform that would give
rights to minority shareholders).
1 24.

See Woolcock, supn note 1 7 , at 1 8 1 -82 (noting that each national system in
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follows that the only safe proj ection is weak convergence-hybrid
innovation that supplements existing systems without threatening
vested interests or requiring law reform. 1 25

2.

Comparative Governance in a National Framework

The weak convergence perspective has negative implications
for comparative governance analysis in a global framework. If
convergence due to the operation of global market mechanisms is not
a significant possibility, then there remains very little "globalized"
corporate governance subject matter to discuss . But the weak
convergence perspective does not thereby imply that comparative
corporate governance exercises are irrelevant. They retain pertinence
in national policy frameworks. 1 2 6
At the national level, the question is whether alternative
mechanisms identified in an international comparison can help
domestic firms solve governance problems. Any such benefit need
only be potential-an experimental possibility-in order to j ustify the
comparative exercise. 1 27 Indeed, so long as different outside practices
have cost implications, actors with a financial stake in a given
national system should have an intrinsic interest in trying them. This
is because the outside practices open an opportunity for domestic
competitive advantage, provided they are productively superior and
not culturally, technically, or geographically bound to the country of
origin. This justification occurs even in the absence of international
competition. In this scenario, competitive survival is exclusively a
function of the operation of domestic markets . A new source of
advantage always will be welcome, whatever its national origin.
The equal competitive fitness hypothesis holds out no negative
implications for this domestic exercise. Even if neither the market
nor the blockholder system has an overall advantage, it may remain
possible to identify material productivity differences among the
Europe is made up of a set of linked policies, regulations, practices, and philosophies
affecting capital markets, corporate structure, and industrial relations).
1 25. Cf La Porta et a! . , Corporate Ownership A round the World, supra note 48, at 5 1 3
(expressing skepticism as to imminent convergence to market system separation of
ownership and control); David Chamy, The German Cmporate Governance System, 1 99 8
COLUM. Bus. L . R E V . 1 45 , 1 64 ( 1 998) (proj ecting that Germany w i l l s e e only convergence
that does not depend on law reform, such as stepped up market pressures and the appearance
of a subset of firms governed along American lines).
1 26 .

O r a regional framework as applies i n the European Union .

1 27. Cf RoE, supra note 6, at 1 8 7-209 (speculating on the possibility the U . S .
intermediaries imitate German o r Japanese banks).
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The fact that the systems '
ms' individual components.
' sy ste
re sp ective strengths and weaknesses tend to cancel each other out
sugg ests potential complementarities. A plus factor in one system
. rnay yield a productivity advantage if transplanted to firms in the
�-'' other sy stem. This possibility is strengthened to the extent that the
.
tems result from accidents of political history. 1 28 American
. sy s
, obs erv ers dissatisfied with the amount and quality of shareholder
monitoring in mature domestic firms thus have looked to the
stockholding patterns and monitoring activities of financial
institutions in Japan and Germany to support law reform directed to
development of home grown institutional monitors. On the contrary,
European observers, aware that firms in the United States and Britain
. have the advantage of a wider array of financing modes and sources
due to deeper domestic securities markets, have been looking to
governance reform to build investor confidence in domestic securities
markets so as to promote their growth.
National-level comparison, then, is a cross reference exercise
in which firms and regulators experiment with new, imported
techniques-the same exercise carried out in the global framework
under the rubric of convergence to best practice. The source of the
competitive imperative differs in the national framework, however.
On the global level, the incentive lies at the international level and
implicates a near-term threat of serious competitive disadvantage for
a given nation' s producers as a whole. 1 29 On the national level, the
incentive lies in the search for national-level advantage, with global
advantage coming to bear as an additional but not essential factor. If,
for example, institutional monitoring holds a productivity advantage
for American firms, then some American firms presumably will want
to try it-and will have an incentive to work toward the removal of
·

128.

This is Roe ' s suggestion. See Roe, supra note 7 , a t 644-4 5 .

1 29. There i s at least one practice in corporate law ' s past to which we can look as an
indirect source of historical support This is the evolution of corporate codes and governance
practices in the United States as it developed as a common market over the last l 00 years.
Famously, corporate law is generated at the state level, with each of the fifty states having its
own code and body of cases, and its generation i s at the same time subj ect to a competitive
constraint The states compete for rents flowing from corporate charters. The historical
result of a century of practice is convergence in the outline of the states' corporate codes.
Any state that fails to conform to this basic outline loses incorporation business to the market
leader, Delaware. Although each statute varies in its terms to some extent, the variation is
not thought to create sufficient incidental costs as to j ustifY a national level harmonization
movement But, at the same time, the normative implications of the system are hotly
controverted. The argument is that the tenns of U . S . corporate law, although constrained by
competition, remains subj ect to interest group influence. As a result, the state codes now
constrain the field of operation of a mainstay of the American market control system, the
For discussion, see ROB ER TA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN
hostile takeover.
CORPORATE LAW 5 2-84 ( 1 993 ).
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regulatory barriers-toward the end o f gaining a cost advantage over
domestic competitors. If no productivity advantage proves out, no
one should be the worse off since the experiment can be abandoned
quickly.
The national and global frameworks overlap in one other
respect. Extensive national-level experimentation in cross reference
could mean incidental steps in the direction of global convergence to
a superior, hybrid governance system. 1 30 These converging stories
stem from very different theoretical frameworks, however. In the
national framework, convergence is only an incidental possibility. No
deterministic vision of global economic evolution is asserted.
The national framework thus offers a more robust, less
demanding base of assumptions than does the global. It implies no
particular evolutionary proj ection. It requires no risky appraisals of
systemic productivity. Yet it promises important contributions to
domestic policy discussions about governance and productivity in
many different countries.
But the national framework still makes a strong assumption
when it commends domestic experimentation by cross reference. As
noted above, 1 3 1 cross reference only works if the different systems
have divisible components. To the extent that national systems
resemble the tightly-fitted complexes of diverse elements depicted in
the weak convergence view, divisibility may be an unsafe
assumption. The pluses and minuses of the two systems depicted in
Tables 1 and 2 do not necessarily imply complementarities. They
also suggest the presence of internal dependencies. Each system may
manifest interconnected trade-offs that strike an overall balance
among the interests of its various participants. The balances thus
struck may not be so easily adj usted. 1 32
Questions accordingly arise as to the likely returns on
investments in experiments m cross reference. If corporate
governance institutions tend to be indivisible, returns may be
nonexistent because frictions prevent experiments from being carried
out in practice or because such experiments as are carried out fail to
bring improvements.
Alternatively, losses could result if
130. See Aoki, s upra note 3 3 , at 22-24; B erg!Of, supra note 1 7, at 1 1 5- 1 7 (presenting a
reform agenda for European corporate governance centered on investor protection) .
131.

See supra text accompanying note 90.

132.

See Coffee, supra note 63, at 6 5 9-60 (noting this problem and suggesting by way of

example that an American monitoring board staffed by outsiders might not make sense i n a
firm in an Asian country in which all other firms in the industry were staffed with personnel
close to government actors, or alternatively, nominated representatives of trading partners to
their boards).
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exp erim entation occurs but unfore seen interconne ctions among
c omponents within a given system lead to perverse effe cts . Parts III
an d IV take up these problems in detail.

The Comparative Governance Matrix

C.

Stripped to its essentials, comparative corporate governance
may be seen as a two-course menu that offers two choi ces in each
course. One first chooses a convergence model, strong or weak. This
choic e has determinative implications for the framework in which
comparison then proceeds. Strong convergence models imply that
global competitive forces dominate national level evolution. Weak
converg ence implies determinative influence for national social and
political institutions, but holds open a door for the homogenizing
influence of competitive forces, whether domestic or global. The
second menu item is divisibility. Here one decides whether it makes
sens e to view national governance systems as open to significant
modification by cross reference to other systems' components. This
choice determines the policy implications of the comparative
exercise-whether it looks toward or looks away from the
development of hybrid governance structures.
The menu implies four basic points of view respecting
comparative governance. Table 3 plots out the possibilities.
Table 3-The Comparative Governance Matrix

Strong
Convergence

Divisible
(1)
Global cross
reference

Weak
Convergence

(3) National cross
reference

Indivisible

(2)
Chicago School
(4) National
embeddedness

Box (1). Strong convergence and divisibility combine to
imply a projection of a hybrid but unitary governance system world
Skepticism respecting near- or intermediate-term
wide. 1 33
1 33.

See, e.g. Kester, Convergence, supra note 5 .
.
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convergence possibilities makes this a minority point of view.
Indeed, it is virtually absent from the legal literature.
Box (2). Strong convergence combined with indivisibility
implies competitive struggle between entire systems, with one system
winning in the end. This is the position advanced by Chicago S chool
participants in both legal and economic discussions. A caveat needs
to be entered about the binary characterization of the Chicago
position, however. Presumably, a Chicago School observer would not
object if a reforming blockholder system adopted market system
components piecemeal, even while simultaneously warning of
potential perverse effects for market systems from experiments in
cross reference. Cross reference enters the Chicago story to this
extent. But it does so only at an intermediate point in the time line.
In the end, the superior properties of the market system overwhelm
the blockholder antecedent and no hybrid appears. Such a market
system triumph is most easily imagined in a crisis: economic distress
leads to political disruption, the blockholder system cracks under the
strain, and there follows root and branch reform designed to foster
market institutions. Thus the Chicago Schoo l ' s strong evolutionary
superiority claims imply a long run assertion of indivisibility. In the
short run, however, cross reference is a productive possibility only if
it goes one way.
Box (3). An observer who chooses weak convergence and
divisible institutions makes reference to other governance systems as
a means to the end of effecting domestic improvements. This
perspective sees value in cross reference even as it abandons
breathless proj ections of near-term international convergence. It is
manifested both in leading American discussions of Japanese and
European institutional investors and in European law reform
initiatives directed to improving the depth of securities markets and in
responsive economic discussions. 1 34 It fairly may be termed the
international mainstream approach.
Box (4).
The fourth and final perspective pairs weak
convergence with indivisibility to emphasize
barriers to both
convergence and cross referenced governance reform at the national
level. This perspective is reflected in the present literature on
convergence, 1 35 but has shown up only sporadically in legal
comparative governance discussions . 1 3 6 It is, however, a possibility
1 34. See, e.g. , B erg!Of, supra note 1 7 , at 1 1 5� 1 7 (presenting a reform agenda for
European corporate governance centered on investor protection).
1 35.

See Boyer, supra note 5 7 , a t 4 5� 5 8 .

1 3 6.

See Fanto, supra note 2 7 , at 1 8 0�9 1 ; Woolcock, supra note 1 7 , at 1 8 1 �8 2 ; Gregory
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explored in the economic literature, 137 and much implicated in the
p osition articulated in Parts III and IV of this Article.
Reconsider now the two questions posed at the start of this
le
Artic in the context of the four perspectives in the matrix. The first
question goes to the near-term possibility of significant convergence.
We emerge less with an answer than with a range of possibilities.
Strong convergence perspectives lie at one end of the range. These
pers ist based on indirect empirical support and descriptive
assumptions derived from microeconomic theory. The closer the
attachment to the neoclassical model, the stronger the convergence
claim. Even so, nothing in the literature permits us to dismiss these
claims altogether. And, even if complete convergence is not
imminent, the plethora of real world convergence events in recent
years requires us to take seriously the possibility that the pace of
convergence will accelerate. At the other end of the range lie weak
convergence predictions made by theorists predisposed to seeing
persistent structures amidst thick institutional descriptions. These
appear to be safer on the state of the empirical studies. 1 38 But even
the weakest convergence position remains subj ect to a caveat
respecting radical change due to external shocks.
The second question, which concerns relative competitive
fitness, now can be restated: Which of the four perspectives implies a
strategy for governance policy best calculated to enhance the
productivity of individual firms and national systems? Empirical
evidence matters here too, but present results remain too thin to
provide a basis for an educated guess. The only strong empirical
result-that significant investment in firms by outside capital
presupposes the rule of law-does not help us to distinguish among
the systems in developed countries. There also is indirect but cogent
empirical backing for the equal competitive fitness hypothesis. 139 But
this does not help us choose a strategy either. We have seen that
equal competitive fitness synchronizes well both with the global cross
reference (Box ( 1 )) and national cross reference (Box (3))
perspectives . 1 40 It is compatible with the national embeddedness view
(Box (4)) for the same reasons. Equal competitive fitness becomes an

A. Mark, Realms of Choice: Finance Capitalism and C01porate Governance, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 969, 993-98 ( 1 995) (reviewing ROE, supra note 6).
1 37 .

See, e.g. , B erglOf, supra note 1 7, a t 1 1 3- 1 6 ; Aoki , supra note 3 3 , a t 23-24 .

1 3 8.

See supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.

1 39.

See supra notes 5 3-56 and accompanying text.

1 40.

See supra notes 86-- 8 9 and 1 26-2 9 and accompanying text.
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issue141 only with the Chicago School view of market superiority (Box
(2)). Its indirect empirical backing provides a basis for arguing
against the market superiority view, but does not suffice to falsify it.
We have, in short, no conclusive basis for assigning equal
fitness to both systems, for assigning relative advantage to one
system, or even for assigning equal or relative advantage to an
internal component of either system. Nor can we falsify the
assertions basic to any of the perspectives in the matrix. Each of the
four points of view thus retains some vitality, leaving the literature as
a whole in a speculative posture.
The existence of such a broad, active menu of possib ilities
underscores the determinative role that theory plays here. Recall, by
way of example, that the cross reference hypothesis derives credibility
from the assumption that cost savings accruing from improved
governance lend an incentive to experiment to business actors. Yet
absent hard numbers it remains difficult to appraise the magnitude of
the incentive posited. If business actors are not operating at the
margin, questions of the magnitude of the gain from experimentation
will be critical in practice. If only modest or speculative gains are
projected, then the actors could tum out to be rationally indifferent to
cross reference possibilities.
The cross reference hypothesis
accordingly needs a cogent, albeit informal, description of the source
and expected value of this gain. Such a specification can only be
based on an economic theory of the firm.
More generally, differences identified in a governance
comparison can be evaluated only by reference to antecedent theories
of the firm. It follows that better information about available
theoretical alternatives means better quality for the proj ections
emergmg.
III.

COMPARATIVE RESULTS AND THE CASE FOR INDIVISIBILITY

The question as to the productivity advantages of different
governance strategies devolves on the utility of cross reference: can it
improve bottom line results for a given firm or system? Answers to
this question tum on views as to divisibility. We have seen that
positive projections of divisibility go together with positive
predictions respecting cross reference in Boxes ( 1 ) and ( 3 ) on Table
3 . 142 Boxes (2) and (4) share suspicion about divisibility and cross
141.

See supra note 1 3 3 and accompanying text.

1 42.

See id.
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reference, but for different reasons. The Chicago School holds
incidents of blockholding to be intrinsically inferior; accordingly,
cross reference should only proceed in one direction whatever its
technical feasibility. The Box (4) view, in contrast, sees national
systems as embedded and asks whether cross reference is technically
feasib le in the first place.
The comparative literature suggests a number of factors that
Significantly,
operate
to embed governance institutions.
ld
cou
different proj ections tend to follow depending on the factor
emphasized. For example, leading contributions to the literature
emphasize past and present political sticking points and assert that but
for such points economic incentives would prompt cross referenced
experiments. 143 The result is a straddle between Boxes (3) and (4 ) ,
which puts the best gloss on the problematics of cross reference. But
for the embedded acts of past legislatures and present public choice
problems, a fitter hybrid would emerge.
This Part explores an alternative view, asserting that economic
factors by themselves make governance systems resistant to cross
reference. It states this case by reference to the results of the informal
comparison described in Part I, showing how incentive structures
built into the market and blockholder systems create barriers to cross
reference. The implication is that even the qualified case for cross
reference put forward in the legal literature has been overstated.
Negative implications also follow for two leading law reform
questions : (a) whether productive monitoring by institutions and
blockholders will result from the removal of regulations controlling
the holding practices of American institutional investors; and (b)
whether equity trading markets on the European Continent will
deepen as the result of enactment of regulation mandating
transparency and barring insider trading. Part IV further develops
this case by reference to leading exemplars of the incomplete
contracts theory of the firm.

A.

Comparative Governance and the Unsolved Free Rider
Problem

A question arises when Boxes (3) and (4) on Table 3 are
contrasted with the pluses and minuses juxtaposed on Tables 1 and
2 : 1 44 does the mirror-image relationship of the systems' strengths and
143.

See

supra text accompanying notes

1 44.

See

supra text accompanying note 5 6 .

1 06-- 1 0 .
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They have
weaknesses suggest divisibility or indivisibility?
suggested divisibility to many observers. But there also arises an
inference of interdependence among elements within a given system
and thus indivisibility. The results of comparative inquiries provide
significant support for the latter reading.
The comparison' s initial impetus came from within the United
States, where observers were simultaneously dissatisfied with
perverse effects displayed by the market system during the 1 980s artd
concerned about anti-takeover legislation's impact on the system' s
capacity for agency cost control. The solution to both problems was
thought to lie in newly activist institutional shareholders. Institutions
had come to hold larger proportionate stakes of publicly-traded
shares. Larger stakes per institution meant higher expected returns
from costs incurred to monitor individual firms in the institution' s
portfolio. Even i f the proportionate stakes o f individual institutions
remained below the threshold point at which investment in
monitoring becomes cost beneficial, it was thought that coalitions of
institutions could reach the threshold point by pooling their
resources. 1 45 But regulatory reform would have to come first, said the
proponents: politically-generated regulatory barriers were impeding
the accumulation of large institutional holdings and deterring
coalition formation. 146
The difficulty for this theory of agency cost control lay in a
free rider problem. 1 47 An institutional shareholder not participating in
a coalition would get the same increased returns as a participating
institution while saving the cost of monitoring. Accordingly, it was
difficult to see how any given institution could have a financial
1 4 5 . See Bernard S . B lack, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 M I C H . L . RE v . 520,
5 24-2 5 , 5 8 5-89 ( 1 990).

1 46. See id. at 5 7 8 . The targets are : (a) disclosure requirements imposed on holders of
more than 5 % of a class of securities under section 1 3 (d) of the Williams Act, 1 5 U . S . C . §
7 8m( d) ( 1 994 ); (b) liability of controlling persons for securities law violations of controlled
persons under section 1 5 of the Securities Act, 1 5 U . S .C. § 77o ( 1 994), and section 20(a) of
the Exchange Act, 1 5 U . S . C . § 7 8 (a) ( 1 994); (c ) short-swing liability for trading profits of
1 0% holders under section 1 6(b) of the Exchange Act, 1 5 U . S . C . § 78p(b ) ( 1 994 ) ; (d)
restrictions on capital structures and incentive compensation for advisors of investment
companies under sections 1 8(d) and 23 of the Investment Company Act, see 1 5 U . S . C . § §
80a- 1 8(d), 23 (a), 2 3 (b ) ( 1 994); and (e) portfolio diversification requirements under ERISA.
See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 9 1 COLUM. L. REv. 1 0,
26-27 ( 1 99 1 ). For a more broadly based attack on American securities regulation, asserting
that it sacrifices governance effectiveness for liquidity, see Amar Bhide, The Hidden Costs of
Stock Market Liquidity, 34 1. FIN. ECON. 3 1 , 3 3--45 ( 1 993 ) .
1 4 7 . See, e.g. , Anat R. Admati e t a ! . , Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and
Financial Market Equilibrium, 1 02 J. POL. ECON. 1 097, 1 1 0 1 ( 1 994); S teven Huddart, The
Effect of a Large Shareholder on Corporate Value, 39 M G MT. SCI. 1 407, 1 407-08 ( 1 993 ) .
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incentive to take the lead in investing in monitoring and coalition
4
buil ding . 1 8 At the same time, the financial benefits of cost-intensive
. rel ational investment remained underspecified. Underperforming
compani es appropriate for coalition intervention tended to be publicly
identified in the ordinary course, and institutions already were
informally (and cheaply) communicating their criticisms to their
149
managers.
The free rider problem and the gains specification problem
had a disturbing implication in turn. Any institutional coalition
buil ding or block formation that actually occurred in practice carried a
cognizable risk of perverse effects. The institutional monitor, rather
than engaging in public-regarding monitoring and problem solving,
rationally would look for compensation for its investment in
information and intervention in the form of side payments from
management. Since these by definition would not be shared with
competing institutions in the shareholder group, they would solve the
free rider problem as well as the returns specification problem. 1 5 0
Comparative governance went to the leading edge of corporate
law scholarship in the United States when proponents of delegated
institutional monitoring and related law reform looked abroad for
material with which to rebut these obj ections. It was hoped that
practices in Germany and Japan would show that aggressive
monitoring by investment institutions holding large equity stakes
leads to financial rewards and need not be deterred by free riding. 1 5 1
1 48. The explanation for such institutional activism as was seen in practice lay in
selective incentives such as reputation. See generally Edward B . Rock, The Logic and
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder A ctivism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 , 473-74
( 1 99 1 ).
1 49. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatoty Competition,
Regulato1y Capture and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L . REv. 1 86 1 , 1 905-06 ( 1 995).
1 50.

See id.

For a model of how to ameliorate the corporate free rider problem through the
supply of screening and monitoring services, see Coli n Mayer, Financial Systems and
Corporate Governance: A Review of International Evidence, 1 54 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL EcoN. 1 4 3 , 1 54 ( 1 998). For a basic theoretical work-up of bank monitoring,
see generally Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 5 1
REv. ECON. STUD. 393 ( 1 984). German banking practices expand on the basic borrower
lender model due to the banks' shareholding role. German banks have a large voting
influence at shareholders' meetings, as a result of their equity shareholdings (direct or
indirect via subsidiary investment funds) and their role as depositories for the bearer shares
held by their individual clients. See JEREMY EDWARDS & KLAUS FISCHER, B ANKS, FINANCE
AND INVESTMENT IN GERMANY 1 7 8-95 ( 1 994 ) . This latter role is most prominent where,
unusually for a German company, the shares are widely held.

151.

For a formal model of the bank-firm relationship, see Ludwig von Thadden, Long-Term
Contracts, Short- Term Investment and Monitoring, 62 REv. ECON. STUD. 5 5 7 ( 1 995). This
one-creditor model shows that relationship banking can reduce short-sightedness due to
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The domestic agenda strongly influenced the shape of the
comparative inquiry. Mark Roe ' s leading study of Germany looks
not at the blockholders who tend to control German firms but at the
investment and monitoring practices of Germany' s large banks. 1 52 It
finds significant bank shareholdings and governance input, but not the
sort of institutional monitoring being envisioned for institutions in the
United States. 1 53 German b ank monitors, as it turned out, do not take
an activist role in effecting investment and divestment policies keyed
to shareholder value. 1 54 When they do monitor they tend to take a
lender' s point of view, intervening on the fmancial downside. Later
studies question even this observation. It has been asserted, for
example, that German banks do not actually take an active role in
downside restructuring. More generally, the studies question whether
German bank incentives lie on the side of shareholder value creation
at all. 1 55
economies of scale. The argument is that banks, which possess good technology for
obtaining information about firms, can strategically use their informational advantage to
select long-term welfare enhancing p rojects over short-term projects. The question, of
course, is whether anything like this ever occurs in practice.
1 52.

See RoE, supra note 6 , at 1 7 1 -77 (including shareholding statistics on banks only).

1 5 3 . I t should b e noted, however, that the impact o f bank monitoring in Germany has
changed over time. See GARY GORTON & FRANK A. SCHMID, UNIVERSAL B ANKING AND THE
PERFORMANCE O F G E RM A N FIRMS 6-9 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper
No. 5453 , 1 996). Table 3 distinguishes the role of the German banks in the 1 970s from their
role in the 1 980s. Using 1 974 data on firm performance, Gorton and Schmid show that at
that time firm performance did improve as a function of how much equity the banks owned,
and that performance was unrelated to bank proxy voting and blockholding. Their 1 985 data
show reduced bank lending and equity holding and no longer support a positive connection
between bank equity holding and firm performance. The 1 985 data show blockholding to
have become the most important factor affecting firm performance and also show that bank
and nonbank blockholders were responsible for improved performance. See id.
1 54. Baums asserts that while it appears that banks have a significant position in the
German system of corporate governance ( for example, three banks hold 37 positions of about
23 1 positions reserved for stockholders on the supervisory boards of the 24 non-financial
companies comprising the DAX 30), their actual influence is easily exaggerated. Their
influence, says Baums, is limited by factors such as the co-determination regime and personal
interlocks among all publicly held firms. Real influence, says Baums, tends to be
concentrated in the hands of a small number of individuals (approximately 45) that control
more than half the positions available for equity available on the boards of DAX 30
companies. It is unlikely that there will be sufficient incentives for these individuals to
monitor each others' actions. See generally BAUMS, supra note 7 1 .
1 5 5 . A number o f studies have yielded results that destabilize the received picture of
productive relationship banking in Germany.
(a) Borrower Dependence. It appears that German firms are no longer as dependent on bank
capital as was once the case. Today, they rely in the main on retained earnings financing.
See GORTON & SCHMID, supra note 1 53 , at 5, 42, n. 1 0 (arguing that if statistical comparisons
are made based on flows of funds, then German firms have similar levels of debt to those in
stock market based economies). Indeed, new studies assert that German banks provide
similar levels of finance to their domestic corporate sector as do Anglo-American banks. See

1 99 9 ]
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R. G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some Evidence
from International Data, 50 J. FrN. 1 42 1 ( 1 99 5 ) ; Jenny Corbett & Tim Jenkinson, The
Financing of Industry, 1 9 70-1989: An International Comparison , 1 0 J. lAP . & INT ' L ECON S .
71

( 1 996) .

(b) Financial Distress. The evidence shows that German banks do not get very involved in
firm rescue efforts. There is little evidence to suggest that German banks "reduce the costs of
financial distress and bankruptcy by close monitoring and control." EDWARDS & F ISCHER,
sup ra note 1 5 1 , at 1 7 5. This is accounted for by reference to the facts that 80% of bank loans
to firms are secured and banks tend only to be involved in restructuring efforts when a
portion of the distressed firm's loans are unsecured. See id. at 1 7 1 . The evidence points to
limited capacity of banks to detect financial distress at companies at an early stage through
enhanced monitoring. See id. at 1 7 5 . There also is little evidence to show that bank presence
on supervisory boards leads to heightened monitoring efforts. See id.
(c) Proxy Voting. There is no doubt that banks, acting as proxies, exercise voting control at
supervisory board elections. See A. Gottschalk, Der StimmrechtseinflujJ der Banken in den
Aktionarsversammlungen der Groflunternehmen , 4 1 WSI-MITTEILUNGEN 294 ( I 9 8 8 ) (the
Gottschalk Study) (looking at a list of 1 00 firms and showing that in 32 firms with equity
capital of DM 2 9 . 5 billion, among them the 7 biggest in Germany, the average size of proxy
votes and direct shareholdings held by the three largest banks was 4 5 .2%, and that all the
banks together on average represented more than four-fifths of all votes present at
shareholder meetings and, with one exception, that they always had at least a majority of the
votes). The question is whether they do so to productive effect. See M. Perlitz & F. Seger,
Regarding the Particular Role of Universal B anks in German Corporate Governance
(Mannheim Working Paper, 1 994 ) (on file with author) (arguing that the control exercised by
banks through boards and proxy votes has been detrimental to German firms). Edwards and
Fischer suggest that collusion between the banks and the managers results, noting that the
voting rights of blockholders can be restricted by an Aktiengesellschaft 's (AG's) charter and
that banks have tended to support managers who propose these limitations. B ank control in
the form of proxy votes has been wielded defensively in the context of recent takeovers. See
EDWARDS & FISCHER, supra note I 5 1 , at 1 92-93 . Franks and Mayer report that in the recent
case of Continental's defensive response to a bid by Pirelli, the banks strategically employed
proxy votes to favor a management motion for a voting restriction on holders of 5% or
greater. At the same time, they note that a predator firm can get around the banks by buying
the shares in the open market and revoking the proxies. See Julian Franks & Colin Mayer,
Ownership, Control and the Performance of German Corporations (London B usiness School
and Oxford University Working Paper, 1 997 ) (on file with author). Finally, Gorton and
Schmid assert that a bank faces conflicting objectives depending on how much equity it
owns, the value of that equity, and its ability to extract private benefits. They suggest that
this is in effect the same trade-off that managers face. The upshot is that when German banks
play this insider role they will tend to take actions which benefit themselves at the expense of
other shareholders, subject to the constraint following from their equity and debt positions.
In other words, the lower the level of the bank 's equity holding the more likely the bank
pursues a private maximization course of action, with firm value enhancement being more
likely when the bank holds a high level of equity. Cf GORTON & SCHMID, supra note 1 5 3 , at
1 3- 1 4.

Incidents of bank defection from the management interest also should be noted. B anks in a
number of instances have assisted predators in hostile stake-building. The context is a very
specific one, however. The subject firm has two or more large blockholders, none of which
has a block large enough to effect control; the bank in effect assists in the development of a
control block. See JENKINSON & LJUNGQVIST supra note 2 6 . Note also that defection from
the management interest in these cases does not by itself assure that the banks were pursuing
value-creation for the shareholders as a whole.
(d) Monitoring and Information. It is often argued that the bank's equity stake in the
borrowing firm improves the flow of information for the bank and reduces the problems of
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The comparison with Japan led to similarly awkward
results. 1 56 Like the German universal bank, the Japanese main bank
engages in crisis monitoring from the lender' s perspective and does
not act like the idealized shareholder monitor. 1 5 7 For enhanced
asymmetric information. This proposition is doubtful in the case of German banks. For
example, there is little evidence that banks use their representation on supervisory boards so
as to assist in their loan decisions. See EowARDS & FISCHER, supra note 1 5 1 , at 23 1 .
Edwards and Fischer point out that while large banks tend to control proxy votes, there is
little direct connection between their supervisory board representation, large control of proxy
votes, and the incentive to monitor. Moreover, it appears that there is very little specialized
skill within German banks to support sophisticated monitoring. The banks are highly
specialized in transaction lending, and possess few incentives to acquire skills which could
decrease their competitive position in the transaction lending market. See ARNOUD W .A.
BOOT & ANJAN V. THAKOR, CAN RELATIONSHIP BANKING SURVIVE COMPETITION, (Center for
Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 1 592, London 1 997). See also FRANKLIN
ALLEl': & DOUGLAS GALE, A WELFARE COMPARISON OF THE GERMAN AND US FINANCIAL
SYSTEMS (London School of Economics, Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper No.
1 9 1 , 1 994) (employing an industrial organization approach and asserting that bank-based
systems may be more suited to traditional industries where there is some consensus about
how the firms should be managed, while stock markets, with their ability to assimilate
information quickly and assess diverse views, may be better suited to provide checks for
dynamic industries).
1 56. This comparison looks to bank monitoring without telling us much about the wider
organizational structure of Japanese industry. That, as described by Masahiko Aoki before
Japan ' s present economic crisis, involves interdependencies between vertically-related
nonfinancial firms, nonhierarchical management practices, and a highly-articulated employee
incentive structure that includes a norm of lifetime employment. Aoki contends that
Japanese successes stem from the combination of these elements. See Aoki, supra note 33, at
1 8-22. For a partial rejoinder that retells the story of the Japanese lifetime employment as an
incident of the settlement of postwar social discord, see Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J . Roe,
L ifetime Employment in Japan: Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate
Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 508 ( 1 999).
1 57. See generally Hoshi et al., supra note 5 1 (showing that the bank governance system
plays a key role in providing funds to firms (permitting investment plans to proceed with
diminished sensitivity to internal cash flows) and noting that main banks can be depended on
to intervene in the activities of a firm before there are financial difficulties); Kaplan &
Minton, supra note 54 (same). But cf Raj an & Zingales, supra note 4 1 , at 43-44
(reinterpreting findings of Hoshi et al., as confirming that Japanese banks continue
expansionary lending in the teeth of evidence of poor borrower cash flows and steady loss of
corporate opportunities).
Evidence is mixed on the question of whether Japanese bank-borrower relationships enhance
firm value. On the positive side, see Jun-Koo Kang, The International Market for C01porate
Control: Mergers and A cquisitions of US Firms by Japanese Firms, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 345-7 1
( 1 993) (showing that firms with strong ties to Japanese banks are more likely to make more
profitable acquisitions). For a study that questions whether the main bank system is superior,
see JUN-KOO KANG & RENE M. STULZ, Is BANK-CENTERED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
WORTH IT? A CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF JAPAN E S E FIR.t\1 S DURING
THE ASSET PRICE DEFLATION (Charles A. Ricke Center, Ohio State University Working Paper
No. 97-6, 1 997) (showing that for the 1 990-93 period, firms which were more dependent on
banks as a source of finance had poorer performance results than non-bank dependent firms,
which is correlated with poor stock market performance for these firms during this period).
See also David Weinstein & Yishay Yafeh, On the Costs of a Bank-Centered Financial
System: Evidence from the Changing Main Bank Relations in Japan, 53 J. FIN. 635 ( 1 998)
(showing that keiretsu borrowers that have a close relationship with a bank may have
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returns on their equity holdings, Japanese banks are said to look to
captive lender-borrower relationships 1 58 and insider trading, rather
than to public-regarding monitoring. 1 59
The comparative focus
accordingly shifted to a different Japanese phenomenon-cross
shareholding (and resulting monitoring) among nonfinancial firms in
keiretsu organizations. But this did not fit the bill either. 1 60 These
rel ationships came to be described as a means to the end of stabilizing
long-term relational contracts among members of vertical production
combines. 161 As such they had nothing to offer in the way of
precedent for financial institutions in the United States.
The comparison, in sum, failed in its purpose of providing
direct, cross referenced backing for United States law reform. 162
Germany and Japan held out no institutional practices suited to fill
America's monitoring gap.

increased access to capital without enhanced profitability); Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, The
International Transmission ofFinancial Shocks: The Case ofJapan, 8 7 AM. ECON. REv. 495
( 1 997) (showing that Japanese banks misallocate investment capital through study of real
estate investment practice in the early 1 990s showing heavy investment in deteriorating
Japanese real estate and disinvestment from recovering real estate market in the United
States). For general discussion of the pluses and minuses of relationship borrowing, see
Raghuram G. Raj an, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed Relationship and
Arm 's Length Debt, 47 J. FIN. 1 3 67-1 400 ( 1 992) (detailing trade-offs, including U . S .
evidence that a borrower' s value i s related to its bank ' s health).
1 5 8. This i s changing in the context of Japan' s current banking crisis. Today Japan' s
banks d o not have the ability t o raise foreign currencies t o service their clients ' needs. The
c lients are turning to foreign banks. See Jathon Sapsford, Citibank Sets Big Credit Line for

Japan Group: Assurance of $600 Million Reflects Emerging Role of Foreign Institutions,
WALL ST. J . , Oct. 2, 1 99 8 , at C 1 2 .
1 59. See J. Mark Ramseyer, Columbian Cartel Launches Bid for Japanese Firms, 1 02
YALE L.J. 2005 , 20 1 3- 1 4 ( 1 993).

1 60 . Roe dismisses cross-holding shareholders in Japan as tending to p l ay a protective
function, insulating the managers in the groups from takeovers. See ROE, supra note 6, at
181.

1 6 1 . See Gilson & Roe, supra note 1 8, at 874-7 5 . For criticism o f this explanation, see
Ramseyer, supra note 82, at 5 3 8-58 (arguing that this explanation covers only a subset of
cross-holdings and deciding that most can be explained only in terms outside of a strict
rational expectations framework).
1 62 . Roe describes the participation of German and Japanese banks in terms of "power
sharing," "interlock, " and "Escher-like overlap":

[A]n Escher-like staircase: while always walking downstairs, we wind up on top
of the staircase from which we started. Banks own industry, but industry owns
banks; managers direct employees; but employees sit on the supervisory board.
The model resembles in some ways American political governance, with checks
and balances. RoE, supra note 6 , at 1 84-8 5 .
Complex interconnections such a s these imply indivisibility.
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Can Relational Engagement Emerge in a System Open to
Hostile Takeovers ?

Barriers to cross reference result in part from internal
dependencies within governance systems. This Section, by way of
example, compares the patient, constructive engagement said to
distinguish the relationship between blockholders and firm managers
with the arm ' s length discipline of the market system' s hostile
takeover. The question is whether both modes of monitoring can be
incorporated in a single governance system. Just such a result has
been a central aspiration of American corporate governance in the
1 990s. American proponents of delegated monitoring envisioned
relational engagement among firms and institutional shareholders
even as they j oined the rest of the corporate law academy in
disapproving state law constraints on hostile takeovers. The question
whether the two obj ectives plausibly may be pursued simultaneously
never came up in practice, because the states were no more ready to
roll back their anti -takeover statutes than institutional investors were
ready to make significant investments in monitoring. But it retains
importance in the evaluation of the cross reference hypothesis.
Minimal hostile takeover activity may be a precondition of
relational engagement between institutional shareholders and
managers. If a hostile offeror holds out a significant premium over
market price, institutional shareholders seeking good results for the
year (and owing fiduciary duties to their clients) have an
overwhelming incentive to defect from any relational commitments
and accept the offer. An active possibility of defection in tum chills
the managers ' ex ante incentive to cooperate with the institutional
shareholders. Control in a blockholder, in contrast, disables the
hostile tender offer as we have known it in the United States . Indeed,
stable Japanese cross-holdings have been accounted for as an anti
takeover device . 1 63
This does not mean that blockholders cannot defect from a
relational commitment to the firm ' s managers by selling out. Given
an offer at a substantial premium, any holder, block or not, has a
powerful incentive to defect from management' s side.
In a
blockholder system, of course, such a control transfer probably would
occur not through a tender offer made to the entire group of
1 63 . See RoE, supra note 6, at 1 8 1 , noting also isolated takeover activity in Japan.
Unwinding of the b l ocks in the context of Japan' s current economic crisis presents a different
question. There have been reports of thi s occurring. See Mitsubishi: The Diamonds Lose
Their Sparkle, EcONOMIST, May 9, 1 998, at 67.
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shareholders but through a private block sale. 164
To see this
possibility, hypothesize a firm with three large blocks, none of them
large enough to enable unilateral exercise of control. An entrepreneur
could unilaterally negotiate the purchase of each of the blocks, take
control, and replace the managers. 16 5 Were such control transfers to
become an everyday event in a given blockholder system, the quality
of the "relational engagement" between its managers and block
shareholders presumably would deteriorate, 166 sacrificing some of the
governance benefits of blockholding itself. Since such disruptive
c ontrol transfers always are a theoretical possibility in a blockholder
system, some stabilizing device would appear to be necessary. Side
payments running from the firm to the blockholder nicely fit this
bi11 . 167 The firm' s managers in effect outbid the hypothetical offeror
for the blockholder's loyalty, the bid (and the relational engagement)
coming at the expense of small shareholders on the outside.
There arises a negative inference for the American case for
delegated monitoring. If the institutional blockholder is disabled from
colle cting the payment, as it would be to an extent in the United
States due to reputational1 68 and legal constraints, 169 then a cross
1 64 . For a discussion of the economics underlying this proposition, see infra text
accompanying note 2 2 5 .
1 65 .
in

F o r a description o f friendly takeovers in Japan, s e e J. Mark Ramseyer, Takeovers
UCLA L. REv. l , 2 1 -26

Japan: Opportunism, Ideology, and Corporate Control, 3 5

( 1 987).
Looking at the small minority of German finns that are not i n the control of a maj ority
blockholder, JENKINSON & LJUNGQVIST, supra note 26, have isolated 1 7 cases of hostile
stakebuilding. Several insights emerge: (a) stakebuilders tend to operate in the same
industry; (b) a takeover via stakebuilding is likely to occur when an existing coalition of
blockholders has broken down; (c) the emergence o f a hostile stakebuilder often paves the
way for the exit o f a blockholder; and (d) banks often play a crucial role in assisting predators
to gain stakes in these firms. In cases where a control transfer is achieved, the firm gaining
control can enter into a control or profit transfer agreement whereby the profits from the
target are transferred to the acquirer. It also appears that protection for small shareholders in
these firms i s weak, evidenced by losses being foisted onto them, group assets being sold at
prices advantageous to the dominant shareholder, and later lowball offers for minority shares.
Thus the ability to extract value from minority shareholders is one of the incentives that
drives these transactions.

, ·

1 66. S ignificantly, J ENKIN SO N & LJUNGQVIST, supra note 26, show that German banks
take an active role in cases of behind-the-scenes hostile stakebuilding. For a description, see
supra note 1 5 5 .

1 67. Cf Marco Pagano & Ailsa Roell, The Choice ofStock Ownership Stntcture: Agency
Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public, 1 1 3 Q.J. ECON. 1 87 , 1 9 1 ( 1 998) (finding
that an entrepreneur choosing between outside finance from private blockholders and going
public will be more likely to choose private finance if a blockholder can be paid off to
monitor less at the expense of the other minority shareholders).
1 68. See Bernard S. B lack, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 8 1 1 , 8 1 7, 8 5 1 , 8 5 5 ( 1 992) (contending that transparency
will prevent members of institutional coalitions from collecting side payments).
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reference scenario looking to institutional monitorin g lacks a
plausible incentive base. 1 70 More generally, it appears that you can
have a system in which a vigorous corporate control market imp orts
dis cipline or a system in which relational engagement imp orts .
discipline, but not both. On this reading, the comparative exercise not ·
only fails to yield positive results for the United State s ' domestic
agenda, but has a strong negative implication for the case for
delegated monitoring.

C.

Side Payments, Insider Trading, and the European Law
Reform Agenda

Relational engagement and side payments are closely linked,
quite apart from the context of control transactions. As noted
above, 1 7 1 blockholders do not sacrifice liquidity and invest in
monitoring without extracting returns. To get these, they exploit their
positions through insider trading and self dealing transactions. 1 72 It
follows that the principle of pro rata treatment for equity holders as a
group can play no significant role in a blockholder system' s legal and
normative environment. We note, however, that the pro rata principle
does activate the investor protections identified in the economic
literature as mainstays of market systems-maj ority-to-minority
fiduciary duties, one share one vote, and the insider trading ban. 1 73
An inference of indivisibility arises.
It has been argued that pro rata treatment is not a necessary
element of an environment conducive to dispersed equity ownership.
According to a well-known precept of law and economics, non
controlling holders of shares of block-controlled firms who are
excluded from gain made available to inside holders-whether in the
form of side payments or premiums in the case of block trades
should not complain so long as shared governance benefits stemming
1 6 9. The legal constraint i s the basic duty of loyalty. See, e.g , DEL C O D E ANN. tit. 8 , §
1 44 ( 1 998). But the duty leaves open room to siphon rents to insiders under the guise of
contracting. For descriptions of the deals, see Edward B . Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of
Relational Investing, 1 5 CARDOZO L REV. 9 8 7 , 1 004-06 ( 1 994 ) .

1 70. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 1 49, a t 1 92 1 -24. But see I a n Ayres & Peter
Cramton, Relational Investing and Agency Theory, 1 5 CARDOZO L . REv. 1 03 3 , 1 04 1 , 1 0606 1 ( 1 994) (suggesting that blockholders could play the role of distinguishing good from bad
takeovers).
171.

See supra text accompanying note 42.

1 72.

See supra text accompanying note 4 3 .

1 73 . These protections show up o n the lists devised to test the investor-friendliness of
different national systems. See supra notes 4 5-46 and accompanying text.
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om the insiders ' arrangements exceed the costs of side payments in
the long run. 1 74 The governance comparisons hold out a negative
implic ation for this position, however. They show that conditions
ary for the realization of the hypothesized efficient result
cannot be assumed to occur in the real world. The problem lies in the
condition that the outsider shareholders be left in their ex ante
position ex post the insider' s extraction of private benefits. Outsider
shareho lders need substantive rights and process rules that provide a
viable means to enforce this condition. Blockholder legal systems
:··_, tend to fail to provide such minimal protections. 1 7 5
-�
The question as to the desirability of creating such a
shareholder-protective legal regime is presently being debated in
Europe ' s blockholder countries. The proponents look primarily to
securities law reform as the means to the end of deeper equity trading
markets, proposing regulations that would enhance transparency
respecting both issuers and the markets on which their shares are
traded . 1 76 The question is whether such disclosure and insider trading
-

·

1 74. Ironically, it is a prominent proponent of the market system superiority, Judge
Frank Easterbrook, who has argued most forcefully for abandonment of the pro rata norm in
American corporate law. See Easterbrook, supra note 9 5 ; Frank l Easterbrook & Daniel
Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 93 YALE L l 698, 703- 1 5 ( 1 982). The argument,
made in the context of the law of cash out mergers, may not carry over to the broader
governance context, however. With merger gain, increased returns that presuppose a non pro
rata rule are on the table in the present or near term. In the institutional investor context we
deal with monitoring over a longer term. The small shareholder is being asked to abandon a
range of claims for pro rata treatment on faith that returns in the long run are enhanced due to
heightened institutional or blockholder attention. The problem is that in a non pro rata
regime, the small holders make the exchange without a guarantee as to a minimum rate of
return. Once the ready yardstick of pro rata treatment is abandoned, nothing stops the
blockholder from splitting the whole pie of enhanced value with management
Easterbrook also took up the case of the block trade at a premium. His analysis is now seen
to be incomplete. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate
Control, 1 09 QJ. ECON. 957 ( 1 994); Marcel Kahan, Sales of C01porate Control, 9 l L
ECON. & 0RG. 368 ( 1 993).
1 75. See Luca Enriques, The Law On Corporate Directors' Self Dealing: A Comparative
Analysis 72-74 ( Milan Working Paper, 1 998) (on file with author), which provides a detailed
comparison of the fiduciary law of France, Germany, and Italy with that of Britain and the
U.S . , and concludes that self dealing regulation is "less significant and less stringent" on the
Continent France has the most rigorous of the three continental regimes. But it tends to tum
on shareholder ratification. See id. at 62-63, 67-69. In a world of blockholders and cross
holdings, shareholder ratification would appear to offer outside minority holders little
practical protection.
Enrique ' s survey of British fiduciary law provides a useful
counterweight to the report in Miller, supra note 1 6, which understates its reach.
GOVERNANCE NETWORK, THE SEPARATION OF
A SURVEY OF SEVEN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (submitted to the
European Commission on October 27, 1 997), which asserts that European blockholders
impose non-transparent constraints on the corporate strategies devised by corporate managers
and recommends greater transparency for the protection of investors and minority
shareholders. The report asserts that self regulation will not produce the optimal level of

1 76.

See
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rules would suffice by thems elves to foster an enviro nment c
Self dealing transactions
to dispers ed shareholding.
blockholders and firms that do not involve purchases and sale s
shares on securities exchanges 1 77 may independently discoura
dispersed shareholding. Accordingly, discussants in countries
Germany, France, and the Netherlands have gone much farther
suggested corporate law reforms. This agenda features direct c
on blockholders, such as the one share, one vote rule, 1 78 self dealing
information and stresses a need for mandatory disclosure. It appears that firms presently
avoid national disclosure mandates through the use of holding companies sited in third states
which have no disclosure rules.
The report also notes that European insider trading
regulation at present imposes no significant costs on the holding and disposition of large
blocks.
Under the EU insider trading directive, large blockholders are not initial ly
considered to be insiders because the directive does not provide any size thresholds. The .
national securities regulator bears the burden of showing that any holder, large or not, is
using inside information while trading. The upshot i s that, unlike United States law, the
European directive has little impact on the distribution of large concentrations of shares.
1 77 . The European Union already has promulgated insider trading rules. But insider
trading remains on the table for discussion because serious doubts remain about the
effectiveness of national-level enforcement of the EU directive. See Berg I Of, supra note 1 7,
at 1 07 , 1 08 .
The E U enacted its Directive o n Insider Trading i n 1 989. See Council Directive 89/5 92 of 1 3
November 1 989 Coordinating Regulations o n Insider Trading 1 98 9 O.J. ( L 3 34) 3 0 . The
Directive stated that the aim of the regulation was to promote investor confidence by
ensuring equal market opportunities for all investors. The Council of Ministers passed the
unified Directive on the grounds that the harmonized provisions would eliminate the conflict
between certain countries and provide the basis for cooperation and enhanced enforcement.
See id. Like U . S . law, the Directive is concerned with the public disclosure of information
that would have a significant effect on market-sensitive information. See Klaus Hopt, The
Insider Dealing Directive, 27 COMMON MARKET L. REv. 5 1 ( 1 990). Significantly, the
directive ignores the fiduciary relationship between insider and firm and imposes liability on
traders who possess inside information. The Directive was welcomed by most member states
although Germany, due to domestic pressures from large banks which stood to lose, delayed
imp lementing it until mid- 1 994. See Daniel James Standen, Insider Tra ding Reforms Sweep
Across Germany: Bracing for Cold Winds of Change, 36 HARV. J. lNT ' L L . 1 77 ( 1 99 5 ) .
The enforcement problem i s shared with other E U directives. While the E U monitors the
implementation of directives into national law, directives are primarily enforced by member
states, which make regulatory decisions within different institutional and political
frameworks. In the case of the insider trading directive, member states are required to
identify the regulatory agency designed to perform the task of enforcement and provide this
body with the resources necessary to ensure the proper exercise of their functions. This
institutional design could lead to lax enforcement, particularly where the governments have
an incentive to minimize the goals of the directive. Furthermore, if this kind of decentralized
enforcement is to be effective, then transparency is needed respecting each member states'
regulations and their effects. A lack of transparency can undermine the level of trust required
for the mutual recognition framework to function effectively.
Very different levels of enforcement are thought likely to prevail respecting insider trading.
For example, it would appear that the passage of the Federal Securities Trading Act in
Getmany in 1 994 has so far done little to alter the trading practices of insiders. See Insider
Dealing Law Comes into Force, FIN. TIMES LIMITED, FTN. REG . REP., Dec. 1 995 , at 22-2 3 .
Dutch compliance also i s thought t o be wanting. See Berglof, supra note 1 7, passim .
1 7 8.

See La Porta et al., Co1porate Ownership Around the World, supra note 48, at 5 1 2,
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to protect outside shareholders, 1 79 voting caps, and limits
prop ortion of capital held by designated investors. 1 8 0
� · Europe thus faces an intriguing choice implicating the
�()n.nection between legal rules, corporate governance practice, and
ttading market depth. If the objective is deep national equity ma�kets
those in London and New York, an analogy to the legal regimes
Britain and the United States suggests that stepped up disclosure
insider trading rules amount to only half of the needed loaf of law
Both Britain and the United States add rules against self
by managers and control shareholders, rules that contain
opportunities to effect non pro rata distributions that reduce
.returns on outside equity contributions.
The problem is that meaningful reform following this lead
could destab ilize the incentives that sustain Europe' s blockholder
monitoring regi me, 1 8 1 inadvertently causing the blocks to dissipate by
·;cutting off the holders' sources of return. An experiment in cross
reference intended to deepen the market thus could imply a larger
(and unintended) move to a market system. In contrast, limited
reform that does not include self dealing constraints may fail to
deepen the markets significantly. Thus, the question as to divisiblity
is joined. Significantly, the comparative governance literature offers
. no cogent advice on the likely outcome. 1 82
-..� ,,TT,. · .

·

IV.

THE INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS THEORY OF THE FIRM AND THE
CASE FOR INDIVISIBILTY

Economists working within the incomplete contracts theory of
the firm have taken up the question raised upon the juxtaposition of
systemic features of market and blockholder systems, as in Tables 1

(one share-one vote will be ineffective, taken alone, so long as blockholders maintain control
through pyramiding arrangements).
1 7 9.

See id.

1 80.

See Enriques, supra note 1 75 , at 93-94.

1 8 1 . Indeed, these initiatives have a negative implication for b1ockholding because
deeper equity markets presuppose larger proportions of widely-held equity. BergliSf suggests
stepped up withdrawals from European exchanges in recent years may be l inked to the
appearance of greater investor participation. See Erik BergliSf, Co1porate Governance, in
THE E UROPEAN EQUiTY MARKETS: THE STATE OF THE UNION AND AN AGENDA FOR THE
MILLENNIUM 1 47, 1 73 (Benn Steil et a!. eds. , 1 996).
1 82. For an extended discussion of the dangers for Europe of the importation of market
system shareholder protection rules, see Bergli::if, supra note 1 7, at 1 1 4- 1 6.
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2 : 3 Do the systems ' contrastin .? fe �tures imp � y unexpl oit�d 1 ,
comple mentariti es or trade- o ffs? The mqmry results m an emph ati c �.
case for a trade-off description. The cumulated trade-offs imp ly "
.
indivisibility in tum .
One line of incomplete contracts inquiry poses a concentration
and liquidity trade-off. This analysis begins with the standard
assumption that blockholder control brings stepped up monitoring that :·�
makes the firm more valuable. It goes on to assert that liquidity also :..:
enhances firm value by lowering the cost of capital. 1 84 The trade-o ff �·
results because concentration sacrifices liquidity even as it enhances
monitoring; at the same time, dispersed ownership enhances liquidity
even as it sacrifices monitoring. One of the basic assumptions of this
trade-off analysis-that increased monitoring makes the firm more
valuable-is scrutinized in tum in a second line of inquiry. This
asserts that delegations of authority to managers have a positive
impact on productivity because they import incentives to make
productive investments. It follows that, although some monitoring
may be a good thing, there can be such a thing as too much
monitoring. There results a trade-off between monitoring and
delegation: stepped up monitoring depresses management' s incentives
to make productive investments even as it imports productivity
enhancing discipline.
By hypothesis, to the extent these analyses identify stable,
optimal (albeit second-best) trade-off points, they provide the
beginnings of a blueprint for a superior, hybrid governance structure.
Conversely, to the extent these analyses show that structural factors or
inci dental frictions are likely to prevent the realization of optimal
trade-offs, they hold out a negative implication for the cross reference
hypothesis.
This Part shows that this theory' s cumulative results lie on the
negative side and support the case for indivisibility. Private benefits
are the key. The models show that absent private benefits and the
incentives they import toward block formation, we can never be sure
of the appearance of blocks when monitoring is needed. Moreover,
an d

. ·

·

1 83 .

See supra text accompanying note 5 6 .

1 84 .

And, hence, raising the stock price, a l l other things being equal. See Patrick Bolton

& Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, L iquidity and Control: A Dynamic Theo1y of Cmporate
Ownersh ip Structure, 1 54 J. lN STITUTlONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 1 67 , 1 73 ( 1 998)

[hereinafter Bolton & von Thadden, Structure] . Empirical support for this proposition can be
found in studies showing that the liquidity of a stock increases with the firm ' s market
capitalization. See, e.g. , Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Limited kfarket Participation and
Volatility of Asset Prices, 1 02 AM. E coN . REv. 933 ( 1 994); Marco Pagano, Endogenous
Market Th inness and Stock Rise Volatility, 56 REv. ECON . STU D . 269 ( 1 989).
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private benefits, such blocks will be unstable and will tend to
large. Once a system allows for private benefits, in
there is no way to assure their provision to an incentive
le degree. Furthermore, only some firms will need block
(and hence limited private benefits provision) in the first
It follows that a system either controls access to private
for the purpose of protecting its liquid trading markets or
not control private benefits so as to nurture its blocks. The
.... "·"'�' of the firm holds out no hospitable middle ground.
()_ lJ... ���-

·

Incomplete Contracts Theory
The various versions of the incomplete contracts model1 8 5
remit us to a second-best world, and there identify and explain
barriers that prevent the evolution of first-best transaction
structures. 1 86 This economic model holds, first, that transacting actors
185.

For overviews of the literature, see BERNARD SALANIE, THE ECONOMICS OF
1 75-1 88 ( 1 998); Bengt Holmstrom & John Roberts, The Boundaries
of the Firm Revisited, 1 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 7 3 , 75-79 ( 1 998). For precedent treatments in the
legal l iterature, see Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory
Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 1 05 YALE L.J . 1 249, 1 278-79 ( 1 996); W illiam W .
Bratton, Dividends, Noncontractibility, and Corporate Law, 1 9 CARDOZO L . REv. 409
( 1 997); William W . B ratton et a! . , Repeated Games, Social Norms, and Incomplete
Corporate Contracts, in ASPECTS OF FAIRNESS IN CONTRACT 1 6 1 , 1 64-7 1 (Chris Willett ed.,
1 996); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: A n A nalysis of Incomplete
Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 2 1 J. L EG . STUD. 2 7 1 , 272-73 ( 1 992); Oliver Hart, A n
Economis t 's View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U . TORONTO L . RE v . 2 9 9 ( 1 993); Oliver Hart, An
CONTRACTS: A PRIMER

Economist 's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm , 89
1 86 .

COLUM.

L.

REV .

1 75 7 ( 1 989).

Incomplete contracts theory should be distinguished from transaction costs theory.
Both recognize that contracting actors cannot be expected to negotiate complete ex ante
solutions to all problems. Transaction costs theory, however, turns on the notion that the
institution of ex ante contracting, broadly conceived, supports efficient transactional
relationships. It makes three assertions toward this end. First, actors who put capital at risk
can be expected to design ex ante governance structures that minimize the costs of future
uncertainty. Second, even though legal decisionmakers must assist the parties by filling in
omitted terms ex post, those terms may be cast from an ex ante time perspective, and, indeed,
should be so cast in order to guard against d isruption of the parties ' allocation of financial
risk and to minimize future transaction costs. See Bratton et a!., supra note 1 85 , at 1 66-7 1 .
Third, and finally, there i s a prediction: given proper containment of the agencies of state
intervention, transacting actors can be expected to devise technologies that lower the
transaction costs that cause incompleteness, thereby expanding the effective zone of
contractual governance. Incomplete contracts theory places a greater stress on the ex ante
impact of ex post problems of performance and enforcement than does the transaction costs
approach. These three factors-computability, observability, and verifiability-intrinsically
limit the operation of the institution of the ex ante contract. State intervention accordingly
takes a place on its list of possible means to the end of improving suboptimal governance
conditions. See Phillippe Aghion & B enj amin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private
Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J. L . EcoN. & ORG. 3 8 1 ( 1 990).
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can create producing institutions that will certainly evolve toward the
first-be st only to the extent that they deal with contractible subject
matter. Second, it hol ds that contractibility cannot safely be assumed.
Noncontractibility may occur because the requisite transactional
technologies may not yet exist. 187 Alternatively, even where an ex
ante contract term can be devised in theory, ex ante agreement on
that contract term will not be feasible if in practice a party' s future
performance of the term will be either unobservable by the
counterparty or unverifiable by the enforcing authority. 1 88
Corporate capital structures provide second-best solutions to
noncontractible governance problems. 1 8 9 Corporate contracts are
famously empty at their cores, omitting important future variables due
the difficulty or impossibility of ex ante description or ex post
·

1 87 . Unlike most law and economics, which tends t o include any voluntary economic
relation within its notion of the ex ante contract, incomplete contracts theory restricts the
reach of the ex ante contract to cases where actors make explicit specifications about the
future. That is, to have "contract" terms that govern future states, those contingent states
must be specified and the future outcomes must be computable. S ince many future states of
nature clearly are not computable, transacting parties as a result lack the technology
necessary to enable the negotiation and composition of a contract term ex ante. See Luca
Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature,
1 09 Q.J. EcoN. 1 08 5 ( 1 994).
1 88. For contributions to the literature making this point, see Sanford Grossman &
Oliver Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral
Integration, 94 J. P oL ECON. 6 9 1 ( 1 986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts
and Renegotiation, 5 6 ECONOMETRICA 7 5 5 ( 1 988); Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. M ilgram,
Multitask Principal-Agent A nalyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design,
7 J . L . EcoN. & ORG . 24 ( 1 992) (showing that contracts that tie an agent's compensation to
verifiable measures can divert effort and attention from other more important but less easily
measured aspects of performance).
1 89. For a formal expression o f this point, see OLIVER HART, FrRMS, CONTRACTS, AND
( 1 995). He notes that given managers who derive no private benefits
from control of assets, first-best results easily can be achieved (in a taxless world) with an all
equity capital structure and a simple incentive compensation system. In a two-period
situation he would simply make the managers' compensation depend entirely on the
dividend. That is, assuming investment at t 0, and cash flows to be realized at t 1 and t
2, incentive compensation I should = n(dt= 1 + dt=2) , where n is a small positive number. If
the payment also covers liquidation proceeds, L at t = 2, then I = n [dt=l + (dt=2, L)}, and
the manager can be expected to make an optimal decision respecting liquidation at t
1. If
at t 1, the expected L is greater than the cash flow expected at t 2, the firm is liquidated at
t = 1 and no indebtedness is needed in order to align management incentives.
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE

=

=

=

=

=

=

But managers do derive private benefits from asset management, and in Hart ' s conception,
the bribe n required to align their incentives with those of the outside security holders is
unfeasibly large. Accordingly, a complex capital structure that includes control mandates
must be interpolated. And, in a dynamic environment, a range of possibly optimal
contractual formulas for setting the terms of that control transfer can be suggested;
uncertainty makes it impossible to deem any one ex ante optimal. Restating this point, it is
now the understanding that a simple one-period incentive contract that sets the firm' s capital
structure based upon a particular projection of the appropriate direction for the agents'
activities will not be optimal for all future scenarios.

Ii

I
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observation and verification. Shareholders, for example, contribute
capital in the absence of terms governing such fundamental matters as
investment policy, dividend payout rate, and management
remuneration and tenure.
Absent specific directives, outcomes
·respecting these matters must of necessity be determined ex post,
either by renegotiation or by the specification of an empowered party.
More particularly, the contracts making up the firm ' s capital structure
deal with noncontractible future contingencies by providing open. ended processes that facilitate the allocation and reallocation of
These control transfer mechanisms are particularly
control. 1 90
nt
in
bad performance states. They determine whether the
porta
im
shareholders vote out the managers; whether a blockholder emerges
to put the managers under effective control; whether a tender offer
occurs so as to effect needed change; and whether the bondholders
take control of the assets in distress situations. 1 9 1
These ex post outcomes follow neither from the
consummation of transactions facilitated by price mechanisms nor
from the operation of ex ante contractual specifications. They follow
instead from the exercise of contingent powers to control the firm's
assets, 1 92 powers in some cases vested by the basic terms of corporate
law and in other cases vested by contract. Incomplete contracts
theory asserts that with the diminution of space in which contractual
specification is feasible, such power allocations play a progressively
larger role in determining the firm' s productivity. 1 93 It further asserts
that some power allocations work better than others and goes on to try
to identify the properties of the better arrangements. Toward this
end, it models the impact of particular provisions for control transfer
on ex ante incentives to make firm-specific investments of human and
financial capital.
This approach is often referred to as the "property rights"
theory of the firm because it isolates the collection of assets as the
firm's defining characteristic and studies arrangements for the assets'
ownership. Notably, "owner" is here specially defined as the party
who has the right to control all aspects of the asset that have not been
given over to contractual specification ex ante. Since ownership is

· ·

·

1 90. See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, A n Incomplete Contracts Approach to
Financial Contracting, 5 9 REv. ECON. STUDIES 473, 479 ( 1 992).
1 9 1 . There is disagreement within the incomplete contracts l iterature respecting the
efficient location of control rights, in particular with respect to the debt/equity trade-off. See
Raughuram U . Raj an & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 1 1 3 QJ. ECON . 387
( 1 998).
1 92.

See id.

1 93.

See id.
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control under this definition, the two cannot be separated, although
they can be shared. 194 This concept has a counter-intuitive aspect in a
world still characterized by the Berle and Means separation of
ownership and control. But the concept, as applied in exercises that
articulate the characteristics of this "shared" ownership, easily
accommodates the management-controlled firm as we know it in
practice. Managers are seen to share control with the equity, retaining
"effective" control in most states subj ect to displacement by the
shareholders in exceptional situations. 195
As thus extended,
incomplete contracts theory comes to bear on production-specific
aspects of firm governance-for example, a manufacturer ' s decision
to make or buy a component part 1 96-in addition to control transfer
events like takeovers, proxy contests, and insolvency receiverships.
The subj ect matter for examination in these extensions is not
"ownership" of assets per se but the grant of access to assets owned
by others. Here again the emphasis is on the identification of
arrangements that encourage firm specific investment. 1 97

The Liquidity and Concentrated Ownership Trade-Off and the
Minimal Block Capital Structure

B.

Concentrated ownership sacrifices liquidity but enhances
supervision, while dispersed ownership enhances liquidity but
sacrifices supervision.198 A theory of the optimal trade-off between
the two should not, according to the economists Patrick Bolton and
Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, seek to determine whether concentrated
or dispersed ownership is per se desirable. It instead should seek to
determine how often and at what points in a firm' s life cycle
concentrated ownership leads to more productive results. 1 99 Bolton
1 94.

See Grossman

& Hart,

supra note 1 88 , at 695.

1 9 5 . See Mike Burkart e t a l . , Large Shareholders, Monitoring, a n d the Value of the
Firm, 1 1 2 Q. J. ECON. 693, 696, 7 1 2 ( 1 997).
! 96.

See Raj an

1 97.

See id. at 3 8 7-90.

& Zingales,

supra note 1 9 1 , at 4 1 9-20.

1 98.

See Shleifer & V ishny, supra note 52, at 754-55 (asserting that concentrated
ownership solves the problem of shareholder disincentive to invest in monitoring that comes
with high levels of diversification, but that the benefits of concentrated ownership must be
assessed in terms of the significant costs, including loss of liquidity and private benefits
extraction).
1 9 9. See Patrick Bolton & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Blocks, Liquidity, and C01porate
Control, 5 3 J. FIN . 1 , 2 ( 1 998) [hereinafter Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks]. The model
appears in two versions. See also Bolton & von Thadden, Structure, supra note 1 84 .

T h e Bolton-von Thadden model has a long ancestry. We c a n trace its origins t o the classic

1 999]
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analysis of Armin Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 ( 1 972). That model looked into the incentive
problems of team production and asked how the owners of the asset can induce the manager
of the asset to cooperate. The model introduced two mechanisms to overcome the control
problem-monetary incentives and a third party monitor�and assumed that the monitor
could measure the agents' performance. Fama and Jensen later sharpened this story by
centering on how the structure of ownership can be altered to limit externalities tied up with
the incentive problems of joint production. More specifically, they argued that an ownership
structure, such as a partnership, can be designed so as to produce an optimal outcome for the
firm . The equilibrium result is asserted to follow from the role played by contractual
constraints enforced by third parties. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency
Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & EcoN . 327 ( 1 983). For a new interpretation of
these foundational models directed to the place occupied by constituency interests in the
theory of the firm, see Margaret M . B lair & Lynn A . Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Cmporate Law, 8 5 VA. L . REv. 247 ( 1 999).
The inquiry into the relationship between ownership structure, team production, and firm
. value took its next step forward when Bengt Holmstrom identified concentration of equity
ownership as a critical factor. See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 1 3 BELL J.
EcoN 3 24 ( 1 982). Holmstrom's model is concerned with techniques for disciplining
production team members. It emphasizes that, given problems in monitoring individual
contributions to firm output, there is no sharing rule which can achieve an equilibrium
outcome. This is because the team members will always have an incentive to collude so as to
facilitate shirking and therefore cannot enforce a sharing agreement among themselves.
Hence, there must always exist a principal to enforce penalties respecting shirking. More
particularly, the moral hazard problem with agents calls for an incentive scheme which
"breaks the firm's budget constraint. " In other words, given bad news about team
performance a budgeting authority must be in a position to cut off needed capital .
Holmstrom suggests that shareholders with an ongoing contingent commitment to provide
capital could perform this incentive function; with the occurrence of the contingency related
to team performance they are released from their funding commitment. The problem left
open for solution in the Holmstrom model, which relies on equity intervention, is the
incentive that some owners have to free ride on other owners' efforts. From this monitoring
perspective, then, it might be optimal to have a single owner. Thus the costs of
independently monitoring the finn and pledging capital for financing give rise to a question
respecting the optimal level of concentration of ownership.
.

Holmstrom identified at a theoretical level the problem on which today ' s comparative
governance discussions devolve�the relationship between ownership concentration,
liquidity, management agency costs, and investor incentives respecting governance.
Holmstrom identified the problem and later discussants went on to confront the problems of
the separation of ownership and control and blockholding. Shleifer and Vishny offered a
model of an equity-financed firm in which there is one large shareholder and a number of
small shareholders who free ride. In this model, firm value increases with the larger
shareholder ' s presence. Consequently, in the model, the large shareholders are likely to have
an incentive to retain their large shareholdings. The problem comes if the large shareholders
ever get into a position to sell their shares anonymously in the trading market. Shleifer and
Vishny found that would have every incentive to do so, sacrificing the benefit of their
monitoring. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert V ishny, Large Shareholders and Co1porate
Control, 94 J. POL E CON . 46 1 ( 1 986). See also Huddart, supra note 1 47 , at 1 408 (modeling
the instability problem in a world where the blockholder' s risk profile differs from that of the
wider shareholder population).
A different perspective on the liquidity-control tradeoff can be found in Bengt Holmstrom &
Jean Tirole, Market Liquidity and Pe1jormance Monitoring, 1 0 1 J. POL. EcoN. 678 ( 1 993).
This paper assesses how a firm's ownership structure effects the value of managerial
monitoring through the improved information content of the share price of the firm.
Holmstrom and Tirole argue that the existing l iterature on managerial incentives poorly

278

COL UMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

[3 8 : 2 1 3

and von Thadden, offer a model of the liquidity-concentration trade
off that bears importantly on evaluation of the cross reference
hypothesis.
The Bolton-von Thadden model inquires into the conditions
necessary for the formation of control blocks and into the concomitant
costs in terms of reduced liquidity. 200 It assumes that blocks can
coalesce in two ways: either (a) there is a large blockholder in place
ex ante who stays put and removes unsuccessful managers, or (b)
where ownership is dispersed ex ante and the managers later fail, an
entrepreneur shows up to put a block together by purchasing shares in
the market by tender offer.20 1 The model further assumes a world
where (a) blockholders can add to their returns through insider trading
but commit no breaches of the duty of loyalty,202 and (b) blockholders
incur net private costs due to monitoring and other activities incident
to the exercise of control . Taken together, these assumptions imply
that block shares sell at a discount from nonblock shares on a per
share basis, reflecting the monitoring cost. 2 03 This result contrasts
with the real world experience of block shares trading at a substantial
premium over market price, of course.204 But the dose of unreality
understands how the stock market acts as a monitor of management: "the firm ' s ownership
structure," they say, "influences the value of monitoring through its effect on market
liquidity." Jd. at 679. More particularly, they show that the informational benefits of listing
and observing a quoted stock price are not well understood in terms of the costs and benefits
of market monitoring.
In this highly stylized model, it is the presence of liquidity traders which produces the
incentives for other traders to invest in information. The informed traders are able to profit
since they choose the profit-maximizing route given the expected behavior of the other
investors. Holmstrom and Tirole nonetheless argue that someone will have to pay the
speculator for making investments in monitoring. The cost of such investments in monitoring
are borne ex ante by insiders in the form of a lower initial share price. See id. at 696-97.
Without the monitoring fee, liquidity would be hard to sustain. Market l iquidity thus has its
costs. Accordingly, say Holmstrom and Tirole, some degree of concentration of ownership is
required. The Bolton-von Thadden model pick ups the problem at this point.
200. This cost-benefit analysis covers not only the blockholder but the shareholder
population as a whole.
20 1 .

See Bolton & von Thadden, Structure, supra note 1 84, at 1 8 8 .

202. See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, at 3. Here they proceed in
contrast to many other incomplete contracts models of blockholding. For recent models that
use insider trading and other private benefits as a permitted incentive to be traded off against
gains from monitoring, see Ernst Maug, Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade
Off between Liquidity and Control? 53 J. FIN. 65 ( 1 998); Charles Kahn & Andrew Winton,
Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder Intervention, 53 J. FIN. 99 ( 1 998).
203 . The implications of possibilities for gain through insider trading are examined in the
model. See infi·a text accompanying note 22 1 .
204. Extensive empirical literature documents this. See, e.g. , Michael Barclay &
Clifford Holderness, Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations, 2 5 J. FIN. EcoN.
3 7 1 ( 1 989). Bolton and von Thadden point out that the Barclay-Holderness study finds
substantial premiums for blocks of greater than 25% and smaller premiums for blocks under
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noneth eless enhances the model' s heuristic value for comparative
governanc e. In the real world, control premiums follow from the fact
that control makes private benefits available absent a strict and
p erfectly-enforced regime of insider trading and fiduciary rules. The
task for comparative governance, in contrast, is to test the proposition,
put forward_ in -� erican inst�tut� onal _investor lit�rature, t�mt public
If
regarding mstltutwnal �onltonng I S econom i cally v � able.
_
incentives for block momtonng
can be shown to occur m a world
entailing a liquidity trade-off but constraining private benefits, then
the case for public-regarding monitoring emerges much enhanced.
Such a result simultaneously would bolster the case for the
coexistence of thick trading markets and effective blockholding in
Europe.
1.

The Optimal Block in a World of Trade-Offs

For Bolton and von Thadden, the optimal trade-off between
concentration and liquidity depends on a number of factors. The
factors include: (a) the degree of liquidity demand due to shareholder
. impatience or desire to consume, with lower demand and patience
favoring concentration; (b) the transaction costs of ownership and
transfer, with high costs favoring concentration; (c) the level of
monitoring costs, with high costs favoring dispersal; and (d) the
expected variance of returns, with high variance favming
concentration because uncertainty implies a need to accord more
discretion to managers and thus an enhanced need for monitoring. 205
The location of the trade-off point varies from situation to situation.
But a clear set of alternatives emerges at the bottom line, despite the
complexity at the trade-off point. If the factors signal concentration,
then an optimal capital structure: (a) contains no more than one
block, since duplication of the block position reduces liquidity; (b)
includes a block containing no more than the minimum number of
shares necessary for the exercise of control, since a larger block
reduces liquidity (the "Minimal Block" or "MB"); and (c) includes
outside shareholders each of which holds only a minimal number of
shares, since any shareholding larger than the minimum also reduces
liquidity (the "Minimal Block Capital Structure" or "MB C S"). 206
·

25%. In effect, they say, their model contemplates blocks of I 0% to 20% that nevertheless
exert control power. See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, at 8-9 .
205. See Bolton & von Thadden, Stntcture, supra note 1 84, at 1 9 1 -93 .
206. See id. at 1 90. In the model the minimum holding is one share. Substantial blocks
smaller than the optimal size could carry the benefit of easing the cost of a tender offer, but
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Under the model' s assumptions, the M B will sell at a disc ount
per share from intrinsic value because monitoring is costly and the
cost cannot be passed on to the outside shareholders in the form o f
private benefits received by the blockholder. For the same reason,
block formation through tender offer occurs only to the extent that the
holder can buy the shares at a discount from intrinsic value. Under
the model' s set up, such purchases can be made only from impatient
liquidity sellers who are willing to sell at a discount. 207 Relative
numbers of liquidity sellers and patient investors (who only sell for
intrinsic value) thus can have a significant governance impact.
We note some points at which the MBCS fails to synchronize
with the main points on governance reform agendas. S ince the MB
must command control, it, of necessity, has to be comprised of a
substantial percentage of shares, even recognizing that control can be
maintained with considerably fewer than 5 1 % of the shares.20 8 The
insistence on a control block follows from a central assertion of
incomplete contracts-that absent enforceable contract terms,
productivity and related incentives depend on control transfer
allocations. 209
The American case for delegated institutional
monitoring, in contrast, looks toward the lesser goal of ongoing
participation in control through institutional coordination. The model
accordingly raises a question as to whether the pursuit of a half a loaf
is worth the cost. At the same time, however, it dovetails with a
central point in the American case: monitoring requires much more
concentration in institutional holdings than we presently see in the
United States.
The MBCS model has the converse message for European
blockholding practices. For Europe, the problem is not undersized
but oversized blocks, for the blocks in place there are larger and more
numerous than the MB model predicts. 2 10 The model also shows that
the European blocks carry a liquidity cost that diminishes the depth of
national securities markets. A clear implication arises for European
law reform: trading market depth approaching that of Britain and the
United States depends not merely on transparency but on the
unwinding of some of the blocks. This presumably could occur
Bolton and von Thadden speculate that dispersion still will dominate due to liquidity benefits.
See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, at 1 8 .
207.

See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, at 1 3 .

208. This result would be especially easy to effect where the firm goes public with a
block in place.
209.

See supra text accompanying notes 1 9 1 -92.

2 1 0 . The implication is that private benefits figure prominently in blockholder-firm
relationships. See infra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
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- without a negative governance impact s o long a s each firm emerged
with a MBC S .
Block Formation
The MBCS model allows for the coalescence of blocks for the
. "·> pUrpose of effecting . governance improvement at. badly ma� aged,
\IW� publicly-held compames. But such block formatiOn comes m the
�� mode of the traditional tender offer rather than in the mode of
�,�,. delegated institutional monitoring. Block formation through tender
offer depends in tum on the degree of uncertainty about the block ' s
appearance. If a block's appearance is certain, no holder will sell into
a tender offer for less than the firm ' s intrinsic value with a block in
place. This kills the offer. Since monitoring is costly, the tender
ii!!,1�·,,�. offeror must get the shares at a discount from intrinsic value so as to
be compensated for the cost of the monitoring. This means that block
If
formation can never be a sure thing: the tender offer proceeds only if
a sufficient number of impatient liquidity sellers are willing to sell at
the requisite discount. 2 1 1 Liquidity, which is enhanced by impatient
selling, thus promotes block formation for a public company212 even
as the block's formation reduces liquidity. Contrariwise, if it were
absolutely certain that no block ever would appear, all shares would
be discounted to reflect that possibility. This in tum would create a
perfect arbitrage opportunity for a potential tender offeror seeking to
The model thus posits an equilibrium
put together a block.

J::
�'(
.•
.

.

·

··

'

2 1 1.

See Bolton & von Thadden, Stmcture, supra note 1 84 , at 1 8 8 .

See also Maug, supra note 202, at 66 (noting that in this sense there is no trade-off
between liquidity and control).
2 1 2.

Liquidity also can make block monitoring difficult to sustain. Whenever a closely held firm
goes public while retaining a blockholder, the free rider problem arises. The holder, who
reaps no private benefits, must spend to monitor but must share the proceeds with the
shareholders as a whole. At the same time, the presence of the block depresses liquidity in
the outside trading market. Not only are there fewer shares trading than otherwise would be
the case, but, given anonymous trading, an information asymmetry arises between the
blockholder and the outside shareholders-the blockholder could be secretly unwinding its
position due to negative inside information and the outside shareholders might not realize it.
See Bolton & von Thadden, Structure, supra note 1 84 , at 1 78 . The possibility that the block
will be unwound independently depresses the value of the finn because it implies a reduced
level of monitoring. That threat always is present to the extent the blockholder' s wealth is
constrained : l imited wealth makes the holder vulnerable to liquidity shocks and the block
unstable. Lower wealth levels thus favor concentration. See id. at 208.
Just as liquidity makes blocks unstable, so it faci l itates takeovers. A deep market driven by
impatient l iquidity traders who do not hold out for the full, long term value of their shares is
a market with minimal free-riding on monitoring gains yielded by a blockholder. Thus block
formation by tender offer is favored. See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, at

3-4.
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characterized b y unc ertainty about prospects for block formation by
tender offer. 2 1 3
The tender offeror only bids for shares on offer from impatient
sellers b ecause only these present an opportunity for an arbitrage
profit. If all holders are impatient, the offeror will tender for as many
of their shares as its level of wealth can sustain. The size of the
emergent block thus very well can exceed that of the MB . Patient
holders, in contrast, will demand a premium in exchange for giving
up their free ride. As a result, if the process rules governing tender
offers require the highest price offered to be shared with the entire
group of offerees, then the bid fails whenever the offeror has to buy
shares from patient shareholders in order to accumulate the minimum
number of shares necessary in order to take control. 2 1 4
There arises a negative implication for transparency
regulations, such as section 1 3(d) of the Williams Act, 2 1 5 that tip off
the holders as a group to the presence of a party interested in
gathering a control block.216 Interestingly, however, this negative
implication does not extend to all regulations appearing on the target
list put forward by U . S . proponents of delegated monitoring.217
Regulations constraining the size of institutional holdings and the
nature of institutional shareholdership, appear in a positive light in
this context because they by definition promote liquidity.2 1 8 The
model thus echoes the Chicago School policy position: emphasis on
law reform to promote larger proportionate institutional holdings may
be misplaced, and primary emphasis should be placed on reversing
state level constraints on tender offers. The underlying reasons are
quite different, however. Here the point is not that the market system
is intrinsically superior to the blockholding alternative. Nor is the
point that market regulation is intrinsically costly.2 1 9 Rather, the point
is that the market system' s underlying incentive structure favors
control transfer by takeover.

2 1 3 . Note also that uncertainty about block formation is the only equilibrium result
absent legal restrictions. Bolton & von Thadden, Structure, supra note 1 84, at 1 94 .
2 1 4.

See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, at 1 4- 1 7.

2 1 5.

1 5 U.S.C. § 7 8 m(d) ( 1 994).

2 1 6.

See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, at 1 7 .

2 1 7.

See supra note 1 46.

2 1 8.

See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, at 3-4.

2 1 9 . Bolton and von Thadden ' s model implies a need for regulation a t a crucial point.
See infra text accompanying notes 2 24-2 5 .
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The Unwind Problem
The same factors that make block formation problematic make
the MB CS unstable once in place. Assume that a privately-held firm
goes pub lic but simultaneously places a MB with a third party holder
who rec eives no private benefits. We have an optimal trade-off
between concentration and monitoring. But will the MB stay in
place? If it is absolutely certain that the MB will remain in place,
- then the market price of the stock will be at a high level, reflecting the
value of the MB holder' s monitoring. But on this state of facts the
MB holder has an overpowering incentive to sell its shares p iecemeal
·
into the market-it is not, after all, being compensated for its
monitoring expenses under the model' s assumptions. If the MB
' holder can sell into the market anonymously, the other shareholders
never will be in a position to know whether or not the MB holder is
imwinding its position. Given anonymity, then, the MB holder can
exit at the higher price, recover its expenditures for monitoring, and
leave the firm unmonitored and thus selling at a lower value. There
results uncertainty respecting the stability of the block, a factor which
will tend to depress the stock price. 220 Ironically, the more stable
market actors believe the block to be, the more the MB holder has an
incentive to unwind it. Intrinsic instability thus is a problem for
blockholder systems, given anonymity respecting trading and changes
in block positions.22 1
A very different result follows where the MB holder' s
Given
ownership position and trades are made transparent.
transparency, other shareholders will read the MB holder sales to
.

'•

220. This problem can be viewed in different ways. Kahn and Winton, accepting that
trading profits yielded by the inside position are an intrinsic part of a blockholder's
incentives, work them in as a factor i n a model directed to predicting types of firms in which
a blockholder emerges in the first place. Trading profits, they find, are likely to loom larger
where the firm is small, young, and not very well known. With mature, thickly-traded firms,
other motives will predominate when a shareholder becomes active. See Kahn & Winton,
supra note 202, at 1 0 1 .
22 L See Bolton & von Thadden, Stmcture, supra note 1 84, at 194-99. The unwind
problem is discussed extensively in the literature. Others, somewhat implausibly, suggest
that the firm lock in the blockholder with supermaj ority provisions in the charter. The idea i s
that the blockholder h a s t o acquire the supermaj ority i n order t o g e t control i n the first place.
The supermaj ority holder is more likely to intervene and suffers a larger liquidity sacrifice,
and thus has a heightened incentive to stay with the firm for the long term. See Maug, supra
note 202, at 67. See also Kahn & Winton, supra note 202, at 1 02 (suggesting that firms p lace
blocks of restricted shares); Admati et a! . , supra note 1 47, at 1 1 00-0 1 (obtaining a first-best
block equilibrium outcome assuming a Walrasian trading mechanism and blockholder
commits to only one round of trading); Huddart, supra note 1 4 7, at 1 408 (noting the
commitment problem and suggesting that all purchases and sales by the blockholder be made
on the basis of pro rata offers).
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;:
m ean th at eith er (a) the MB holder is unwinding because it h as
become impatient and wants to cash out, or (b) the . MB holder is '
b ecause it has adverse inside informatiOn about th e
unwin di ng
prosp e cts � f th� f�. Either way, the sales will de:pres � the sto ck
pri ce, makmg 1t difficult for the MB holder to unwmd m the first
pl ace . Transparency thus has a tendency to lock in the blockholder,
making the block more stable and thus more effective as a governance
tool.222
Bolton and von Thadden draw a regulatory conclusion from
all of this . Just as transparency respecting blockholder purchases,
such as that mandated by regulations like section 1 3( d) of the 1 934
Act, decreases the likelihood of block formation, so mandated
transparency respecting blockholder sales, such as that incident to
section 1 6(b) of the 1 93 4 Act/23 imports stability to a block
monitoring system by preventing the blockholder who has negative
information about the firm ' s prospects from selling out on the sly . 224
S ignificantly, the MB holder is not absolutely locked in given
transparency. If it encounters a need for liquidity it always can exit
by selling its block as a whole. That sale will be at the MB holder ' s
pro rata share o f the value of the firm a s block monitored net of
monitoring cost, compensating the holder for its governance input if
not depriving the other shareholders of their free ride. 225

·· ·

A First-Best Second-Best Hybrid Capital Structure

4.

Can the MBCS be endorsed as an all-purpose optimal capital
222. See also Pagano & Roell, supra note 1 67, at 2 1 3- 1 4 (finding that b lockbolders will
have an incentive to alter their stakes through trading absent complete transparency i n the
trading market and that transparency imports a stable ownership structure) . Cf ERNST MAUG,
INSIDER TRADING LEGI S LATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Duke University Economics
Working Paper, 1 999) (visited Oct. 27, 1 999) <http ://www . duke .edu/-Maug/research>
(arguing that in a situation where insider trading is not monitored and dominant shareholders
can monitor companies, managers will have an incentive to disclose private information early
to induce large shareholders to sell rather than intervene whereas if insider trading is
regulated, the interests of the dominant shareholder and small shareholder converge; noting
also that EC Insider Trading Directive may not be very effective because it requires
information to be precise which creates a gray zone where information cannot be easily
classified as inside information).
223.

15 U.S.C.

§ 7 8p (b ) .

224. See also Pagano & Roell, supra note 1 67 , at 208-09 ( finding that mandatory
disclosure that makes private benefit extraction easy to detect encourages public o fferings to
the extent that they lower the monitoring cost that otherwise would be incurred).
225. See id. at 1 97, 1 99, 207. The block is broken up in subsequent liquidity trading
only if every holder becomes impatient. See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99,
at 1 1 .
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? As we have seen, a MB by definition leaves the largest
ossib le numb er of shares available for trading and thus best
ombines the monitoring advantages of blockholding with the thick
trading of market systems. 226 Generalizing from this point, Bolton
and von Thadden assert that, given a number of nonblock shares
'tending to infinity," blockholding will always dominate over
Otherwise the choice between dispersion and
depends
on the full range of trade-off factors. 227
.concentration
Does this finding provide us a template for the optimal firm
supporting hybrid governance system? No, since the number of
· aD.d a
shares outside of the block always is finite we remain stuck in a world
of trade-offs. But it still plausibly can be suggested that real world
.trade-offs heavily favor the MBC S as a practical matter. If the
optimal block was sufficiently small so that a very large number of
dispersed shares were left in circulation, then a satisfactory level of
. · liquidity could be maintained even as the holders benefited from the
blockholders' monitoring. Bolton and von Thadden take pains to note
that control can be maintained with a block of 1 0 or 20% of the
shares. 22 8 With a large capitalization firm, the 80 or 90% remaining
available for trading should more than suffice to support a deep
market.
There emerges, then, a picture of first-best second-best capital
structure, characterized by a 1 0-20% block with the remainder
publicly traded. This MBCS seems better suited to conditions in
Continental Europe than in Britain or the United States. Although 1 0
to 20% blockholders certainly have been known to exercise control in
market systems, control does not inevitably attach to blocks of this
size.
The American experience has been that such a small
blockholder is difficult to unseat if already in control of the board.
But, at the same time, an outsider who newly acquires a 1 0 to 20%
block has influence but will not necessarily possess unilateral control
power.229 Thus the MBC S picture seems tailored for Europe, where
blocks larger than 1 0 or 20% and not identical with the management
interest already in place. 2 3 0 P resumably, the blocks ' size can be

�

·

·

226. This result previously has been commended i n Amar Bhide, The Hidden Costs of
Stock Market Liquidity, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 3 1 ( 1 993).
227.

See Bolton & von Thadden, Blocks, supra note 1 99, at 2 1 -22.

228.

See id. at 8-9.

229. This is the lesson of sale of control cases like Essex Un iversal C01p.
F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1 962), in which a 28.3% block implicates control.

v.

Yates, 305

230. Note that in the United States, where a corporation has a I 0 to 50% blockholder or
blockholders, there often is identity between the blockholder group and the firm's
management group-as where a group of entreprenet'!"S bui lds a successful close corporation

286

COL UMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONA L LA W

[ 3 8 :2 1 3

reduced with out materially disturbing existing control relationship s.
The Unite d States, in contrast, lacks these existing blocks.
Entrepreneurs would have to put the 1 0 to 20% blocks together
through open market purchases. No control transfer would follow so
long as management remained opposed, necessitating the further step
of a proxy fight or a tender offer for a 5 1 % block.
5.

Implications of Indivisibility

Despite the problems, the MBCS model suggests a hybrid,
block-based solution to the problem of optimal capital structure. It
thus supports the cross reference hypothesis, but on an aspirational
level. The model simultaneously offers incidental, but significant,
support for a real world description of indivisibility. It does this at
three points. First, it is fundamental to the model that, absent a
number of shares tending to infinity and given substantial demand for
liquidity, a MB may fail to emerge even though it is needed to
maximize the value of the firm. Here the insight is that in a world
where all investors are impatient, liquidity is valued above all even at
the sacrifice of gains from monitoring. We note a more than passing
resemblance to investors and markets in the United States. 2 3 1 Second,
as the model' s discussion of the incentives of the tender offeror
shows, when such a control block does emerge in world where
liquidity is highly valued, it likely will do so in the form of a
suboptimally large block. Third, absent complete transparency in the
trading market and private benefits, a MBC S will have a tendency to
be unstable.
Given these results, the model can be read to predict not an
and later takes it public, continuing to run the business and retaining significant equity stakes.
Such firms are not "blockholder" firms within the model, which contemplates separation in
the identities of the blockholder and the manager. The importance of thi s distinction is
dramatized in Pagano & Roell, supra note 1 67 . Thi s model shows that for an owner taking a
firm public, completely dispersed shareholding maximizes returns even though entailing a
suboptimally high level of monitoring. The owner avoids a capital structure entailing a
higher level of monitoring because it chokes off her private benefits. See id. at 1 90 .
Interestingly, the model also predicts that private benefit extraction will not tend t o be very
wasteful for firms that do go public-otherwise monitoring would be highly beneficial and a
close corporate structure with a large outside investor-monitor woul d make more sense .
. Similarly, strict disclosure rules encourage dispersed ownership by making monitoring from
an outside point of view more effective. See id. at 1 9 1 . See also Burkmt et a!., supra note 22
(predicting that concentrated ownership leads to high levels of monitoring and low
management initiative).
23 i . No claim to originality accompanies the observation. See generally John C. Coffee,
Jr. , Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 9 1 COLUM. L.
RE v . 1 27 7 ( 1 99 1 ).
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ideal hybrid system, but a world in which we are likely to see: (a)
given legal controls on private benefits, intervention respecting a
poorly performing widely-h� ld. firm in the f?rm of a tender offer for a
majority or greater than maJ onty stake, as m market systems; (b) the
emergence of smaller, long-term control blocks only with the
provision of returns through private benefits, as in blockholder
. systems, and (c) hostile takeovers for maj ority and supermaj ority
stakes rather than optimal blockholding. The divergent results
strikingly resemble the divergent characteristics of existing market
and blockholder systems. The results are doubly noteworthy because
they are yielded by a model devoted to predicting the shape of a
superior hyb rid.

·

· .

Institutional Monitoring and the Free Rider Problem
Bolton and von Thadden model a world in which
blockholding without self dealing is profitable, replicating a result
basic to the American case for delegated monitoring.232 Although
they do not in terms address the subsidiary point respecting the
formation of institutional coalitions, their model does not exclude the
possibility. Indeed, elsewhere in the literature we learn that such
shareholder cooperation presupposes two conditions: (a) stable
interactions over time within the monitoring coalition, 2 33 and (b)
232.

See supra notes 1 68-70 and accompanying text

233. Pagano and Roell suggest that such a cooperative pattern may make possible
monitoring by institutional coalition. See Pagano & Roell, supra note 1 67, at 2 1 0 citing Jean
Tirole, Collusion and the Theory of Organizations, 2 ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY:
SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS 1 5 1 , 1 5 6 (Jean-Jacques Laffont ed., 1 992). We are skepticaL
The problem facing all attempts at cooperative monitoring is how to enforce a
noncontractible contract for monitoring. Pagano and Roel l ' s solution is to suggest that even
if there is no enforceable contract, the prospect of an equilibrium outcome is made possible
by such mechanisms as reputation, which can facilitate long-run cooperative behavior.
Following Tirole, supra, they propose relying on reputation as the foundation of
enforceability of repeated interactions. The idea here is that given enough repeated
interactions, trust will emerge and a party can invest without a contract More specifically,
the repeated game works as a self-enforcing arrangement so long as there is a high
probability that each round will be followed by a succeeding round, which deters defection
and induces cooperation in the current round. The reputation model makes a number of basic
assumptions. A player will invest in his reputation and cooperate so long as that player
values the returns from cooperation over time higher than the short-term gains of
opportunistic behavior. The player's self-interest serves as a mechanism for overcoming the
collective action problem. We should note, however, that in many infinitely repeated games
there is a very large (possibly infinite) number of outcomes which are better than the non
cooperative outcome. See Bratton et aL, supra note 1 85 , at 1 77 . These persistent multiple
equilibria give rise to questions respecting the viability of the reputation effects model of
cooperation . Quite simply, the number of equilibria predicted vastly outnumber the number
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r
substantial shareho ldings, since incentives to free ride diminish as
stake s grow. 234 B ut these conditions only return us to the incentiv e
Stabl e
problem s bound up in _the liq�� dity-co�trol tra�e-off.
i
prevail
Will
only
amon
positiOns
substant
s
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and
t
g
interac ion
inve stors who do not value liquidity highly. The shareholder fre e
rider problem also comes to bear-the MBC S model never quite .,
manages to make it go away. This could retard coalition formation
among institutional investors even if coordination otherwise ·. was
desirable and investors had come to value liquidity less highly. Note
also that, given the free rider problem, it is prospects for trading
profits (as realized by a tender offeror in the MBC S model) that
provide the incentive that brings a block into existence. But, since
trading profits mean selling as well as buying, they tum out to provide
an unstable incentive base for long-term monitoring, at least absent a
regulatory device that prevents blockholder sales.
A model from Charles Kahn and Andrew Winton expands on
this point. Kahn and Winton's set-up takes us a step closer to
American practice. Here control transfer is not the only meaningful
form of intervention: influence stemming from significant stakes can
lead to productive changes in certain circumstances.
More
particularly, institutional ownership stakes below a critical level
means that information about the firm developed by an institutional
investor is most profitably used only for the purpose of speculative
trading. Above the critical level, intervention in the firm ' s affairs is
the more attractive alternative, but only if special conditions exist. 235
A large capitalization conglomerate in need of unbundling presents
the archetypical attractive situation: it is informationally accessible,
its stock has been bid down, the intervening institution knows what to
do, and the intervention is quickly completed. In contrast, a firm
where problems and solutions presuppose special knowledge, like a
high technology firm, presents an unattractive case for intervention.
Here the situation is opaque, intervention is more expensive, and tum

we would expect to observe in the real world. This creates the problem of predicting an
outcome.
This approach is not without problems even on a practical level. If there is to be cooperative
monitoring by a subset of shareholders, the level of cooperation sustained over time surely
depends on the incentives of the parties. Institutional investors present a succession of
different parties none of whom appears to be committed to maintaining a reputational interest
in monitoring. Thus it appears that cooperation can be sustained only if it is possible to bind
parties to the process by first persuading them that they have common interests. Thi s i s an
heroic assumption no matter how large the stock of companies that wish to invest in
monitoring.
234.

See Pagano & Roell, supra note 1 67 , at 2 1 0.

235.

See Kahn & Winton, supra note 202, at I 00.....0 I .
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takes longer. Even an institution with a large stake resolves
in favor of selling in the event of bad news.236 Given wealth
.. limitations on institutions and the need to diversify, say Kahn and
Winton, intervention will follow only in quick-fix situations where
the critical level of ownership stakes is low.237 Given this analysis,
. ·" the economically sustainable pattern of institutional intervention
It takes the form of
• already has appeared in American practice.
;·discrete (as opposed to relational) intervention against mature, large
· capitalization firms that are manifestly ill-managed-actions like the
"Just Vote No" campaign, the shareholder proposal against the poison
•· pill, and the one-time, behind-the-scenes meeting between company
executives and select institutional representatives. Incentives for
2
more sustained delegated monitoring appear to be lacking. 38
rt·,,.
The MBC S model, as thus supplemented, challenges the cross
'.
hypothesis as applied to the United States : economic
rence
refe
fundamentals rather than historical path dependencies may be the
factor primarily responsible for the dearth of institutional monitoring.
There follows an endorsement of the Chicago School ' s policy
recommendation, albeit from a different base of assertions. Recall
'· that Chicago simultaneously holds to market system superiority and
strong convergence by asserting, (a) that substantive convergence
already has occurred because the same set of microeconomic factors
can be drawn on to explain all national systems, and (b) that persistent
differences among the systems completely can be explained as the
results of legal intervention. 239 Here, in contrast, we get an economic
analysis compatible with the equal competitive fitness hypothesis.
The analysis indicates that not only has substantive convergence not
yet occurred, but that interdependent financial incentives may stand in
its way. Persistent differences among national systems can be as
plausibly accounted for as either the results of free choice in a world
of trade-offs or the perverse effects of interest group legislation.
·

236. See id. at 1 1 9-2 1 . The model has a strong regulatory implication. To the extent that
quick institutional intervention can assist in company tum around, short-swing profit
disgorgement under section 1 6(b) of the 1 93 4 Act has an unproductive side effect. 1 5 U . S.C.
§ 78p(b).
237.

See id. at 1 20.

238. For a description of the pattern seen in practice, see Bratton & McCahery, supra
note 1 49, at 1 906- 1 8 .
239.

See supra text accompanying notes 94-99.
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The Monitoring and Initiative Trade-Off

D.

American analyses o f blockholder systems have proceeded on
the assumption, widespread in corporate law, that increases in a
principal' s effort to measure or verify an agent ' s performance
necessarily induce better performance. The incomplete contracts
literature reconsiders this proposition,240 entering a caveat respecting
monitoring.
The caveat has powerful implications for both
comparative governance and other exercises in incomplete contracts
economics, including the MBC S . Even if it were safe to assume that
control passes to a 1 0 to 20% blockholder, the MBC S model' s signal
of optimality cannot be taken as conclusive because it reflects only
two factors, concentration and liquidity. Firm value may be sensitive
to a wider range of governance variables.
The variable now in question is a trade-off incident to
monitoring itself. The concession of decisional authority to an agent
means a potentially costly loss of control over proj ects, but it also
entails a benefit. The agent' s incentive to acquire and develop
information-increases along with the scope of the delegation of
authority. It follows that reductions in monitoring activity can
encourage initiative in the agent, increasing the principal ' s expected
return.24 l The costs of monitoring however, can include a diminution
in the value of firm-specific investments made by the firm ' s agents. 242
Just as stepped-up monitoring is a benefit of increased concentration
in shareholdings, so is reduction in management initiative a cost of
concentration. 243
The trade-off implies a commitment problem. If management
initiative is crucial for the firm ' s success, maximal shareholder value
requires an ex ante commitment to leave control in the manager.
Given concentrated shareholdings, that commitment may be difficult
to make credibly. Matters such as investment and monitoring policy
are noncontractible: the equity holder cannot credibly commit ex ante
to refrain from using its control rights in situations where it deems the
exercise to be optimal ex post.244 The best available solution may be a
240. See Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real A uthority in Organizations,
1 05 J. POL. ECON. 1 , 1 0 ( 1 997).
24 1 . See id. at 1 1 . The incentives of the agent, thus empowered, to communicate
information back to the principal depend in tum on the alignment of incentives between the
principal and the agent. See id. at 1 7- 1 8 .
242.

See Burkart et al., supra note 1 95 , at 694.

243.

See id. at 70 I.

244. See id. at 700-0 I. At least, this statement is true according to the literature. A
Corporations teacher at this point might make reference to the device of a shareholders'
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reducti on in concentration of shareholdings. The equity holder 's
incentive to monitor decreases as the level of holdings bec omes
dispers ed. Cost and incentive barriers decrease the likelihood that
disp erse d shareholdings will coalesce into blocks ex post.
Manag ement' s initiative to invest productively is enhanced as a
result. 24 5
The point for comparative governance is not that monitoring
.
ys
� alwa is a bad thing and dispersed shareholding always superior to
blockholding. This literature takes pains to stress that the optimal
trade-off between initiative and concentration (and thus monitoring)
may vary from firm to firm. For example, the trade-off point may
vary depending on the availability of reliable means to measure agent
performance. With a long-established, mature business, reliable
measures of management performance may be found in conventional,
short-term quantifications such as the stock price, the earnings results,
the dividend payout pattern, or the performance pattern of the
industry as a whole. Accordingly, strict incentive contracts may work
well in tandem with limited monitoring and dispersed ownership.
With a high-tech business engaged in a novel line of business,
monetary incentives will be harder to design. Tighter control and
concentrated ownership may be needed as a result.246
A warning for comparative governance emerges from this
analysis: there may be such a thing as suboptimal overmonitoring.
The warning gives rise to a question: does the intense blockholder
engagement with management hypothesized in the comparative
literature carry this risk of overmonitoring? The results of the
informal governance comparison confirm the question ' s salience.
American academics went abroad searching for vigorous institutional
agreement combined with an irrevocable proxy: assuming a small number of shareholders,
complete delegation can be effected if either (a) the manager is given irrevocable control of
the board, or (b) the board is abolished and a shareholders' agreement gives the manager the
right to the Presidency and an irrevocable proxy to determine the results of shareholders'
meetings. These arrangements do not solve the problem, however, because of the absolute
nature of the delegation they entail. The more desirable middle ground of a continuing,
conditional, and controlled delegation proves problematic because of the contractibility
problem.
245.

See id. at 694, 7 0 1 .

246. See Aghion & Tirole, supra note 240; Burkart et a!., supra note 1 95 , at 7 1 8- 1 9. We
note an apparent tension between thi s line of inquiry and that of the Kahn-Winton model,
discussed in the text accompanying supra note 2 3 7 . Kahn and Winton intervene in the large
capitalization firm and avoid intervention in the high-tech firm. Here we monitor the high
tech finn and rely on published data on the large capitalization firm. In fact, it is the same
story. Kahn and Winton' s intervention is a low cost event, initiated by institutional holders
who presumably are relying on published data and would never invest in the monitoring
contemplated by Aghion and Tirole, whose monitor is a blockholder.
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m onitors-banks that scrutinize investment policy with a clear eye for
shareh o lder value. 2 47 But, as noted above, comparative inquirie s
rep ort that the benefits of European and Jap anese institutio nal
investor monitoring lie in downside intervention. 248 These rep orts
correspond directly with the basic assertion of the incomplete
contracts models : investor-manager arrangements are more likely to
look to the transfer of control to remedy manager failure than to
ongoing active participation in management control as a prophylactic
that prevents management failure from occurring in the first place.
In sum, we see an additional reason why control transfer
trumps control sharing as a governance strategy for the equity
interest-control sharing carries a risk of chilling management
incentive.24 9 We also must modify the vision of optimality bound up
24 7.

See supra text accompanying note 1 5 1 .

248. See supra text accompanying notes 1 52-62. The blockholders' inside access and
reduced information asymmetries certainly create possibilities for constructive engagement
on an ongoing basis. But comparative research has not yet yielded concrete evidence of such
relationships.
249. The Aghion-Tirole model has prompted a series of inquiries into the problem of
overmonitoring. The fact pattern posited depicts an owner considering taking her firm
public, facing a choice between holding a control block and an otherwise dispersed
shareholder group, and holding a control block and admitting another large holder and an
The former situation carries a risk of
otherwise dispersed shareholder group.
undermonitoring, where the latter carries a risk of overmonitoring. Pagano and Roell explore
the possibility of a cooperative solution to the latter problem: the controll in g shareholder and
the blockholder make a collusive contract in which they agree to an optimal level of
monitoring activity. In the model, increasing returns to capital fol low i f the monitoring
shareholders act together to set the level of monitoring activity. On the other hand, small
shareholdings will be discouraged given the existence of the collusive contract between
controlling and large shareho lder. This means that small stakeholders are l ikely to meet
heavy discounting of their share stakes in subsequent trading. See Pagano & Roell, supra
note 1 67 at 209- 1 3 .
We have questions about Pagano and Roell ' s approach, based o n insights developed i n a new
theoretical literature in industrial organization that tests the effects of enforceable side
contracts within the firm. See Tirole, supra note 2 3 3 ; Jean-Jacques L a ffont & David
Martimort, Collusion and Delegation, 29 RAND J. ECON. 280 ( 1 998). Jean-Jacques Laffont &
David Martimort, The Firm as a Multicontract Organization, 6 J. ECON. & MGMT. STG. 20 1 ,
223-24 ( 1 997) [hereinafter Laffont & Martimort, Firm] point out that s ide contracting is
possible but may be costly. A tractable model must explain how bargaining takes place,
which party has more bargaining power, and whether the parties bargain under asymmetric
information. It is suggested that, in the context of the principal-agent models, the bargaining
problems are further complicated by mechanism design difficulties. More specifically, it is
pointed out that there may be several problems with the implementation of the contract
offered by the principal (here the controlling shareholder). They stress that, in this regard,
the modeler may have to make a choice between the assumption of a strongly collusion-proof
allocation (which is robust to all equilibria in hidden games) versus a weakly coll usion-proof
allocation (that is responsive to just one equilibrium). See id. at 224. But they acknowledge
that this distinction makes little sense when the agents bargain under symmetric information
since they will, assuming joint rationality, bargain to the set of Pareto optimal outcomes. It
follows that Pagano and Roell ' s collusive contract will emerge if the contracting parties are

·
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in the MBC S : block capital structures are optimal only to the extent
that the benefits of intense monitoring outweigh the costs of its
effects on management initiative. More generally, the
optim al capital structure may be asset specific. The question for
. comparative governance is accordingly one to be addressed separately
. and spe cifically to each different system world-wide: Is there any
aspect of your practice or regulation that unnecessarily prevents given
firms, viewed as collections of assets and incentive problems, from
The answers could involve either
maximizing their value?
Cross
·: dere gulation or regulation depending on the circumstances.
referen ce and hybridization would or would not result depending on
the answers.
·.

The Role ofPrivate Benefits
The informal comparison, as we have seen, tells us that
. blockholders look to yields from insider trading and self dealing
trans actions 250 to recoup their investment in monitoring and sacrifice
' of liquidity. In contrast, leading models of the concentration-liquidity
trade-off and the monitoring-initiative trade-off tend to assume a
world with constraints on private benefits.25 1 The assumption, while
heroic, teaches an important lesson about the connection between
private benefits and governance structures. The more closely we look
at the dynamics of the MBC S model, the harder it is to imagine a
MBCS in a world without private benefits. In the MBC S world, as
posed by B olton and von Thadden, blocks appear only occasionally.
narrowly rational and symmetrically informed. As a practical matter, however, parties are
more likely to be imperfectly informed agents who, due to less than ideal conditions, bargain
to less than efficient outcomes.
The problem of asymmetric information is yet another serious barrier to the emergence of an
equilibrium side contract Laffont and Martimort point out that the scope for a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in the game of coalition formation "depends on what happens in the
status quo outcome when one agent refuses the coalitional agreement." Laffont & Martimort,
Firm, at 224. In conventional Bayesian theory, it is the substitution of different beliefs from
prior beliefs that ensures the emergence of an equilibrium side contract. As with the standard
Bayesian dynamic games, problems of multiplicity arise also in the game of coalition
formation. One potential solution is to assume an uninformed and benevolent third party that
suggests side contracts to the parties which jointly maximize their collusive activity.
Obviously this model is more appropriate to regulated industries where delegation to third
parties dominates. From the perspective of corporate law, it is unlikely that this second-best
solution can be achieved.
250.

See supra note 42 and accompanying text

25 1 . See B olton & von Thadden, Stntcture, supra note 1 84 and accompanying text See
also Burkart et aL, supra note 1 95, at 697 (monitoring vs. managerial-initiative model) .
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Even then they are unstable so long as equity holders value liquidity
highly and gains from monitoring are the only reason for block
formation. Incentives for block formation diminish further once we
interpolate the insight of the monitoring-initiative models: if block
formation carries a cognizable risk of unproductive overmonitoring, a
clear cut formation incentive emerges only in the case of contro l
transfer due to poor management performance. We accordingly must
make reference to private benefits if we are to account for the b locks
that exist in practice (and dominate capital structures outside of
English-speaking countries) .
Thus, these incomplete contracts
models effectively refute the case for block monitoring based on a
pure financial incentive.
This point is made affirmatively in a new model from Lucian
Bebchuk.252 Bebchuk interpolates private benefits so as to cause a
volte face. Now it is dispersed ownership structures rather than blocks
that are intrinsically unstable. The reason is straightforward. Absent
effective anti-takeover devices and to the extent that private benefits
are freely available to actors in control , a dispersed group of shares
presents an intrinsically attractive opportunity for a takeover
entrepreneur because the private benefit yield assures a payoff. Given
this, there is no incentive for an insider to sell out by taking the firm
public in the first place. Such a move sacrifices the value of the
private benefits, detaching it from the insiders' control stake, only to
leave it open for capture later by a tender offeror.253
An important lesson results for Europe. Clearly, private
benefits must figure into the explanation of its existing blockholding
pattern. Market liquidity comparable to that in Britain and the United
States will come only with fewer and smaller blocks. One means to
the end of reducing the blocks is a legal regime that effectively deters
blockholder insider trading and self dealing and brings transparency
to internal corporate affairs. The question is whether a partial
regulatory package will suffice. More particularly, if self dealing is a
mainstay of blockholder returns, then an effective insider trading ban
2 52.

See

LUCIAN

AYRE BEBCHUK,

A

RENT-PROTECTION

THEORY

OF

CORPORATE

(Harvard Law School, Center for Law, Economics, and Business
Discussion Paper No. 260, 1 999).

OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL

253.

For a recent model that also considers the role of private benefits, see MIKE
IN TRANSFERS OF CORPORATE CONTROL (London School of
Economics, Financial Markets Group D iscussion Paper No. 1 868, 1 998) . The assertion here
is that tender offers are a preferable means of effecting control transfer to b lock transfers.
Under this model, a controlling blockholder with a large stake internalizes more deadweight
costs of extracting private benefits and thus gain less. To the extent that private benefits
extraction decreases in the size of the block, tender offers are superior because they increase
concentration and hence firm value.
BURKART ET A L . , BLOCK PREMIA
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will not suffice to bring high liquidity and present European reform
. initiatives could fail in their purpose. This appears to be a serious
. prospect: if sub �tantial _rriva�e . benefits r�J?ain available, why should
· a bl ockholder give up Its pnvileged position? But a tougher reform
package that constrains self dealing transactions gives rise to the
converse question: assuming (a) that a new regime discourages
'b lockholding by regulating both self dealing and insider trading, and
(b) that blockholder monitoring does import benefits and a MBCS
;{ should be the objective, how can it be assured that a single, optimally
sized block will remain in place in each firm? Unless some private
benefits are reserved for this remaining blockholder, it remains in the
. same posture as the selling blockholders. In other words, the free
rider problem shows up at exactly the same point where it presently
' · determines results in market systems.
-·

·

.,
·

....

F.

Summary-Private Benefits and Indivisibility

Let us suppose, with the American governance literature, that
Bolton and von Thadden' s model of the concentration-liquidity trade
off more closely approximates the problem for solution in the real
world than do models of the concentration and initiative trade-off.
Given this assumption, the problem for solution concerns the interface
between the MBCS and private benefits provision. That is, we take
the MBCS and relax the assumption about self dealing transactions.
A number of problems identified by Bolton and von Thadden become
solvable as a result. Given the right amount of private benefits, free
riders and gain specification need not present a problem and a clear
cut incentive to form a block and monitor readily can be
hypothesized. The block, once formed, remains stable.
By hypothesis, then, an optimal trade-off between
blockholding and ownership dispersal implies a subsidiary need to set
an optimal level of self dealing and insider trading. That optimum
could be variously defined as, (a) an amount costing the minority
shareholders just less than their pro rata share of the gain to the firm
as a whole from blockholder monitoring, (b) an amount just sufficient
to cover the costs of blockholder monitoring but no greater, or (c) an
amount falling between these two extremes resulting from
negotiations between the inside and the outside interests. 254
254. Cf Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 1 09
Q. J. ECON. 9 5 7 ( 1 994) (discussing the costs and benefits of equal opportunity and free
transfer rules respecting transfers of corporate control); Marcel Kahan, Sales of Corporate
Control, 9 J . L . EcoN. & ORG. 368 ( 1 993) (same).
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A question then arises as to why we do not see real world
governance systems directed to the achievement of this result. The
answer must be that the subj ect matter is noncontractible. Neither the
per period cost of monitoring nor the per period gain to the firm from.
monitoring is suited to advance specification. Nor, given
information asymmetry that prevails between blockholders and
outside shareholders, do we have conditions favorable to ex post
observation and verification. 2 5 5 It follows that a choice thus must be
made between prohibiting or granting private benefits at a systemic
level.256 That choice can be seen in economic terms as turning on the
relative value placed on monitoring and liquidity. It also legitimately
can be described in political and historical terms. Either way, it
appears to be fundamental and unavoidable.

V.

CONCLUSION-IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

We return to the corporate law system of the United States to
offer a new view as to the message held out by corporate governance
comparison.
Certainly, there emerges no template for public 
regarding delegated monitoring, as observers once hoped to find. We
reserve judgment on the assertion of market system superiority, but
with a comment. We wonder whether triumphal cries of market
superiority heard from American observers reacting to the distress
across the Pacific could prove closely tied to transient stock market
averages and turns of business cycles. We instead perceive a warning
from comparative governance.
The comparative exercise teaches again the old lesson that
markets are only as deep as their legal foundations. Market systems
have been built on foundations that compel transparency, prohibit
2 5 5 . Once we confront the difficulty of setting the right amount, it would seem that we
can re-characterize the monitoring incentive problem as a species of the economics of
management compensation. But the re-characterization holds out no quick solutions to the
basic agency problems under discussion. Oliver Hart has argued that the management and
shareholder incentives can in theory be perfectly aligned in a world without private benefits
by giving management a set cut of the dividend payout stream. The problem, says Hart, is
that amount that would have to be paid over is too large as a practical matter. See supra note
1 89, for the formal presentation of this point. The same would appear to be the case for a
blockholder in control . Moreover, given anything but completely effective regime o f private
benefits prohibition (which in turn presupposes complete transparency) the control-monitor
on an optimal salary easily can double dip. See also Burkart et al., supra note 1 9 5 , at 705-06
(arguing for an analytical distinction between employment contracts, which encourage
productive behavior with monetary incentives, and monitoring, which discourages bad
behavior).
256.

In the alternative, contractually by individual firms within a given system.
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trading, and police self dealing. Yet legal mandates that
these foundations have been questioned in the United States
rec ent years, with the questions following from the idea that
tion means freer markets.25 7 The comparison can be seen as a
to this line of reasoning. From this point of view, markets
legal investor protections go together in the real world. Where
are absent, one-sided deals flourish and outside equity
nrcnet;u·u
either becomes more expensive or dries up altogether. Of
course, the comparison also shows us that self dealing can have
incidental productive benefits when l eavened with relational
engagement. It can even be built into a system that is equally
competitively fit. But the system that results is materially different
from ours.
Furthermore, a nominally mandatory, market-protective legal
system such as ours can be captured by the special interests that
� operate within. It can be manipulated for their benefit without
simultaneous provision of processes adequate to facilitate corrective
. self-help by the injured interests. This is precisely what has happened
· in American corporate law during the past two decades. Management
capture of the state-based system has led to anti-takeover regulations
and enervated fiduciary rules, without provision of processes
adequate to facilitate contractual adjustment by shareholders. P olitics
· do matter, and, as Chicago School likes to remind us, it is not safe to
assume that invulnerability follows automatically from the
evolutionary survival of our system.
So whenever someone suggests that we unwind one of our
system' s legal supports, we need to ask whether we want to do so at
the risk of pushing the system in the direction of a market
blockholder tipping point. Across that line, private benefit provision
is so liberal as to make blockholding the only rational systemic
alternative. The question, by virtue of its very existence, materially
increases the burden on the deregulatory proponent.
·

·

257. See, e.g.,
disclosure system).

ROMANO, supra

note 1 29, at 8 5- 1 0 1 (arguing against the mandatory

